





ZARATHUSHTRA AND THE GREEKS


SIGILLVM ACADEMIAE HARVARDIANAE IN NOV ANG
CHRISTO ET ECCLESIAE
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Zarathushtra and the Greeks

A discussion

of the Relation existing between the Ameshaspentas and the Lógos

being

Part I

of

Zarathushtra (Zoroaster), Philo and Israel

by

the Rev. **Lawrence Heyworth Mills,** D. D.
Professor of Zend Philology in the University of Oxford.

To be had of **F. A. Brockhaus in Leipzig.**
1903—1904.

ZOROASTER, PHILO AND ISRAEL

being

A TREATISE UPON THE ANTIQUITY OF THE AVESTA

by

Dr. Lawrence H. Mills
Professor of Zend Philology
in the University of Oxford.

Translator of the XXXIst Volume of the Sacred Books of the East, Author of the Five Zarathushtrian Gâthas, etc.

Part I: **Zoroaster and the Greeks,**

Composed at the request of the Trustees of the Sir J. Jejeebhoy Translation Fund of Bombay.

To be had of **F. A. Brockhaus** in **Leipzig**
1903 — 1904.

Preface to the first issue.

Thankfully reporting my general circumstances to be favourable, I would yet say that the passing-on of time renders it prudent that I should not delay any longer than may be necessary in issuing the first portion of this Work.

In special studies like the present completed sections necessarily become detachable units; and critical writers more often than not have published treatises upon parts of the main lore which engages their professional attention at certain intervals.

This discussion was asked of me long since by representative persons, which is another reason why I present a portion of it now, notwithstanding the fact that all, or almost all the remaining parts of it lie ready type-written to the printer's hand [1].

By waiting till the whole book is manufactured I might lose forever the opportunity of saying what it has cost me so much labour and time to prepare.

I therefore proceed to lay before my auditors in Oxford and before my readers elsewhere what I have been able to ascertain with regard to the relation once supposed to exist between the well-

[1] One can of course never be certain as to what one may not add to such a broad presentation of a subject.

known chief Concepts of the Zend Avesta and certain more or less closely analogous developments among the suggestions of the Greek philosophical writers, including permissably among them the Jewish Alexandrians with their most prominent scholar, Philo.

I have in my opening chapter entered to a certain extent upon prefatory and introductory matter, which renders what I have to say here all the more succinct.

The work is an attempt to fulfil an engagement accepted by me now some few years ago with the Trustees of the Sir J. Jejeebhoy Translation Fund of Bombay. Those Gentlemen (then upon that Board) requested me to write a book upon the 'Antiquity of the Avesta', the occasion for their invitation having been (apparently) a sudden change of opinion on the part of one who was intimately associated with the works of Parsi scholars and also nearly allied to myself (not however that this item was directly mentioned).

I answered my esteemed correspondents that I could furnish them with an essay within a very short time; but that a thorough investigation of the question might be delayed for some few years [1].

[1] ,owing to the fact that I was in the course of preparing several other works, the shortest of which required prolonged attention. (See the Texts of the Pahlavi Yasna as for the first time edited with collation of Mss. and also for the first time critically translated and commented upon in the JRAS July 1900, April and July 1903, Z.D.M.G. April and Oct. 1902, April and Oct. 1903, JAOS July 1901, and Oct. 1903, etc., etc.; see also the Dictionary of the Gāthic Language of the Zend Avesta 1902, preceded by the Second Edition of Verbatims and Metricals in 1900. etc.).

And in fact I have indirectly fulfilled both these proposals, for I began not so long after their communication to print articles distinctly bearing upon the matter in the Asiatic Quarterly Review and later in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society and in that of the American Oriental Society and in the American Journal of Philology as well as in the Critical Review, and several of the Chapters contained in this book are really approximate reproductions from those insertions [1].

I was especially under obligations for the commission for an interior reason. It was this, - to meet the request made it obligatory upon me to do without further delay what I had always otherwise intended to do, which was to take up once more the thread of my original researches begun in '72. As I have elsewhere noted [2], I entered upon Zend Philology in the summer of 1876 in order to follow out a study of the history of Hegel's method of procedure by sublated negation, regarding this latter as having had its true origin through Fichte and Jacob Boehme in the writings of the Gnostics, whose ideas in their turn were, as I then thought and as I think still, to a large extent founded upon the suggestions of the Avesta or of its kindred lore.

I trust that my results will be viewed with the

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[1] The introductory chapter was partly printed in advance in the Asiatic Quarterly Review (Jan. 1903), so the treatment of Tansar's letter (1902), so the section upon 'parallel development' (1901). So 'Zarathushtra and Heraclitus' and 'Philo's dynámeis', appeared in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (see Oct. 1902, July 1901), etc.

[2] See The Five Zarathushtrian Gāthas, Introduction, at the close.

more indulgence when it is remembered that this is the first serious effort as yet ever made by any writer to present anything like an interior investigation of the question.

The influence of Philo upon the Avesta had been asserted by a great scholar and repeated, I dare say, by his gifted satellites; but he did not proceed to enter upon any very close discussion of the texts on either side, or of the subject matter considered in its entirety; that is to say, not so far as I am aware.

I cannot believe that he would have persisted in his sudden change of opinion had his lamented life been prolonged. As to this however no one can make an assertion. It is sufficient for me to say that I have spared no pains to make the treatment thorough; and I trust, that this will be obvious upon the face of it [1].

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[1] Naturally I mean to say this only when my full argument is taken into consideration in the sequence of my publications. As to the main matter in hand, the translation of the Gāthas, I am happy to say that so far as a literal rendering is concerned, my Latin Verbatims of '92—'94 have not yet been superseded, nor are those which I made of the Gāthas into Sanskrit; see Roth's Festgruss, 1894, and the Actes of the International Congress of Orientalists at Paris, 1897; that is to say, 'not', judging from a certain prominent rendering of Yasna 45 by another writer. For my verbatim treatment of that piece (in 1892—94) *is with some alternatives practically identical* with that referred to. See also the copious translations which appeared not long since in the works of a certain brilliant, if young, contributor to the Syntax of the Avesta in JAOS. With one notorious exception which really proves the rule, we are now (some of us very reluctantly) practically unanimous. In the exceptional case referred to the Author follows all the eccentricities of tradition with little reserve.

With few exceptions no *verbatims* are taught in any critical

There is one especial service which I hope that I have rendered to my greatly more distinguished colleagues upon kindred branches of research.

It is this. We are, all of us, particularly anxious to secure the opinions of experts upon the connection of other specialties with our own.

Here historical writers will at least receive opinions upon the relations of the Avesta from one who has made exceptional sacrifices of time, effort and patience in the study of them; and he should therefore be all the more fitted to afford auditors, whether through print or lecture, information as to what are the bearings of the matter as regards other themes as well as to give closer elaborations of the original texts. I call this first publication 'Zarathushtra and the Greeks' instead of the fuller title for an obvious reason. For the traditional aspects of the inquiry so far as it to touches upon history I refer to the admirably complete summaries of Professor A. V. W. Jackson as published in his very valuable volume, The Prophet of Iran, Zoroaster, NY. This present treatise necessarily confines itself to doctrine; and to history only as affected by interior considerations.

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school save those published in my Gāthas of '92—'94 as re-edited in the English Verbatims of 1900. Even as to interpretation which is a very different thing from Verbatim translation, there is scarcely a possible opinion of any serious importance which cannot be found at least alternatively stated in my three Editions together with the Commentary of '92—'94, and the Dictionary, Gāthas. Vol IIIa pp. 623—821, 1902. Many subordinate touches are of course appearing by way of superficial improvement; but they are for the most part really mere alternatives, the authors themselves not regarding them as the most probable suggestions; and they are doubtless very useful in stirring up thought.

Contents.



The Avesta[1].

No subject in the range of ancient oriental literature should be considered more important of its kind than that collection of venerable documents which has come down to us under the above mentioned well-known name. The immense literature of India with its divisions and subdivisions would indeed prove itself a formidable rival to any other monument of the early intellectual life of man. Its depth and later rare refinement, with its minute delineations of the more subtle forms of human passion, and the rough exuberance as well the remote age of its earlier portions make it, taken as a whole, perhaps the most astonishing phenomenon of its kind among the present possessions of our race, always excepting the aesthetics and dialectics of incomparable Greece, and the moral earnestness of the Jewish and Christian Scriptures. But truly wonderful as Indian literature may well be termed, it does not in the matter of spiritual tone surpass the sparse relics of Iranian lore in their mysterious sublimity, if indeed it be fair to institute a comparison between the two. For, let it be well remembered, each may claim all that is impressive in the other, as they are very near akin.

[1] Introductory.

And in their close relationship the northern lore, shorn of its dimensions as it is by the effects of an unfavourable climate and a bad (strategetic) position, (on the highway of migration between East and West) may still assert for itself in the primeval sisterhood, if not the senior place, at least one which, in several important particulars, is of superior interest.

Its myths are as hoary with the gray of primitive history as the Indian; its language, while it has shown signs of departure from the common mother stock in some particular items where the Indian has remained steadfast, has yet preserved others which are lost in the kindred speech; and perhaps it can claim a preponderance of earlier survivals.

And the Iranian, as of course, occupies the more original home. The Aryan Indians (as no one doubts) once lived in lands to the North East (or North West) of Iran, if not in Iran itself. And our convictions as to this are not founded upon mere undefined traces of their nationality, but we have actual relics, even in our documents, of those who held to the Indian creeds. They still lingered in the times of the later Avesta as a down-trodden portion of the community, while in the feuds of earlier centuries they are strong and vigorous, as seen in the older book [1].

There they enter fiercely into the very struggles of the partisans of the two (once twin) religions, just as the Dēvas themselves and the Asuras were said to contend, in some of the old fragments of the

[1] The Gāthas.

Indian lore [1]. D(a)ēva-worshippers are met with as an inferior caste in the Vendīdād long after the mass of the D(a)ēva-worshipping Aryans had gone south (toward India). And we have in the Gātnas a conflict so marked, and of a bitterness so pungent, that some scholars have been induced to believe that it affords us a glimpse of an original feud, having been actually the scene of the first split between the main body of the Iranians and the future Indians. Some critics have also in fact asserted their belief that this religious difference really induced the memorable march toward the land of the Five Rivers with its momentous consequences [2]. And, as I need hardly add, in these more northern places where future Indians and Iranians once lived, (and loved and quarrelled) we have way-marks of that remote and still prior migration from the unknown land from which the earliest Aryans came.

In these time-honoured paths there lingered a scant nation of virtuous husbandmen who preferred to worship God under simpler names than Váruṇa or Indra, if indeed their epoch was not so remote that these venerable names were as yet unheard by them [3]. And as these 'tiller-men [4]' were of the same blood with the future Indians, so they spoke the same rich language, as described above, with a difference not greater than, if indeed so great as, that which

[1] See Haug's Essays, pages 270, 271.

[2] See my article The Veda and the Avesta in East and West, Feb. and March, 1902; see also the XIXth Century Review for jan. '94.

[3] Which indeed seems hardly possible.

[4] Aryans.

distinguishes the dialects of Greece [1]. They knew the same gods also who were extant at their particular ages, and sang to the best of them in the same old metres. It is therefore not at all quite fair to separate these lores too widely.

Questions indeed arise, and must for ever remain unsettled as to how far the differing literatures were divided as to time; but no one with any capacity whatsoever to read the evidence can well fail to recognise the identities, as they so unmistakably reveal themselves before our eyes. Veda is Avesta in many a fundamental trait, and Avesta is Veda. Each however has its strongly marked idiosyncracies as a subdivision of the whole. The Veda possesses enormously the greater bulk, and in the richness of its very numerous sections and subsections it surpasses Avesta amid a thousand forms of beauty and exactness, while the Iranians lead the Indians and in fact all ancient folk beside them in the elevation of their moral and religious tone. Yet even as to colour and aroma, we could only acknowledge the superiority of India so long as we forget that mass of middle and later Persian art which may be regarded as a continuation of the Avesta in a certain sense, with the Pahlavi literature as the intermediate between the two. Surely the early Ṛk is not much nearer to the Hitopadeça than the later Avesta is to the first Persian bard; and if we take in the middle Persian literature, Iran does not look so scant in comparison with the thronging South. The

[1] The one from the other; see Oldenberg, The Religion of the Veda, p. 27.

fairest field for an estimate is however the earliest period; there the two lores should be regarded, for once at least, as things by themselves, apart; for so indeed they are, in the Gāthas and in the Older Veda. When the Vasishṭhas[1] chanted the Ṛk of the seventh book, or the Vāmadevas that of the fourth there was no other Veda extant of any equal power. And so when Zarathushtra first composed the hymns of which our Gāthas are the fragments, there was nothing among things germane which equalled them extant, as we must believe. The Veda[2], even of that day, is everywhere the fullest, judging from the wild luxuriance of its human thought alone. Its varied poetic forms impress us; but Avesta stands for ever alone as the oldest lore still surviving which speaks so distinctly as it does, revealing to us a spiritual life on earth with a moral heaven beyond it.

And great is our privilege in exploring it. For where, to mention but a single point, in all the thousand Ṛks, if we must compare the two, can you find such a grouping of personifications as in the Immortal Seven, the Ameshas, Ahura with his Six? In the Veda they exist indeed, but in sporadic occurrences, not grouped but torn apart, if we may so explain their scattered distribution, or, it may be, never gathered, and therefore lost to that signal influence which comes from the concentration of ideas. And that combination of the concepts in the Avesta, the good God with His attributes, made

[1] So, better than Vasishṭha.

[2] In a larger sense.

up one of the most powerful beliefs that has ever influenced the destiny of men.

With regard also to the differing phases of their hoped-for spiritual future, the most effective considerations which can operate upon the careers and destinies of men, where do you find such pointed expression of the soul's own judgment upon itself? Much as the later Indian literature may indeed surpass the later Iranian, that is to say, if we exclude the middle and later Persian from the literature called 'post-avesta', in the closeness of its definitive discussions, and more engaging as the primitive Indian may appear in its accumulated attractions, tinged with the charm of a richer fable, yet amid those first voices which arise from the abyss of immemorial antiquity the Avesta can claim that deeper grasp and nobler enthusiasm which lifts the soul higher out of the dust of sensuality into the clear realm where it is freed from the degrading claims of mere self-centred interests and linked closer in its better aspiration with the spirit of the Divine.

I do not know that we are called upon to take into consideration such a subordinate matter as *the range of their respective influence* (that of the Avesta and of Veda).

The swarming millions of India, even at an early period, no doubt presented an audience in their cultivated classes which was impressive indeed, and they must be said to surpass any fair estimate of the numbers of those who listened to the Ṛishis of Old Iran. So also as to the succeeding populations in the accumulating generations, the throngs of quick-witted hearers must have been greatly more

compact in India than in the North. And indeed may we not say with reason that the learned class was greatly more numerous there than in any other centres, not excluding those of European nations at any past age, and with them even those of the present (?) day. But if we may include all Iran, I am not aware that any one Empire in India ever surpassed, or even reached the dignity of Persia from the time of Cyrus. She was the Rome of Asia and for centuries, later even subduing repeatedly the forces of the Eternal City. Her literature, as represented by the Zend Avesta in its related lore and in its now lost portions, if not by the echoes of our actual books themselves, had its effect beyond any manner of doubt upon the Medo-persian Emperor of Babylon.

Deeply inspired by the entire atmosphere of those thoughts which are so obviously forced upon us from the Inscriptions, and which are as unmistakeably seen to be germane to the Avesta, he did not yield his interest so much to the engrossing theologies of Assyria, or to the current literature of India, even then (?) perhaps over-refined, blasé, too nimble of the wit, but he became distinguished by sympathy with a small group of captive tribes (by the waters of Babylon) on whose development were to depend the most extensive religious movements which have ever taken place. India itself could not boast an audience more mighty than the combined Europe which has accepted the lore of the once Jewish exiles, whose Divine Martyr uttered a Persian thought in Persian syllables[1] at the moment

[1] *Ἀμὴν λέγω σοι, σήμερον μετ' ἐμοῦ ἔσῃ ἐν τῷ παραδείσῳ.**

when he was (as has been believed by the West for many centuries) redeeming the very world. Avesta, or something radically akin to it [1], that is to say, to a distinct extent identical with it in sisterhood or origin, moved the mind that ordered the Restoration of the Holy City and the Return of the vanguard people. Surely in the matter of audience, if the ultimate hearers are held in view, Avesta might not fear a comparison with Veda; that is to say, if Avesta is as nearly kindred to the Inscriptions, as the Inscriptions are to the Scriptures.

In the mediaeval period the literature of Persia, had it been known in Europe, would have taken a very high, if not the leading rank, and until late in that interesting age; and at present Persia is entitled to be called at least the most European of Eastern nations. And it is far from certain that she does not owe all the manhood which has ever characterised her from the first to her earliest source of guidance, with its solitary voice proclaiming amid the brutality of an undeveloped age the need for 'holiness as to thought, as to word, and as to deed'.

Yes, the Avesta is important, if anything at all like it could be ever called so; and it should be preserved to us not only as a mass of documents considered by some to be of interest, nor even as a quantity of unique monuments, but most of all as a Holy Book.

Schools of sound exegesis should be founded

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[1] That the early Avesta was once far more widely extended as oral lore than the portions which have survived to us goes without saying and as of course.

totally freed from that sinister corruption which combines to exalt empirics and stifle advanced discussion.

And yet, it was just as we were beginning to investigate the Avesta in the only way defensible, that is to say exhaustively, we heard a voice which seemed to utter impeding principles. A prominent expounder suddenly retracted his clear words, or rather superseded them without retraction. A man, the endeared of all, whose genius was as delicate (and beautiful) as his personal honour was untarnished, turned his back upon some of the leading facts which he had himself in his first edition presented, and perhaps even more pointedly than others; and with a change which one cannot so well explain.

Here are his statements as to the antiquity of the Avesta in the first edition of his Vendīdād made in accordance with principles then widely accepted, and on the strength of which I acceded to his urgent request that I should become his continuator in the Series of the Sacred Books of the East [1]. »That all Avesta ideas were already fully developed »in the time of, or at least at the end of the Achae»menian dynasty appears from the perfect accor»dance of the account of Mazdāism* in Theopompus »with the *data* of the Zend Books.« Introduction to S.B.E., IV, p. XLII.

»We must admit that the religious literature »then in existence, if there were any, must have

[1] »Je le désire du fond du cœur; car à defaut de vous je ne vois pas qui pourrait faire la chose et la faire bien . . dans l'espoir d'une réponse favorable.« Letter of Nov. 5th, 1883.

»differed but little, so far as its contents were con-»cerned, from the Avesta ...., therefore nothing »forbids us to believe, with the Parsis, that the »fragments of which the Avesta is composed were »already in existence before the Greek invasion.« S. B. E., IV, Introduction p. XLIII, flg.

... »It is quite possible« (he goes on to say) »that Herodotus may have heard the Magi sing in »the fifth century B. C. the very same Gāthas which »are sung now-a-days by the Mobeds in Bombay, p. LIII. »Some parts of the collection are undoubtedly older »than others ... (hardly however a necessary remark).

»The Gāthas are certainly older than the rest »of the Avesta«.

»There is no part of the Avesta which.. may not »have been written in those times (the Achaemenian »period). Nay the Greek accounts of that period »present us, in some measure, with a later stage of »thought, and are pervaded with a stronger sense »of symmetry than the Avesta itself. Such pas-»sages as the latter end of the Zamyād Yasht and »Vendīdād X, 9, seq. prove that when they were »composed the seven Arch-dēvs were not yet point-»edly contrasted with the seven Ameshaspends*, and »*therefore those* passages (some of the very latest parts, »L. H M.) of our extant Avesta *might have been* »*written long before the time of Philip*[1]. The theory »of time and space as first principles of the world, »of which only the germs are found in the Avesta, »was fully developed in the time of Eudemos, a »disciple of Aristotle«, see p. LIV.

[1] The italics are mine, for the passage is most remarkable.

My gifted friend here repeated the universal argument, which is that Herodotus and his successors report a stage of Mazda-worship which had become more fixed and liturgised than such lore as we find even in »parts of the later Avesta«[1].

Those statements I take as my 'text' in the following discussion. My lamented colleague's later views as to the main issue treated in this discussion are directed fully against himself. I will defend him therefore, as I say, against that opponent (himself).

I had kept silence, though deeply wounded at the turn events had taken. It seemed almost as if my fellow labourer had intended to belittle the subject which he had committed to me in so conspicuous a manner. But any conscious tendency in this direction was of course impossible.

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[1] The newer Avesta could not however possibly have been less than from two to five centuries later than the older Avesta, the Gāthas[1]. So[2] wrote the author of S. B. E., IV, in 1881, and it was on the strength of this that he urged me to take up his task, and that I accepted the engagement. I make no attempt at all to trace out all the ideas which may be intended to lurk in the various allusions to the subject in the great works of the eminent author. I refer the reader to those impressive publications for all the details which were intended to be obscurely implied, or not. But many points seem to me to be hinted at by the Editor rather than fully stated. I confine my discussion to those above. It is of course possible that I have misapprehended some particulars, and so misstated them. I only hope that I have indeed so mistaken him. Just in so far as any critic may suppose me to have done so, just to that degree let this argument be regarded as having no direct application to his later departure; but let it be regarded as a defence of the Avesta against any possible future attacks from others occupying such a curious point of view as that which I have succinctly sketched. [1] M. [2] as above.

II.

The Discussion.

Perhaps it will be well to begin our discussion with a curious question which gives point to the whole matter at once (I have already alluded to it). It will be remembered that among the views so suddenly brought into prominence by my more distinguished associate was one which to non-experts may have appeared very striking indeed. It was to the effect that the Vohumanah of the Zend Avesta was the Lógos of Philo; that is to say, that the entire system of Gāthic thought was closely akin to that of the Platonic-philonian philosophy, to which philosophy it was, as he avowed, indebted for its conception of Vohumanah and the accompanying five personified abstractions so well known under the popular name of Àmeshaspends (amesha spenta), a title which does not occur in the Gāthic Avesta, appearing however in the next oldest portion, the Gātha Haptanghaiti. As we see, this introduces us at once into the interior of the entire subject, for if the Gāthic system be dependent upon the Philonian, its origin must be subsequent to it.

To explain a little more fully.

The point which was made by my colleague and to which I refer with so much regret was then this:

That our present surviving texts of the Gāthas date from B. C. 100 to A D., a chief reason given being that they are full of the spirit of Philo,

especially as expressed in those concepts to which I have just referred.

My greatly distinguished predecessor seems to have been confirmed in this unfortunate conclusion by three items, one of them something considerably more than a subordinate consideration.

First, he notes the place in the Dēnkart where one Tōsar (*sic*, emended with fair probability to Tansar) is mentioned as a chief Mobed who collected the religious documents of his time.

Second, he cites the Arab historian 'Mas'ūdī', also of the IXth century to prove that a certain Bīshar (the name being again restored as 'Tansar' by correcting the small diacritical points of the Arabic) was a 'Platonician'.

And third, he reproduces Tansar's celebrated letter [2] to the princelet Jasnaf-shāh of Tabaristān, where the supposed character of this Tansar is fully depicted; for according to that document, if only half accepted, this Tansar was certainly a very remarkable man, corresponding also in a very interesting manner with the Tōsar or Tansar of the Dēnkart and with the Bīshar (Banshar etc. restored as Tansar) of Mas'ūdī. The points of the connection, as I suppose, were somewhat as follows:

This Tansar being believed to be a Platonic philosopher of the school of Socrates (is this a pardonable little blunder?), the circumstance proves that people could be Platonic, or Philonian, in Medopersia in the year A. D. 226 (about). Then, if the

[1] Or 'holy'.

[2] Which had long been known in manuscript.

Gāthic concepts, Vohumanah, or Asha, could be regarded as showing strong analogies with the Lógos of Philo (based upon the Platonic concept though modified), we have an obvious proof from probability that there was some historical connection between the two.

I hardly believe that it was meant to hint that Tansar in A. D. 212 flg. was actually the author of the Gāthas!, (this latter as a possible alternative to the view that they were composed B. C. 100 to A. D. One circa). But that a Tansar of the year A. D. 212 (?), flg. was, or may well have been, the author of some portions of a lore now lost, which might be justly called 'Avesta', or even of parts of our present later Avesta (and this was perhaps intended to be suggested), is an idea which possesses every plausibility; for if this Tansar did not write, or re-write, something which might well be called 'Avesta', somebody else exactly in his position must most assuredly have engaged in such a kind of authorship. For beyond any reasonable doubt 'Avesta' of such a kind as that which we have in the later fragments was being continually written. And indeed we have one surviving piece among our actual Avesta texts which, considered as language, is as bad in its forms as anything that a Tansar might have written, and it is perhaps greatly later than his age [1].

To continue (and as I proceed I will fill up the gaps in the statements which seem to have been intentionally left open); — I should say that we were intended to be informed that some Alexandrian,

[1] See the Yasht XXIV of Westergaard.

or some Persian scholar largely under the influence of the Alexandrian Platonism, not only inspired the idea of Vohumanah (or of Asha) in the Gāthas, but that he was actually the author of these singular pieces in their ancient Zend, with their old antevedic metres, with all their personal allusions, and in their, at times, really passionate tone. Whether this authorship was intended to be represented as a forgery, or as genuine, is not very clearly said Possibly our great critic actually meant to imply that there was really a Vīshtāspa at the time of Christ, and a struggle then transpiring between the Iranian tribes and the Daēva worshippers lingering in that far northern land with the original Zarathushtra at the head of the Iranian forces; and this, hundreds of years after the name had become a household word in many lands, and the language had merged into Pahlavi.

I do not know that it will be any very serious 'anticipation' for me to say here at once what I expect to say later on with proofs and illustrations with regard to the authorities adduced in support of this theory. It is this; I am of the opinion that the venerable Dēnkart as well as Mas'ūdī, or Tabarī, or Albīrūnī, while of the greatest value when taken as indirect witnesses, are yet at times wholly useless, or worse than useless, when taken in direct affirmative evidence, as in fact are nearly all ancient and also many modern histories, for their own literal statements are, some of them, among the most 'unhistorical' that have been recorded.

And here also our eminent commentator

began his attack most fairly, as I understand him, not upon this direct evidence of the Dēnkart, or of Mas'ūdī, or of 'Tansar's' letter, but most appropriately upon that of the Gāthic texts themselves. The whole argument is well built upon the too advanced depth of the thoughts in them. The accomplished Zendist could not believe them to be ancient in the old Vedic sense[1]. He therefore positively held during the last few years of his lamented life that this Gāthic literature was indebted to a direct or indirect historical contact with Alexandria, having been composed by some Parsi-persian who had drunk deeply at the sources of Philonic inspiration, possibly in the City itself.

With this further attempt to unravel the tangled issues we can at once address ourselves to the closer details of the subject.

The first thing for us to do is obviously to ask what the concept of Vohumanah precisely is, as it appears in the Gāthas. Then we had better discuss thoroughly the document which is supposed to have brought up the whole question, i. e. Tansar's letter. And after this would be the time to examine into the nature of the Philonian Lógos, showing how little it stands really related to Vohumanah. The way will then be open for us to refute the variously important or trivial arguments which have been adduced to disprove the Antiquity of the Avesta upon the grounds of this supposed close relation between it and Philo, as well as for other reasons once thought by some to be valid;

[1] This doubt was however first expressed in SBE, XXXI, p. xxxvi.

and then we can see what can be said to show the close connection between the Bible (Scriptures) which Philo had been taught from his infancy and the Zoroastrian lore, through the Achaemenian Inscriptions.

Vohumanah.

What then, let us ask, was the Vohu manah[1] of the Gāthas? We can very rapidly correct a subordinate misapprehension, pausing only for a moment. It is Asha, the Vedic Ṛita, which should have been brought forward as the analogon to the Lógos, and not Vohumanah; for this latter came to the front through a mistake in exegesis on Y. 28, 2 or 3.

Asha, as Ṛita, is actually a lógos, the rhythm of nature. But the error is of trifling importance, for the question is as to the analogy of the Lógos of Philo, or one of the lógoi, with some one of the concepts of the Zoroastrian heptade, or the lack of such analogy. What then was the Zarathushtrian Asha, or Vohumanah?

An indispensable distinction.

First of all it is necessary to make here a greatly needed distinction. It is one which ought indeed to be obvious; but unfortunately it is far from familiar. So that if we are to make it, we must do so in the most incisive manner that we

[1] In the Avesta two words, Vohu manah; in the Pahlavi one word, Vahōman or Vohūman, in the Parsi Bahman. I will write it in familiar occurrences as one word.

can command. Perhaps the most discouraging, and I had well nigh said, fatal circumstance in connection with the entire controversy is the simple failure on the part of most writers to define, or even to state, what really the sphere of the facts, or supposed facts, is in regard to which they are attempting to draw conclusions. In plain words we seem too often not really to know even what facts we are talking about. What should we say for instance of debaters in biblical exegesis who proceeded as if the Pentateuch and 'the Lives of the Saints' were of similar date and of equal importance in church history? Or what should we say of people who used 'Christianity' with no apprehension that it includes various and sometimes heterogeneous forms of belief? Yet in our so-called Zoroastrian science outside a very small number[1] of fully informed persons, writer after writer quotes, now from the Gāthas, and again from the late Pahlavi books, and apparently as if they were closely related and equally authoritative parts of the same fundamental lore.

What should we say of a scholar who spoke of the Greek philosophy and its dogmatic system as if there were no distinction between the physicists and the idealists? One can only repeat the facts, though with little prospect of their being even superficially taken into consideration. Be it known then, let me attempt once more to say, that not only the

[1] In all these specialties the number of living persons who even make any pretension to be called 'experts' in a thorough, and therefore in the only truthful sense, is exceedingly restricted.

Asha and Vohumanah of the earliest period, but also several other elements of the first importance in it beside them become essentially modified in progressive degrees as the texts grow remoter (and yet more remote) from the Gāthic period: so that even in the later but still rich, valuable and genuine Avesta these original concepts seem to have lost almost entirely some of their most important original uses.

While again, on the other hand, between the later Avesta and the next stage, that of the Pahlavi literature, the meaning of these words is also different in both point and degree of significance. Let it then be distinctly understood that it is my purpose to discuss these concepts for the present only or chiefly as they appear in the original and oldest Avesta, that is to say, in the Gāthas, which are the obvious expression not only of the oldest forms of sentiment in the entire lore, but which are also the expression of a sentiment which was acutely experienced by persons living at the time of their composition.

These questions are however so exceedingly wide and so exceedingly difficult that I have made them the subject of laborious separate treatises. And these I have had the honour to insert in that most authoritative periodical, the Journal of the American Oriental Society. They will be found under the following titles and dates; —

'Asha as the Law in the Gāthas', J. A. O. S. 1899. pp. 31—35.

'The personified Asha', J. A. O. S., pp. 277—302.

'Vohumanah in the Gāthas' J. A. O. S., second half, 1900, pp. 67—87.

'Khshathra, Āramaiti, Haurvatāt and Ameretatāt', it is hoped, will follow. To these the reader is referred. But, as many valued friends in Bombay may not be able to gain a ready access to those volumes, I will say here in a few words what my results have practically been. I discover Asha and Vohumanah to be first of all simply expressions for the attributes of 'truth' and 'benevolence'; first as those characteristics are supposed to inhere in the supreme good Deity; and then I find them as expressing those qualities in the faithful disciple.

After this I find that they become also personified, first rhetorically, then doctrinally, as 'Archangels of God', and later even as 'his sanctified servants', Asha representing in these instances 'the orthodox community', and Vohumanah 'the orthodox individual'. This explanation leaves them indeed very impressive and refined as religious-philosophical conceptions, but they seem to have been introduced in a spirit which was quite simple and without any trace whatsoever of hair-splitting dialectics. They however express in a significant manner the activity of the Deity as directed by His justice and His love, and by these as exerted toward His entire creation, which is declared to comprise the chief objects even of material nature [1]. There is indeed 'an evil creation'; but with this the supreme Deity has nothing whatsoever to do, either directly or in-

[1] The earth, the rivers, the waters, the winds, the cattle, and man.

directly through either his Vohumanah or his Asha (except indeed to oppose and finally to overcome (?) it). It is the work of a separate Original Spirit, not supreme of course, but independent [1]. Such are Asha and Vohumanah in brief.

And what on the other hand is Philo's Lógos?

We can answer this question most conveniently if we include what we may have to say within a more extended section; that is to say, within a direct examination of the supposed analogies which are believed to exist between Asha and Vohumanah as described above and this same Platonic Philonian Lógos.

Before however we enter upon this detail it lies in our path first to examine critically that brilliant document which seems to have given rise to entire suggestions involved. Let us then recall and study more carefully 'Tansar's letter'.

Tansar's alleged Letter.

The distinguished Commentator proceeds as follows.

The Chaplain of Ardishīr is known to us through the Dēnkart, a Pahlavi compilation of the IXth century. In this treatise this Chaplain is given the title of Herbad of the Herbads, that is to say, High-priest, or Chief of the Religion, and the personal name by which it mentions him can be read either Tōsar, or Tansar [2].

[1] See below on the fuller analysis of the system, also in its relation to that in the Achaemenian Inscriptions.

[2] See Haug's Essay on Pahlavi, p. 146 (bound up in one volume with the Old Pahlavi-Pāzand Glossary).

It is this Tōsar, or Tansar, whom Ardashīr, according to the Dēnkart, charges with the task of collecting the Sacred Texts on which Zoroastrianism reposes, and of restoring the Avesta which had been lost or mutilated. He receives the epithet of 'man of the doctrine of the ancients'.

In addition to this Mas'ūdī (so spelling the Arabic historian's name), also of the IXth century, alludes to the relations which Ardashīr had at the commencement of his reign with a pious personage of royal blood, named Bīshar, who belonged, as he says, to the Platonic sect[1] (sic). In the Kitāb et-tambīh** he returns to this Bīshar, 'a name which the fancy of the copyists transforms now into Banshar, Yanshar, Tabshar' (on account of the shifting of the small diacritical points which determine whether a letter should be read 'b' or 't', 'y' or 'n', etc.); and this recalled to Professor D. the Tōsar or Tansar of the Dēnkart. This Bīshar, etc. was, so Mas'ūdī, as cited in the passage, goes on to say, Ardashīr's Mobed and also his 'apostle' (sic). He (this Mobed or apostle) was one of 'the Kings (sic) of the provinces'[2], and he reigned in the Province of Persia, Farsistan, at the ancient seat of the Persian kings.

Again, he repeats, that he was of the Platonic sect, that he abdicated (so), and embraced the religious life (so). Then he, this Bīshar, proclaimed the advent of Ardashīr, sent missionaries into the provinces, and so facilitated the triumph of the Prince

[1] In his Golden Meadows, II, 161.

[2] Mulūk ut-tavāif.

over the other provincial kings. Mas'ūdī adds that he composed excellent treatises upon administration and upon religion. In these he justified the innovations which Ardashīr had introduced into both, and which were unknown to former kings. In particular a letter of the king of Tabaristan is cited, and another to the king of India (so). Mas'ūdī, as the Editor remarks, gives us a fragment of one of these letters [1]. But a happy accident, so he adds, has preserved to us the whole. (Journal Asiatique, mars-avril, p. 186, flg.).

A certain Bin-ul-Ḥasan, a native of Tabaristan, had undertaken to write the history of his country. In the course of his researches he found an important document in a shop at Khvārizm. It was apparently a letter addressed by Tansar, a Persian sage and High-priest of Ardashīr Bābagān, to Jasnaf-shāh, the prince of Tabaristan.

Bin-ul-Ḥasan translated it into Persian and inserted it in the Introduction to his history of Tabaristan. This was in about the year A. D. 1210. The text from which Bin-ul-Ḥasan thus translated into Persian was itself in Arabic and made by one Ibn al-Moḳaffa', a converted Guebre (i. e. a renegade Zoroastrian), who had devoted himself to translating the principal national books of the Persians into the language of their conquerors, 450 years before.

He died in 760 A. D., in the year 152 of the hejira (hijrah). This Arabic version is supposed to

[1] The following reference is made: 'voir la citation au commentaire de la page 17b.'

have had two intermediaries at least between it and its Pahlavi original, Bahrām, son of Khorzād, and before him his father Manūchir (so), Mobed of Khorasan, and still other intermediaries are mentioned, viz. 'the sages of Persia (so)'.

The document, as already intimated, is in the form of a rather abnormally extended letter from its reputed author to the Prince above named, written with the object of inducing him to give in his adhesion to the Rule of Ardashīr. And it is moreover said to have been written in response to a letter of inquiry received from the said Jasnaf-shāh, in which he brings a severe critique to bear against the acts of Ardashīr, and this fourteen years after he had begun to reign[1]. In itself, as a document and without any reference to its genuineness, or to its partial genuineness, it possesses great interest. But very much of its supposed original has perished, and little wonder; Ibn al-Moḳaffa' is supposed to have worked on it nearly *five hundred and fifty years after the accession of Ardashīr.*

His translation of it, or that part of the letter which is supposed to be his translation, is so overloaded with Arabic allusions that the style at least

[1] So far, these remarks are almost a translation from the number of the Journal Asiatique. I may say that I understand that a very able English translation of the whole letter was made by a High-priest Darab Peshotan Sanjana of Bombay. I wish that I had seen it; doubtless it contains valuable annotations. I may mention to non-experts in Bombay that translations by different writers must really differ from each other in some respects; but that more often they only seem to differ through the choice of varying words which possess very nearly the same meaning.

of the original work must have been wholly, or almost wholly, obliterated.

And Bin-ul-Ḥasan translated this translation *nearly four centuries and a half after this*, evidently taking similar liberties. That is to say, the last translation was made at second or fourth hand about a thousand years after its lost original was supposed to have appeared, four intermediaries at least having interposed, not to say an indefinitely larger number.

The above data, aside from my own few remarks, I take immediately from the mars-avril number of the Journal Asiatique of 1894, pp. 185—188, to which the reader is referred.

The Editor justly calls attention to the fact that at the age of Ibn al-Moḳaffa', A. D. 760, Pahlavi must have still been current as a written language, so that so far as the actual wording goes, a document might well have survived from the date of Ardashīr, A. D. 212—230 odd, to the time of Bahram and Manūchir, the originals of Ibn al-Moḳaffa'; see above. And I would cordially add that such a political letter as this had an increased chance of surviving; moreover I positively believe that portions of it have survived and are incorporated in the document, though not in its original terms.

The French translation published in the number of the Journal Asiatique for mai-juin 1894 'représente essentiellement la version d'Ahmed-Bey Agaeff' (a young musulman of the Caucasus, and a pupil of Professor Darmesteter in Paris in 1892). It had been revised by M. Ferté in 1894 at the French

Consulate at Teheran. The text is said to be substantially that of the Indian Office Library, no. 1134, though it was first made on no. 7633 of the Addenda of the British Museum. Before we come to our discussion of it, let me say here at once with regard to this French translation which lies before us, that I accept it cordially, but with reserve, as Professor Darmesteter did, not at all criticising its freedom, which is often desirable and admirable.

It is no doubt a very great advantage for us to have a version of a Persian document from the pen of a native Persian, but we must not forget that this writing is by no means a modern Persian document; and one can easily see from even our own early English that a Persian of to-day might very readily misunderstand some of the idioms of the thirteenth century. The piece, while affording no particular difficulty as to the main bulk of it, is by no means so clear in many places, not to speak of the fact that the text itself at times requires especial emendation. But I accept the rendering gratefully for the time being; and it would be also odious as well as difficult to attempt to rearrange it. For, let it be distinctly understood that I object to the statements contained in it only partly; and I differ from the conclusions drawn from them by the commentator *only up to a certain point;* and I am in controversy with thos ewho have brought it forward only in an external sense. That is to say, I have little interest in questioning anything that may be questionable in the treatment of the texts, as such, either as regards the edition, or the translation.

My present business is with the historical conclusions, which are very often to be drawn from texts even when they are imperfectly reproduced; and it is proper to state our point at places, not from the letter itself, but from other works of its Editor.

The object in bringing the letter forward seems to have been to prove that there existed in Persia at the time of Ardashīr a high state of social and intellectual culture, and even a school of philosophical thought, this being regarded as fully illustrated as well as proved by the document. Then the impression seems intended to be left upon us that much Avesta was written during the early part of the reign of Ardashīr, which last is, in fact, quite natural enough, even if other views are not to be supported. If any Avesta could have been written at the period, the implication is left upon us that the Gāthas themselves may have been written some 200 or 300 years before, say in A.D. *circa* or B.C. 100. I do not think that the above course of reason is sound. My reasons are that the 'letter,' like scores of similar documents in those early and also in later ages, is, in everything but its nucleus, entirely spurious, and with the rejection of it I most especially doubt the presumption that a philosophical spirit at all seriously prevailed at the time in Persia.

I hope to illustrate the truth of these last objections by an examination of the document as published and explained in the French periodical.

The Document.

Graphic details meet us at once at the commencement. Tansar (accepting this reading of the name also provisionally for the Bīshar of Mas'ūdī) is said to have been a 'Mobed of the Mobeds', which is well in keeping with the conclusions, as Zarathushtrianism was distinctly organized, and its adherents might be well called a 'church', and the line of the Chief-priests must have been also continuous and practically unbroken.

We can freely compare our own ecclesiastical system as to this one particular.

But extraordinary peculiarities are at once claimed for this Archbishop (*sic*), and by himself; before these, however, we have the item from Masū'dī quoted. This refers to a self-sacrifice *not* claimed by Tansar himself. The Bīshar (Tansar) mentioned in Mas'ūdī was said to be one of the provincial kings (or princes), and to have reigned in the Province of Persia. He was also declared, as we have seen, to have been of the Platonic sect (so). He abdicated and embraced the religious life (thus our worthy annalist). Now these tales of kings becoming monks, though always, of course, possible, are, as in themselves, more than suspicious; and here our suspicions are at once deepened into the strongest possible adverse conviction after reading the letter of this princely renunciant with philosophic convictions. I for one do not hesitate to say that I do not at all believe that the author of such a composition ever had the oppor-

tunity of resigning a kingdom, however insignificant. He states that he was an 'ascetic', and had been one for fifty years. 'I have abstained rigorously', he goes on, 'from the joys of marriage and of love, from the acquisition of riches and the intercourse of men. I have never taken deeply to heart what I happened to desire, and have lived in the world as a prisoner, that the nations (*les peuples*) might know my justice and my virtue, and seek my counsels as to the salvation of the soul'.

Now this would indeed be an admirable policy for securing the object held in view; and if the bombastic tone of the letter did not betray it as the made-up fiction of a later age, it would be adapted to its object. Audacity in an extreme manifestation might seem well calculated to produce the desired effect; but it is out of all keeping with historical circumstances. Asceticism and celibacy were, in the first place, strictly against all the usages of the Parsi priesthood, in all probability also as even defined by law. And these assumptions are still more out of keeping with the character of the man as revealed in this document, which is supposed to have been his composition. Then, also, his excessive claims to spiritual sanctity are not harmonious with the tone of his effort, which is worldly to a degree. I will not, of course, deny that egotism and vanity may have manifested themselves in a person otherwise fairly honest and sincerely fanatical; but the objection which I have already made is so obvious a difficulty with the later compilers of the letter that they immediately hasten to 'accuse'

while 'excusing' themselves, for they elaborately anticipate the expected criticism.

Anachronisms in the course of the discussion.

"How could I dare to attack my religion," he is made to exclaim, "by refusing to accept what it permits as to wife, as to wine, etc., for to forbid what is permitted is as bad as to permit what is forbidden?" He proceeds to defend himself by way of precedent; — that is to say, he cites certain supposed sages who did the like from the days of Darius. 'They preferred,' he declares, 'to isolate themselves, to renouce this hollow life and the ways of the brutes (*sic*). Blushing to own those as their companions who were walking outside the paths of reason, they crushed their hearts; and, refusing to play longer with foxes, they went to seek peace among the panthers. They bid adieu to the world, renounced the thousand passions which follow it, and preferred the struggle for the soul and for eternity to those scenes, where they empty the cup of vain desires; they sacrificed their passions to the salvation of their souls, for it is written in the Bible (*Car il est écrit dans la Bible!*[1]) 'to fly from the ignorant is to approach unto God,' for there are none more miserable than two kinds of men; the first is the sage whom the world leaves miserable in the hands of the ignorant; the second is a King whose evil fortune has hurled him from a throne to poverty.' One would suppose that this passage was enough

[1] This exclamation point is my own, not the reviewer's.

alone and of itself to decide at once and for ever as to the genuineness of the letter. What had the Iranian High-priest of Ardashīr to do with the Hebrew Bible in A. D. 226 odd? Of course, the remark came from one to whom the Thora* (so) (not 'la Bible') was familiar through the Kurān, and the Kurān alone; but the Kurān was not composed till centuries after A. D. 226, nor known in Persia till still later. Yet the distinguished Editor is equal to the occasion, for he at once elides the passage, and most properly so. The sentence is not possible, so he cordially acknowledges, when regarded as an original part of a letter composed at the time and place named, and by the person who, as he maintains, had been the author of it.

Surely by such a process we can prove anything to be genuine.

We have only to cut out of it all the passages which make it clear that it was late. Of course, we must eliminate the passage, if we wish to prove that the bulk of the letter was written in A. D. 226, following; but what right have we to eliminate this passage unless we at the same time eliminate whatever is cognate to it? What can be more apt than this rejected citation, or more germane to the context? Why should it be eliminated? The process of elision can only be rationally guided by the congruity or incongruity of the passage to be retained or elided either to the immediate context, or to the bulk of a document. The author of the letter wishes to conciliate sympathy with those who voluntarily or involuntarily fly from the world, and in defiance

of the spirit of Zoroastrian precepts. The words seem written by a man who knew something of the (early) lives of the saints written centuries after Ardashīr. If a real Tansar at such a date had any knowledge of the Bible, it would be only to despise it. And yet this 'Bible' citation is wholly germane to the contexts, for both the old and the new Bible abound in ascetic hints urging upon men to give up the world to save their futurity. The new presents one ascetic figure which has been signal for all ages[1]. Why then, should these remarks be cut out? As we all agree, no High-priest of Ardashīr ever penned or dictated such a sentence; but neither did he pen that which goes before it, nor that which follows after. Why not elide those passages as well? The sole difference between the Editor and me is this: that in order to get at the real nucleus of the letter as extant in A.D. 226, I would elide not merely an awkward passage here and there, but almost the whole mass of the text as in its present form, for almost the entire mass of it, as it now stands, is impossible as an original production by a Parsi at the date proposed.

Further discussion.

But let us not consider the question settled by any means. On the contrary, let us patiently proceed to examine the entire document, or the greater

[1] Viz., the Baptist.

part of it, for it is in itself of the highest interest, in fact a masterpiece in early historical romance.

Upon this beginning follows a statement concerning Quābus king of Kirman, and his submission; and we have but few data at hand to verify or refute it, save that the entire tone and diction of the remarks are far advanced beyond the period to which we must assign Ardashīr and his counsellor. Ardashīr is declared to have remarked in the style of Louis the Magnificent, and to his Mobed of Mobeds; see p. 513: — 'We intended not to give the title of 'king' to any creature in the kingdom of my ancestors, but here is Quābus, who has come to seek asylum with us, and we will confirm to him his throne and crown.'

It is of course not only possible, but very probable, we might even say 'certain', that some of the petty princes who were nearly independent under the Parthian dynasty, should have hastened to make their submission to the new ruler; and that the timely submission of Quābus should have secured to him advantages; but that Ardashīr ever expressed himself in the finely discriminating manner recorded with reference to the fact I do not for a moment credit. He would have had no audience capable of appreciating his subtle diplomacy; notice also the expression 'the great way of obedience' which savours of religious vows, and later times. I do not think that it refers to the Gāthic 'way' in any sense, which it might well, if the other circumstances were congruous.

Claims to clemency.

Not far on after this follows a claim to peculiar clemency in the interest of the King (of kings), almost in contradiction to what is said later (see p. 515). 'The reigning Shāhanshāh (so) has power,' so the document goes on to say, 'over religion. God is his ally, and in changing this work of destruction and in altering the order of violence, I see him better armed and adorned with virtues than the ancients.' But as a matter of fact he found it to be necessary to execute his brothers,[1] a too familiar procedure for an ancient Oriental upon mounting a despotic throne. Still, this particular by no means decisively militates against the genuineness of this eulogy. Ardashīr may well have dealt less in bloodshed than others (yet see p. 43); and nothing would be more natural than that he should order his creatures to multiply assertions to this effect as to his goodness; and as to this the substance of the letter must have been genuine. But these urgent and cunning injunctions which resulted in its present form belong to the party politics of a different age. I make no doubt of it that the real author of the Persian translation was in sympathy with the Parsi community, whose first Sasanian King he was lauding, though I am not quite sure that he was himself a Parsi; and the passage seems to me to have been intended to produce an effect upon Parsi and Arabic opinion long after the conquest, toning up the waning Zara-

[1] This is the opinion of a certain close critic. It hardly looks like the Gāthic lore.

thushtrian sentiment of the day, and stemming the tide of perversions to Islam.

The Destruction of the Books.

Then follows (p. 516) a simple acceptance of the ancient tale that Alexander destroyed the sacred books, no limit being placed to the assertion: 'He burnt our sacred books written upon twelve thousand ox-skins.' But does the distinguished Editor really seem to hint here, or elsewhere, that this is a reason for supposing that 'all the original Zend documents have totally disappeared'? I should hesitate very seriously before I accused anyone of such an idea. In the loose phraseology of the later Zoroastrian books this was, however, often and plainly stated. See the 'Ardā Vīrāf', with its allusions to 'the accursed Alexander', i. 7, and the 'religion written upon prepared cow-skins and with golden ink (*sic*), which he burnt up'.

The fact that valuable or splendid Mss. emblazoned upon leather were burned or otherwise destroyed at Persepolis and in various places during Alexander's march is most credible. As the religion of Auramazda was nearly universal, it would seem to be hardly possible that some Mss. should not have disappeared, especially from the chief palaces, which immediately attracted the cupidity of the invaders; but that Alexander of all men in any way whatsoever especially ordered their destruction depends entirely upon how much he may have feared their influence as a means of strengthening the fanatical resistance of the population. In the first flush

of his successes, and in the eagerness of pressing them, he may possibly have given a free hand to military arson; but everything goes to show that directly his results seemed secured, he would have been anxious to preserve rather than to destroy the Mss. He seems soon to have hit upon a policy of conciliation and even of assimilation; he affected to become half-persian himself, at one time even adopting the Persian dress; he tried to talk the Persian language, and sought to be indoctrinated in its lore. He was the last man living to order the destruction of the monuments of an ancient faith, unless he acutely felt the danger of their inspiring his adversaries, and any such apprehension with regard to the Zoroastrian documents must have been rapidly dispelled, if it ever existed. Precious copies of the Mss., like many a fire-altar, must have been destroyed with the brutal fury of a victorious soldiery, and, as usual, the person supreme in command reaped the credit of the mishap, though he may never have known that it occurred. But that anybody endowed with a critical judgment should for a moment suppose that Alexander destroyed all the then extant 'books' or manuscripts of the Zend Avesta, or could have destroyed them had he made the attempt to do so, is very remarkable, nor has anyone positively ventured upon such a suggestion. The priesthood swarmed, of course, and every hamlet had its altar, or at least its assembly; the sacred places may have been indeed defenceless, but the Mss. would have been hurriedly concealed. That there existed some very valuable parchments in the

palace at Persepolis goes without saying, for even a lukewarm King would have preserved a fine collection, and this whether or not they were written in 'letters of gold' and on 'cow-skins.' If they were set up in gilt they would have been beautiful enough, for the character was shapely even then; but that these codices comprised more than a very few copies of their extant Zoroastrian scriptures is not at all probable. They perished, naturally enough, with the burning castle; but there were doubtless hundreds, if not thousands of copies of every one of the different books in the strong chests of the priests scattered throughout the provinces. To destroy the Mss. so that not a 'letter remained' would have taken years, and occupied an inquisition aided by the most modern of police. The 'scriptures' were a talisman of life to the people; an indestructible fanaticism would have saved them. The loss of the treasures at Persepolis was doubtless great, and Alexander, if he ever heard of it, would have bewailed it most. However that may be, this much is certain: that whether done at Alexander's order or by his wish, or without his directions or knowledge, this pre-vandal vandalism could not have had any appreciable effect upon the continuity of the great religion, as it did not, in fact, for Ardashīr some 500 years later than this could only have enthroned a faith which was part and parcel of the mental life of vast masses among his people. So much for the really unreasonable belief that Alexander burnt the Mss., all of them, and on purpose; that is to say, such an opinion would have been extra-

ordinary when regarded as the conclusion of a modern critic; but it was a very natural belief indeed when regarded as prevailing among the Zoroastrian Persians at the time of Ardashīr the Great. This, then, is in favour of the general authenticity of the facts presented. Alexander's foraging parties must have burnt up many documents with or without his will or knowledge; and nothing was more natural than that he should have reaped the credit of burning all of them that were so destroyed; for it would be foolish to suppose that any facts in favour of that great conqueror, who was so bitterly hated, could have maintained themselves for a decade in the memories of his enemies. The 'infamy' of Alexander was the talk of the priesthood for generations, and if Ardashīr encouraged it, the circumstance simply proves that he did not possess either the inclination or the capacity to make the easy discriminations in the case. The least statement that modified the iniquities would have been extremely unpopular. Even a longer catalogue of misdeeds would not have come amiss to him. As it is, the indictment is by no means light, and it is quite certain that it prevailed at every period since the date of its victim. Both Ardashīr and his Minister may well have uttered the usual calumny whenever they were displeased with Greece or with Macedon, or otherwise thought that the repetition of it might be useful.

This item, then, belongs to the real nucleus of the 'letter', whether gathered from separate documents long subsequent to Ardashīr, or not. But it is

simply a matter of course; it proves nothing, nor does it disprove anything, and, indeed, I may say at once that the same can be said of almost every sentence in the piece.

To proceed; – the statement that Ardashīr was the 'right-minded and honest man to revive the religion' must be of course understood chiefly in a political sense; and it was fully justified, all things considered, though in all human probability he owed his success from the first to the last as much to the vitality of the Religion as that vitality owed to him. But this is not my present point, which is the credibility of this 'letter' as being a document founded upon an historical nucleus. Such a statement as the one just recalled would be very natural, and something like it must have been constantly said.

The social status reorganised.

Another item most certain or probable in itself is that the new king reorganised the social status, or at least attempted to do it. He rallied, or revived the system which had been earlier in vogue, but how about the *names* of the different classes? They are all in Arabic, which came in 300 years after Ardashīr, as did the Kurān alluded to above. Our answer to this would be wholly sympathetic with the reproducers of the document; it is that Persian itself is now at least one-fifth Arabic, and it may have been so in A.D. 1210; and that this Arabic-persian was the language of the last author. Such objections as that to the use of Arabic, I am

glad to be able to say, have little validity. If Arabic terms were made use of in this translation of the XIIIth century, where more simple ones would have been natural, the plea might be made that this was simply accidental; and this reply would be all sufficient. But the question with reference to the subject-matter aside from the dialect is not so easily answered. How about the existence of that passage in the Yasna, Pahlavi or otherwise, in which this enumeration of classes is seen to have taken place?

The Pahlavi Yasna cited; its effect upon dates.

First we must notice in passing that if these sentences really occurred in a Pahlavi treatise of A.D. 228, that is to say, in a Pahlavi commentary on the Yasna, they prove at once the point which the entire reproduction of the 'letter' was intended to disprove; for such occurrences show of course that the original Avesta Yasna XIX, of which the Pahlavi was a commentary, existed much earlier than at such a date. I am far from wishing to press any adventitious advantage in this debate. But I must really point out that if this passage is supposed to be a part of the Pahlavi Yasna, and especially if that Pahlavi Yasna were at all like the document which has survived to us as the Pahlavi Yasna, and if it existed in this form in A.D. 212—228, the fact would push back the date of the original Zend Yasna XIX say a hundred, if not hundreds of years beyond and before that date; for valuable, or rather invaluable as the Pahlavi translations

which have survived to us are, the differences between them and their originals, that is to say, their inaccuracies, prove that they, the Pahlavi translations, must have post-dated their originals by at least a hundred years, many would say by a much longer period. The date of Yasna XIX would then in that case be pushed back at least till A.D.; and Yasna XIX is later Avesta. And this would therefore have a disastrous effect upon the theory that the Gāthas, or the original Avesta, were composed as late as that same Annus Domini, or indeed 100 years earlier.

The opinion that the Gāthas antedated the rest of the Avesta may be regarded as universal. And several of the compositions which follow the Gāthas are of earlier date than this Y. XIX. The Ahuna vairya, Airyaman Ashya, and the Yęńhę hatām; these may indeed have been echoes of the Gāthic period, say 50 to 100 years after it had closed. But then comes the Yasna of the Seven Chapters [1], which was so distinctly later that the term 'Bountiful Immortal', amesha spenta, first appears in it. This shows that the Gāthas had even then been long looked back upon as ancient pieces, for nowhere within them do we meet with these terms. Then come the Srōsh Yasht and the Hōm Yasht, which could hardly be expected much before two hundred years at the very least; where then are we to place Y. XIX in reference to the age of the Gāthas? not to speak of its Pahlavi translation, which I have purposely excluded for the moment. Surely if Y. XIX

[1] See S.B.E., XXXI, page 281, cp. this with the oversight in a certain prize essay which did me the honour to refer to me.

were written about the time of Christ, and the Hōm Yasht, the Srōsh Yasht, the Seven Chapters, and the Yęńhę hatãm, etc. intervened between the already previous date of this Y. XIX and that of the Gāthas, together with the main Yashts and the Vendīdād as well, then the Gāthas would certainly be determined to an antiquity of at least 200 to 300 years greater than that assigned to them by the brilliant scholar who has pressed this letter upon our attention (in connection with an argument to the effect that the Gāthas were composed as late as 100 B.C., possibly even hinting at a later authorship). If the passage was Pahlavi because our Pahlavi translation existed at A.D. 212—228 odd, this of itself frustrates the purpose for which the passage was cited. But, as I say, I would not press such a point, for there is no reason at all why the Avesta text itself should not have been cited in Pahlavi forms, even if no full or continuous Pahlavi commentary then existed, almost impossible as this latter supposition appears to be. I will then simply point out the obvious circumstance that if this passage was written in Pahlavi or otherwise in A. D. 212—226 (about), then in that case it is certain that the Avesta text of Yasna XIX, Pahlavi or original, must have existed then. But if only this is true, and if it be not certain that a regular *Pahlavi* translation of the Avesta texts somewhat like our present ones existed at that time [1], then this alone and of itself proves that the Gāthas, which were so

[1] Which, as I may say in passing, I regard as simply an obvious certainty, for Pahlavi had been familiar for centuries.

long previous to that Yasna XIX, were far older than one of those dates so uncritically assigned to them in the face of universal opinion. But all this is mentioned only in passing, important though it is. Our present and immediate object is to show what is possible as part of a letter written by a Tansar (sic) at the date suggested, and what is not possible. Whatever the important bearing of this citation may be upon the question of the date of the Gāthas, the citation itself was thoroughly possible at the period stated; and the fact that the present terms are in Arabic has no force at all as an objection. The item indeed possesses no power whatever to increase the probability that the nucleus of the letter was written in A.D. 228, but it also possesses no force in the contrary sense.

What now follows seems to me to be probable enough as one of the particulars freely disseminated at the period of the Restoration; but it is diametrically in contradiction to what was so emphatically said in the earlier part of the letter; see above on page 34.

Ardashīr's moderation.

For the letter goes on to say; see p. 520: »'In regard to what may appear excessive to your »eyes in the tortures or penalties which the Shāh»anshāh inflicts and in the prodigality with which »he sheds the blood of those who act contrary to »his views or his orders, know well that the an»cients had a shorter arm (literally a shorter hand) »than he, because disobedience and the abandonment

»of good manners did not exist (sic) in the cha-»racter of the people'«.

It is therefore freely conceded here in this part of the (extended) 'letter' that Ardashīr shed blood abundantly, and this coincides with the facts; for not only did Ardashīr find it necessary to resort to such a procedure, but this was in so far the custom that three [1] at least of the Parthian kings succeeded to the throne upon murdering their fathers. Yet notice the cynical language, p. 521: »It is the rain »which reanimates the earth, the sun which comforts »it, the wind which increases its breath. If he pours »out the blood of such people with a prodigality of »which one sees no end, we, for our part, know »that it is the life and happiness of the future (sic)«.

This was indeed in the true line of sequence; and I by no means deny that the justifications were warranted in the sense of the times.

Those early centuries after Christ were as terrible as those before him. Bloodshed may well have been absolutely indispensable to avert what was worse, and that is, anarchy. I only object to the excessively worked-up and most modern type of thought and diction with which the whole theme is handled, and to the direct contradiction in terms in the 'letter' itself. It is impossibly original to a Tansar of the middle of Ardashīr's reign.

»You tell me«, so the supposed author of the 'letter' goes on to say, »that they speak much of »these effusions of blood, and fear them. I tell you »that there are many kings who have poured out

[1] Did not four? of them follow this device?

»blood solely by shedding a few drops; others have »slain thousands who ought to have slain more, for »the thing was necessitated by the times and the »men« [1].

Eliminations.

But what shall we say as to the 'elimination' of the passage translated on page 521? It seems to be exactly in harmony with the context, and, as we may notice, it is not written in Arabic [2]. The concluding bracket which separates it from the rest of the text is accidentally absent, which I note simply to guide readers. It should be added in the 7th line from the top of page 217, mars-avril 1894. The passage seems to be a good clincher for the general argument. It proceeds to show why the King gave the order to prevent the passage of persons from class to class. 'If masters were turning servants and servants masters, if wives were to rule and husbands obey', it was indeed time to put a check upon promotions. Of course this most elaborate description (both text and context) savours wholly of a later age.

And the Editor eliminates it, very properly. But why does he eliminate it without eliminating the text before it and the text after it, which are wholly germane to it? I object to these eliminations, as will be observed, *solely in case we are to stop too soon with them.* Of course there was

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[1] Everything in the dissertation is too much spun out and too modern; too full and too nervous, for the time supposed.

[2] Though this would make little difference.

a Mobed of Mobeds, and his name may as well have been Tansar as anything else, and of course there were scores of such documents as the nucleus of this brilliant and ingenious piece [1].

Further items.

But of this more hereafter; — to keep on now with our review before we draw our final conclusions-, the Shāhanshāh is further said, p. 522, to have established a travelling school of cavalry; which pervaded the Empire. No king of Persia on his accession could have failed to revive such services, how much less Ardashīr. The item is very natural, but it is nothing to our point; it is one of the particulars which the politician of the VIIIth, or the later century brushes up to show the character of the Founder of the Dynasty which the Arabs had conquered. Notice in passing the affectation and extravagance of the expression 'This King surpasses Bahman, son of Isfandyār, as to whose goodness all the ancient nations are in accord'. Panegyric would be natural enough and well in place, but not in wordy bombast at that period of time. Then the homily as to Ardashīr's enforcing conversions is altogether too elaborate for the occasion, in the midst of a reign after a savage revolution. 'The ancients', so the document goes on to say (p. 524), 'put everyone to death who departed from the established religion; but the Shāhanshāh keeps them for a whole year (sic) and plies them with catechisers!; only

[1] If there was not an historical nucleus for this one, it would be strange indeed.

then on his persistence did he execute the heretic'. This at such a date. It was a hint delivered in the eighth, ninth, or a later century by a renegade Zoroastrian to show the Arabs of that moment how to act. Had they pursued such a course many more Zoroastrians might have recanted, and earlier than they did; and those who wrote this sketch might well have saved the lives and property of many of their fellow countrymen. (However, whether by guile or bloodshed, the Arabs, as we know, at last reduced the adherents of the old faith to a wretched handful; but that is not our business here). Then follows an allusion to a law referred to Yasna XII, 2. But if the Oldest Avesta was written in the year 'One', as the Editor would gladly have proved to us, then Yasna XII hardly existed at 228. See above as to the citation from Yasna XIX; the same arguments apply. We must claim an universal acquiescence in the view that time was needed for the change from the personal Gāthas, depicting, without intending it, a vivid history, to the most conscious Yasna XII carefully worked up as a fixed profession of the faith.

Other Objections.

My chief objection as ever is, I repeat it, the impossibility of the whole *character* of the composition as original to A.D. 212—228. There is a delicacy and finesse about it that seem to be in harsh discord with the epoch of a great military revolution and with the general oriental literature of the time. *That was no age for mincing distinctions.*

As to the 'enregistrations', and general laws re-establishing ancient distinctions of classes, they are all natural enough; for Persia established the first postal system in the time of the great Darius, and registration must have existed; what I object to always is the way in which it is talked about. On what particular warrant does our distinguished commentator excide the 'bizarre' citation on page 527, mai-juin 1894, about the 'coffre', and the things which follow from Genesis? I fail to perceive it, unless the whole treatise is 'excided'. The item is directly in point as to the desirability of not mingling the classes, and not only this; it is categorically so applied. It is a citation fast enough; but the real cause of its excision is that it is obviously so late. I agree with the commentator, that it was never written in A. D. 212—226; I simply, as usual, go much further than he does; *and I excide* its context which is equally impossible for the time. Then see the next remarks about the composition of wills; p. 529: and the division and inheritance of property; and compare these with the book of Leviticus on the one side and the crude regulation of the Vendīdād on the other, remembering that on the theory which it is attempted to establish the Vendīdād must have been written or put into shape just about the time of this Shāhanshāh, or even some hundred of years *later. The hints of Leviticus could only have come through the Kurān, which was written centuries after Ardashīr,* and was extremely familiar to the Arabic translator, that is to say, if it be true, as is maintained, that he was a renegade

Zoroastrian, and a convert to Islam. This our translator so fully admits that he excerpts the whole passage as usual; but why 'excerpt' all this, if anything else is to stand? It is germane to what goes before and also to what follows. But, above all, does it, or any other portion of the 'letter' adjust itself to Persia in A.D. 226, if the Vendīdād was then composed and *at that place;* for that is the consequence involved? *Compare the Vendīdād with this Letter!; — to regard the two as contemporaneous in the same locality would appear to be the ultra pointing of a sarcasm.*

A striking feature.

But we now come upon an item which again gives the commentator pause. It is nothing more nor less than the mention of Ardashīr's own will in a letter which is supposed to have been practically dictated by this Ardashīr himself. We may believe even Mas'ūdī when he speaks of Ardashīr as having left a will; but how could it be mentioned in a letter which he Ardashīr inspired while he was alive, and for the special purpose for which this dissertation** was written? That the will was a final testament and not an 'ordinance', as is suggested, is a point out of all dispute; see the next page, 533, where the writer speaks of the King's death. Was the will published before he died, and in the very middle of his reign? Persian kings generally, and this Ardashīr among them, took precisely the contrary course with reference to *some* of their possible

heirs (see above). They acted as if those heirs, and not they themselves, should be the parties to make their wills, and a very much later eastern monarch is mentioned who did not permit his wives to have sons, as they, the future sons, would be too prone to make use, if not of a 'poudre de succession', then of some other convenient mode of disposing of their parent. It hardly seems likely that Ardashīr should have *published* his will before he had actually established his Empire; and according to this letter, his rule was manifestly not yet consolidated. Here was a powerful Prince still undeclared as a loyal subject; and the whole object of the letter is to secure his adherence; and would he accomplish this object by speaking of his 'will'? A modern might hit upon such a device possibly to throw dust into another's eyes, while guiding the developments of some subordinate conjuncture, but hardly an Ardashīr laying the foundations of his Realm.

Yet see the detail which follows in the document. The writer, or one of the writers, indulges in platitudes as to the degenerate state of things.

This item of the will is about as probable a proposition as that he, Ardashīr, really 'abdicated' as Mas'ūdī reports, and soon after the supposed date of this document. And all of this has been seriously regarded as an integral part of a letter to one of this King's future vassals, urging upon him his submission before his (the King's) real reign

can be said to have actually even begun [1]; for I cannot myself believe that even the nucleus of this letter was written midway in the King's career. Fourteen years are a long time for Ardashīr to have left a princelet independent; and a new sovereign, introducing a new dynasty, would hardly urge inferiors to submit by making known his last will in the very epistle in which he urges their surrender.

Another curiosity.

Still more curious does it seem to me to be that any critic could for a moment accept the elaborately detailed account of the *mode of appointing a successor to the throne.* Let any one, whosoever he may be, if he be only an unprejudiced witness, read these regulations; and then say whether he believes that *this* was part of a letter of a successful adventurer** to one whom he wished to make his adherent in Persia and at that early year. It is also spun out to a degree, a fanciful and theatrical description of what a later annalist might have sketched out as an interesting mode of procedure in a kingdom upon paper. See the questions and answers all elaborately given.

But to go on with our task. In enumerating the four* parts of the earth he begins with the region of the Turks, and our brilliant commentator at once changes the reading to 'Turanian'; or more

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[1] Later on he may have associated his son with him in the Kingdom; see the sculpture of Takht i Bostān.

properly he refers this passage to a later age; for the Turks, as he remarks, only entered upon the horizon of Iran under Khosroes Anūshirvān. It is however always a little awkward to say *when* one particular race or nation was *nòt* known to another. A negative statement, as Kant would have said, is nearly or quite an 'universal statement'.

Some remarks upon modesty.

On page 534 (to go back for a moment) we have a specimen of the critical skill of one of the early re-writers of this document, which, let it be well remembered, I most seriously admire and greatly value as one of the choicest bits of VIIIth, IXth, or XIIIth century literature. One of them explains 'airya' as Parsi '*er*' in the sense of 'modest', which may well have been a secondary meaning, whereupon he enters upon a self-laudation à propos of it.

Now *all* our attempts at etymology may of course be pardoned, but see what follows from this effort. »This name recalls«, so he says, »and it »preaches to us our duty. It secures us honour and »consideration and dignity . . . since humiliation . . . »attaches to pride. We have also remained faithful »to this idea and to this moral tendency . . . »We were the envy of the world, sovereigns »of the seven quarters of the globe« . . . (That was in a sense true; yet hear this): . . . »To such a »degree were we thus sovereigns that if one of »us travelled we were supreme* in the seven karshvars »of the earth, so that not a creature dared from

»fear of our Kings to cast on us a disrespectful »glance!« That seems couched in rather too high a tone for the period mentioned. From this there proceeds some further curious history dealing with a Persian Prince long subsequent to Ardashīr, for he bears a name which seems to be of Turkish origin. The distinguished Editor here eliminates as usual all that seems inconsistent with his theory, — and we should understand that his explanation, like that adapted by me, is in no respect inconsistent with such a procedure.

But here he seems to eliminate mainly on account of an anecdote which follows (see page 535), which he again justly declares to be an addition of the Arab translator. I cannot however at all see why it, not the story but the passage, is not a good illustration of the matter in hand, supposing the matter in hand to be likewise of later date and an 'addition' of some previous 'editor'. It is quite right to 'eliminate' the whole allusion, if we wish to lay bare the nucleus of the treatise; *but then we must not stop at that; we may 'eliminate' the whole context to which it is germane.*

Listen also to this further description of Persia. »This fourth* region (the land of the modest) is »the privileged portion of the earth, and compared »with other countries it is the head, the umbril, »the camel's hump, and the stomach. The head, »because from the time of Iraj, son of Farīdūn, »pre-eminence and sovereignty has belonged to all »our kings.

»They, the Persians, have governed all nations«.

(This was almost true of the Achaemenians, as we may note in passing.) »Conflicts which arose amongst »nations were regulated according to the views and »order of our kings. They sent to them, the Per- »sian kings, their daughters and tribute and pre- »sents . . . It, Persia, is the navel of all lands »because it is at the centre of all the nations of »the globe; and its inhabitants are the most illus- »trious, honoured, pious and brave. It has the »horsemanship of the Turk[1], the ingenuity of India, »the dexterity and the art of Greece (*sic*). God has »given us all these talents and in greater measure »than to any one of these other peoples.« He goes into the 'tint of their complexion, and the colour, length and medium straightness of their hair'. . . . »All the sciences of the earth are our portion[2] . ., »all difficulties between subordinate princes are settled »in accordance with the religious law and the »process of proof! As to military prowess, one »thousand of our men have never proceeded to »attack twenty thousand of an enemy without »returning victorious!« Such is the style of this supposed religious ascetic of the year 226 A.D. No wonder Jasnaf-shāh gave up appalled. This was the Platonic philosopher of the school of Socrates and one of a set almost fit to write the Gāthas!

What I shall say further will be for the most part a mere repetition of the foolish items; — foolish,

[1] But the Editor has noted that the Turk was known only later (?).

[2] Did this assist in forming the opinion that philosophical science was familiar in Persia in A.D. 226?

let me always remind the reader, only when one regards them as being really believed to be the statements of such a person as the supposed Tansar writing at the dictation of an Ardashīr at the date ascribed to them. The author, or authors, of the valuable piece soon take[1] up a series of statements which may well reproduce, while they enlarge upon, some actual annals of the time of Ardashīr. It is fully certain that Ardashīr caused his agents to proclaim far and wide, that he would »pour his favour upon all who submitted.« They also doubtless reproduced the standing claims against Rome. And they may well have done their best to spread the pompous assertions that he, Ardashīr, would postpone his campaign against Rome till he had reclaimed the domain of Darius (only we have some suspicious doubts as to whether the crafty conqueror would so plainly unveil his intentions to the enemy by making them too public*). It is not unworthy of a passing word to mention that 'Alexander', the so hated name in Iran, happened to be also the name of the then reigning Roman Emperor[2]. The items which follow are again well in keeping, and must certainly have reproduced what were the standing claims of Persians against Rome. The quick eye for the provinces makes these passages all the more probable. 'He, Ardashīr, will take no rest', the 'document' proceeds to say, 'till he has avenged Darius against the Alexandrids, and so

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[1] or 'takes'.

[2] Alexander Severus.

enriched his treasury and that of the State, having restored the cities which Alexander so wickedly destroyed in Farsistan 500 years before . . .'. Here we have again a touch from a later hand. One almost doubts whether political romance at such a time, fantastic as it sometimes is, would have thought particularly of the extinct cities in a moment of triumph. If the memory of their devotion was so many centuries old, this item would look particularly academic. The man of action has obviously here brushed up his history for effect. He, the supposed author, goes on with his ancient annals. 'He would subject them, the Romans (?), to the tribute which had always been paid to our Persian kings for the country of the Copts and for Syria, which our kings formerly conquered in the land of the Hebrews, since the invasion of these countries by Nebuchadnezzar'. To which the 'letter' adds a thoughtful excuse on behalf of the Persians for not pushing matters too far, and that reason was this, 'that the climate in those regions was too bad, and the chronic diseases too prevalent for his countrymen to settle there'. Then comes (page 549) one more of the anachronisms: 'This state of things continued till the time of Khosroes Anūshirvan* 531—578'. That is to say this state of things mentioned here in this supposed letter of Tansar in A.D. 226 circa, continued and was stated in this same letter by this Tansar, to have continued till a period more than three hundred years after this same writer of this letter, Tansar, had been dead and in his grave

(or rather pulverised to dust, for the flesh of a Parsi was first exposed and not buried), and Ardashīr with him, and the princelet to whom this 'epistle' is supposed to have been addressed along with the two! Our great reviewer and commentator here naturally assents that this is hardly possible. So he proceeds as before to cut the passage out. Yet where is the sign of a break in the diction or the narrative? I again agree in exciding, but my excision would be rather 'excavation' than 'excision'. I would excide what goes before and what follows after. The document here recalls a remark of the recipient of the letter. He had stated that he was related to the Shāhanshāh* through a connection with Ardashīr son of Isfandyār, called Bahman. This certainly looks like a contemporary morsel. A prince would have been likely to be put thus to his resources, and the answer is not unlike what a vain politician would make to him. 'I assure you', he declares, 'that this second Ardashīr is far superior to the first', etc., etc. This was of course the recurring cry of the Restoration, even after its crisis. But the whole description of the thing is elaborated and beyond all proportion for the date. The Persians of the VIIIth, IXth or XIIIth centuries under the Arab power had every motive for reconstructing the historical importance and glamour of their venerable but now superseded dynasty. Their ready wit would most naturally weave a subtle fiction. But the Ardashīr of the Restoration was a man of another mould, and still somewhat in his struggle; for he is actually supposed to be endeavouring in this

very letter to secure the adherence of an additional Chief. Why then is the correspondent made to speak so extensively and so eloquently of him as the author of faits accomplis? The answer might indeed be that he was purposely blatant. The document goes on, page 550, if possible still more in the style of a sensational fabrication: »You say that the acts of the »Shāhanshāh astonish you. There is nothing in them »which ought to produce that effect so much as the »manner in which he has alone of himself conquered »the world. For four centuries the land (or 'la »terre entière', the whole earth) was filled with fero»cious beasts, demons with human faces without »religion, morals, education, wisdom, or shame. It was »a people from whom only desolation and corruption »came into the world. Cities had become deserts, »buildings were in ruins. In the space of fourteen years* »by cleverness, strength and genius he (Ardashīr) »has made waters flow in the desert, and founded »cities, created villages, as they had not done in »four thousand (!) years before him (*sic*)«. That is certainly a 'modest' statement for our Platonic philosopher of the sect of Socrates and our ascetic Archbishop who had abjured ambition, say for 'fifty years'. If he thought that his master, supposing him to have existed, had established such a record as having done more in fourteen years than had been accomplished by all preceding Persian monarchs, Darius the Great included, in 4000, we have but a small opinion of the strength of his judgment; if he were indulging in mendacious panegyric, he was not very exalted as a saint. He goes on: »He,

»Ardashīr, has brought in architects and inhabi-»tants, constructed roads, published laws even »on eating and drinking, on apparel, on travelling »and sojourning. He has put his hand to »nothing without inspiring men with confidence and »bringing matters to a favourable result. He has »worked so well for the future that for a thousand »years after him his work will never be interrupted (!). »He finds more happiness in that future, and takes »more pains for the generations which will come »after him than in the present moment, and more »than in arranging the affairs of his contemporaries«. This was certainly an ideal characteristic; but the panegyrist goes one step further; »he takes more »interest in it (that is to say, in the affairs of the »generations which shall come after him) than he »does in the *preservation of his own health* (!). (Here »the sacrifice becomes serious indeed). 'Whoever', he »proceeds, 'will reflect upon all the merit, know-»ledge, reason, eloquence, anger and satisfaction, »generosity and modesty which he has developed »during these fourteen years, will be able to re-»cognise the fact *that since the Almighty Artisan »of the world constructed the azure sphere of heaven, »the earth has never seen a King so just as to be »his equal* (!)« That was doing pretty well (for a careful official). But he is again as free to predict the future, good and bad, as to delineate the past. »The door of welfare and of order which he has »opened will remain open for a thousand years. »And did we not know that the abandonment of his »will shall bring on trouble and confusion in the

»world, at the end of a thousand years, untying what »he has tied, we should say that he was labouring »for eternity«.

A singular interpolation.

Here follows what seems to me to be a shred from the noble doctrine of the Stoics, 'Notwithstanding that we are *creatures destined to destruction and annihilation*, philosophy demands that we should toil for that which is to last, and that we set our wits to work for eternity'. Where did this singular scrap come from? If it means anything, it is a genuine fragment. Philosophy, as we know, came to Persia in the person of Simplicius and his seven colleagues in the VIth century, 533* A. D., they taking refuge at Teherān as long as they could endure its barbarity; that is to say, for two years. Did this trace of true philosophy indicate a romancer of some philosophic culture in, say the VIIIth or IXth century? Whoever the writer may have been, it is not necessary to say that he never penned these words in the reign of Ardashīr. The composer by implication applies all this to the supposed recipient of the letter: 'You ought to be among those who toil for eternity, etc., though destined to extinction'. At the time of Ardashīr the doctrine of personal immortality must have been particularly strong, as I need hardly say, when regarded as an article of faith among the Persians, for the Revolution was largely carried through with the aid of religious fervour.

Here then we have a positive case for a later

date. If 'immortality' was marked as a doctrine of the Persians in ordinary times, and if the enthusiasm for it was great in the crisis of the religious Restoration, how comes it that a man supposed to be canvassing politically at the very height of this struggle could yet make use of the sentence which I have cited quite in the spirit of the materialistic fatalism, an impossible utterance for such a time and place? With most pertinent worldly wisdom he however adroitly adds: »(You will not »need to toil with only annihilation in view); you »will soon receive the benefit and happiness reserved »for your services. God grant that trouble may »not fall upon your people«.

An extraordinary suggestion.

We now come upon remarks so utterly alien in tone from the time and place, and so near akin to the Mohammadan* controversy that, next to the notice of facts of later date, they constitute an objection to A.D. 212 — 226*, which is more powerful to one who reads the Persian of 1200 A.D. and later, than all the other items presented put together.

»Be convinced«, he concludes, »that the man who »gives up personal effort and falls back upon pre»destination [1] degrades and vilifies himself, and he »who excites himself and allows himself to be »excited in free investigation and denies predestination »is an infatuated dunce. The wise man should

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[1] ! That for the time of Ardashīr.

»take the via media between free endeavour »and destiny« (! this for the year stated); »pre-»destination and free will are like two packages »on the back of a quadruped, if one is heavier than »the other the baggage falls to the ground«. Who does not recognise at once the later fencings of religious dialectics? Jalālu-'d-Dīn i Rūmī is full of things like this; and the whole train of ideas came in with the Kurān. And yet this is left undisturbed in the letter and not 'eliminated'. Surely this must have been an oversight on the part of the gifted Editor; and we must excide it for him. It is simply ridiculous to suppose it to be a part of a political letter written at the date suggested. And the passage affords an absolute proof to all moderately experienced readers that the letter in all but its nucleus was the product of a later age. It is almost, if not quite as certain a proof that A.D. 212 — 226* never saw such a document, as an alleged note in the middle age would be shown to be false because it mentioned some modern invention; — not quite so striking a proof of impossibility, but really quite as firm to those familiar with the circumstances; — the ideas are literally a part of the later age.

Upon this appears an anecdote in further apt illustration of this same fatalism; and much of the same kind abounds in later Asiatic theological literature. The distinguished Editor immediately and, as usual, simply cuts it out; I would at once follow his example, save that I would 'cut out' all that precedes it, for I can see no just warrant for rejecting the illustration while retaining the principal passage which

is equally impossible for Persia at the time supposed. The anecdote is as distinctly apt to the context as it is reasonable to expect; it is germane to what goes before as it is to what follows.

So much for the facts as cited by the 'letter' in the edition as it stands before us, or rather for most of them. A thorough and critical revision of the text and translation of the letter on my part is uncalled for; see the cogent reasons already given; and in fact only a verbatim is needed, and with the texts now printed any one can make that for himself. The argument is concerned with the general bearing of the letter, and only very seldom indeed with textual difficulties.

Résumé as to its style, — excisions.

I had intended to divide my brief review of this very interesting document into two portions, one concerning its facts, and one upon the style; but the style is in itself almost the most prominent fact, and it is inextricably bound up with the other elements.

What, then, is our conclusion? — first and foremost as to the body of the document. And here I differ from the eminent Editor, as I cannot too pointedly repeat, *only in the degree* of my estimate of the details; yet I cannot at all conceal the fact that this matter of 'degree' is decisive. He excerpts all that seems to him to be absolutely impossible as a portion of a work written at the time and place stated, about A.D. 212—226, and I literally follow in his track so far as this principle is concerned. Among these impossible allusions he

excludes all those portions of the letter which speak of matters which were notoriously not in existence at that period of Ardashīr, and secondly several other important items which do not seem to him to be congruous to that early authorship, such as the mention of the 'will' of the man who is in the next chapter spoken of as practically the inspiring originator of the so-called epistle itself. But he preserves a large part of the document, and attributes it really to one Tansar (so deciphering the name in the Dēnkard and in Maçoudi, or Mas'ūdī), to correspond with the name of a chief Mobed, or Archbishop**, under Ardashīr the First. I endeavour to carry out *the same process of excision exactly*, *only that I leave a greatly more reduced residue as the result.* And if the alternative opinion suggested on p. 191, Mars-avril 1894 be accepted, then *I hardly differ from my so greatly distinguished colleague* save as to the effect of his conclusion. See where he most sagaciously admits that the texts may be the work of Bahrām. Things that could not possibly have had any existence in A.D. 226 (circa) were of course not referred to at that period; nor could a style of composition together with a grasp and delicacy of thought which were common in Persia in the XIIIth century, and also possible from the VIIIth to the Xth centuries, have been habitual to any such person as a simple Mobed of Mobeds under Ardashīr.

Perhaps this is a favourable place to bring in another unmistakable touch from the hand of a later artist, even if we must go back to the 'introduction' to the 'letter'

in which it occurs It is that wonderful piece of counsel which Aristotle gives Alexander. The sage, for so he was evidently supposed to be, tells him (Alexander) 'to leave princelets independent of each other, so that they shall be sure to disagree; so many misunderstandings, rivalries, and quarrels will arise among them that they will have no time to avenge themselves upon you, and they will be so absorbed in such distractions that they will forget the past'. Surely such blasé remarks were never made by an Aristotle, first or second. But this was not in the letter proper. Here is, however, a piece of avowed thirteenth-century writing, or, at least, of ninth-century writing. It is not presented as a part of the letter, and *yet it matches in style completely with it;* and it matches also with that style throughout.

I must therefore designate the whole document, and without hesitation, as being in its present form a subtle political fiction of the highest possible value, worked up like many other such spuria, [1] and upon ancient traditions of the glorious Sasanian Restoration, intended, moreover, to gratify the wounded vanity of the crushed Persian circles who, in the seventh to ninth century or later, still adhered either in heart or practice to the primitive Persian faith. And I do not yield at all to the Editor in my admiration for parts of it, nor for the skill or veracity

[1] Such spuria are well-nigh universal, as the reader should understand. Recall for instance the letters of Heraclitus, the false books of Plato, the spurious pieces of Philo, etc., etc. Literature is full of such apocryphal documents.

disclosed in it, regarded as an artistic production or reproduction, of a later age. I will go further, and would say that the document was unquestionably founded, like almost every other document of the kind, upon facts past, or long past. Beyond any manner of question, there was a flood of political circulars or official 'letters' sent by the agents of Ardashīr methodically to every potentate within the Empire, soliciting his adherence to the new régime with promises and threats (see above). Instead of there being one 'letter', like this, in all save its impossible amplifications and its thirteenth-century style, there must, of course, have been scores of them. That Restoration was a 'large affair', if ever a revolution was. The amount of 'business' — military, diplomatic, and bureaucratic — involved in it must have been immense; and Ardashīr was not the man to neglect its chief items in any way. If there was no Tansar as Mobed of Mobeds at his Court, then there was beyond all doubt some other Archbishop, so to speak, if not like him personally, yet discharging the self-same functions; and it matters little what his name was called. And such an official could not have avoided being in the very centre of the situation, for Ardashīr was pushing the interests of the national religion for all that they were worth. It is not improbable that an ardent fanaticism was prominent among the chief forces upon which he relied to complete those results which seemed to be, and which were, quite all-important. If, then — I repeat it — there was actually no such person as this High-priest at the Court

of Ardashīr about 212—226 A.D., there were most certainly many busy and shrewd public officials of various degrees of authority closely resembling this supposed Tansar, and ready to do the bidding of their master. These persons would be naturally ecclesiastics for the reasons given; and they were doubtless writing letters continuously to the Governments of the provinces, each one of which must have dealt in panegyric toward the new Emperor, though in rougher and simpler words. And over these astute persons there would be, unquestionably, the titular head; but whether this nominal Primate were really the force which Ardashīr was using, or only the figure-head to some other abler man, can never be surmised. Office itself, however, at that early day must have constituted a predominant element of power. Still, whatever imperfections may exist in the grouping of the ancient facts which are supposed to be represented, it cannot be denied that early history is illustrated in the details. And that is my verdict.

The piece is beautifully worked up with ingenious and refined imagination from ancient hearsay, or possibly from older documents.

But what results if the letter be genuine as actually written at the date of Ardashīr? Let it be supposed for a moment, and for the sake of argument, that this really attractive piece was in reality so composed, as it stands, at the time stated. What then? What bearing has such a fact upon the date of the 'Old Avesta'? What sort of an author does

it show this one to have been? Was he a '*Platonist of the school of Socrates?*' (*sic*). If so, I fear that he was a bad imitation of his masters; or the school, on the other hand, must itself have degenerated. Let me be pardoned for saying it; but if ever a vain coxcomb penned a pointed political paper (not, so to say, a 'pamphlet'), it was this wonderful ascetic Ecclesiastic who declares that he had abjured the world for a lifetime, and who is also supposed to be a person who[1] renounced a throne!, one of the most suspicious items, as it seems to me, in literature.

No possible freedom in the last very fair French translation can at all conceal the eccentricities of the individual on the supposition that it was written at the time reported. If a Tansar, as a narrator, wrote this at the date suggested, then he was not an infatuated egotist only because he was untruthful; and upon that understanding his existence was wholly to be regretted as an element in so serious a situation.

Nor was his Chief himself, as he depicts him, any more exalted in principle than we should expect for the time, place, and circumstances. Let it however be once more supposed, for the sake of argument, not only that the piece was genuine, but that all such objectionable features as we have noticed were wholly absent, what, even then, in all the world, has such a letter to do with the 'Antiquity of the Avesta'? Do such allusions to speculative thought as appear in it at all illustrate the presence of the

[1] As Maçoudi (Mas'ūdī) says.

Gāthic spirit in Persia at that time? It seems to me to be absurd upon the face of it to mention such a parallel. And where is the first word in it even about the collection of primitive documents, to which allusion has been made?, not that we should suppose for a moment that such a work had been neglected. What bearing could such expected, and even necessary, clerical diligence have upon the antiquity, or non-antiquity, of those time-honoured relics? Collections of ancient parts of the Avesta with additions to them and translations of them into later Zend and into Pahlavi must have been taking place from the earliest periods, and especially at crises of religious revival.

Are we to suppose that the Gāthas were written in the year One, or at B.C. 100, because a resuscitation took place when Zoroastrianism mounted the throne in the person of Ardashīr two or three hundred years later on? There is no necessary or relevant connection whatsoever, so far as I can see, between the two propositions.

No one doubts that religious zeal was at a white heat in A.D. 212 and for some time following, while with it theological ingenuity became active, and documents worthy to be called 'Avesta' must have been composed; the contrary is most improbable. Is it possible that a Restoration which was probably largely incited by the priestly class, and which seated a person upon the throne who himself claimed priestly descent, and which, as we see from much unintentional evidence, affected a religious sentiment, could possibly have neglected

its, to it, so sacred Scriptures? If the hated Alexander could eagerly seek out the Persian sages, and affect the Persian lore, together with the Persian dress, how much more would the busy Ardashīr attend to a matter so vital in every sense to the moment! Except in times of exceptional neglect or degeneration, the documents were not only periodically, but almost continuously, subjected to revisional treatment[1] How many scores of centres must there have been where the rites were celebrated! And how often were the scrolls stored in their priestly chests recopied as they became worn out by use, new documents, expository or original, being most certainly often added to their number. The Pahlavi translations, or the Zend of the Avesta, must at least have been continually recopied, emended (?), and increased from the very first. It seems simply childish to place any exceptional emphasis upon that statement of the Dēnkard, to the effect that the religious documents were collected[2]. *Of course*, the Scriptures were re-collected, recopied, and enlarged. And if the Vendīdād, the Yashts, and the Gāthas possessed in themselves any evidence at all that they originated at the time of Ardashīr, *of course* it would be natural to suppose that they were among the documents which were composed at that period, or that it was they, among others, which were recopied, explained (!), and sanctified afresh; and this would be practically certain. And, so far as re-editing was concerned; that is to say,

[1] of some kind or another.

[2] See it alluded to above, upon page 64.

rearrangement in the liturgies, etc.; this must certainly have happened even with regard to the Gāthas themselves. The statement cited does not touch the question of their origin, which depends wholly upon their internal evidence, and upon that of the other lore, the Indian, which is so intrinsically related to them. *Some* documents were continually appearing; and some, beyond a doubt, appeared under the stimulus of the Restoration; but what those documents were would be plainly shown by their contents; that is to say, their contents would plainly show at a glance, at least whether it were possible that they were composed at such a time, place, and under such circumstances, or not. Our inquiry, however, has reference to a particular part of the Avesta, that universally acknowledged to be its original and oldest part.

These ancient pieces are, I need hardly say, of all possible documents of the kind about the least probable as the *forged* product of the Sasanian age, early or late; and, in fact, there is no one, so far as I am aware, who supposes that they were composed in that age, unless, indeed, there is a certain undertone of insinuation throughout the translation and representation of this 'letter', which was intended to induce a current of opinion trending that way. The question, however, lies in a certain sense upon our path, and we must consider it.

Is it, then, likely or possible that while priests were elated in a crisis of enthusiasm at the glorious events which were transpiring, any one of them,

even if he had the power, should have set to work to forge those deeply meditative though impassioned pieces, with all their wranglings and their hopes, and with their wonderful internal evidence, as well, of contemporaneous historical origin? Was that a time for a fantastic invention which was to foist upon the people *the very central document of their Religion*, for let it never be forgotten that the Gāthas were the very core of all the religious traditions of the Persians then, and deservedly so considered, for they are obviously a contemporaneous record of the life of their Prophet; and they, the Gāthas, together with other sacred pieces, were the objects of worship in the course of the liturgies?

Or was the impression, on the other hand, at all really intended to be insidiously conveyed that the Gāthas thus actually *arose* as *genuine compositions*, with all their homogeneous lost companions, in Medo-Persia in the years A.D. 212—226 (*circa*)? Granted that there existed brilliant schools of Zend philology throughout the Sasanian age, — and the origin of the new Zend alphabet thoroughly proves that such centres must have existed, — can culture itself account for the origin of a document which is totally alien from all the facts of the period? Where was the Vīshtāsp struggling for the early throne? Or was this name (Vīshtāsp) a pseudonym for Ardashīr with the extinct Arsacid, or his lingering adherents, as the dregvant? [1] Were these the objects of the Gāthic anathemas? Where were the Daēvas, that

[1] A word for the 'faithless' with which the Gāthas deal.

is to say, the Daēva-worshippers? These were on the south-east toward India, not among the Parthians or Persians who had been Mazda-worshippers, as is believed [1], for ages. The lingering Daēva-worshippers were kindred to the Ṛig-veda men. There was once a day when Iranians, too, worshipped Dēvas*, like their so distant kinsmen. 'Heaven-gods' was an Indo-aryan name in ages lost to memory. Did Dēva*-worshipping tendencies linger till AD. 226 at Teherān? The Gāthic struggle, as we hold, was one of the original conflicts which turned those Dēvas* into Devils, and a signal part of one of them. These questions cited are truly difficult.

And who was thê Zarathushtra? Was this Tansar the man? Such questions seem to an antiquarian critic to be simply irrational; and they were hardly ever really meant to be seriously suggested, if at all.

And here I must recall what was said in the preface to my new and curtailed edition of the Gāthas, which seems also to have produced conviction in some quarters at least. It anticipates, indeed, what I shall have to enlarge upon still later; but it will yet be useful if now stated here. It is that we hold the Gāthas to be ancient, not at all because of anything in the nature of authoritative assertion to that effect contained within them, or in any other possible documents. All definitive assertions of claims to antiquity, veracity, possibility, or probability, have with me at least — for I venture to speak for no one else—absolutely no persuading

[1] That is to say, largely so. See even the Religion of the Arsacids.

force. On the contrary, such assertions, if too urgently presented, would immediately arouse my own suspicions. Just in so far as any passages in the Gāthas [1] *asserted* them to have been composed at any particular date, early or late, just in that degree would I, for one, repudiate such a passage. We hold them to be the delineation of long-past scenes; but scenes, indeed, like those in the Iliad, or other very ancient compositions, might have been totally poetical and illusory, and obviously intended so to be understood; but we believe these hymns to be the expression of contemporaneous life, because they *disclose this without intending it, and as it were in passing.* They are made up of personal allusions of such a character as to convince us that they refer to real and contemporaneous events. And we hold them to be centuries older than Ardashīr, because *these allusions are wholly unconscious.* They obviously refer to people who could only have existed at an early period, for we are forced by their language, and, above all, by their extraordinary metres, to associate them with the Ṛig-vedic Indians of at least many centuries before Ardashīr. Evident traces of positive association with Ṛig-vedic worshippers linger in the books themselves, or, at least, traces of association appear with remnants of tribes, the bulk of whom had indeed, perhaps a long time before, pressed southward through the Khâibar [2]. But I will not

[1] See my introduction to the second edition of the Gāthas, 1900.
[2] *Sic.*

pause longer upon this just here, as I have dealt with it before.

To sum up, then, my own impressions, which, however, I am very far indeed from wishing to press unduly upon others, —though, as I am in duty bound to say, they have been formed after very severe and prolonged labour and reflection throughout many years; —they are as follows:

I confess that I cannot at all understand how a great scholar of such widespread authority as the gifted Editor of this letter could push it forward as having any decisive connection whatsoever with the question of the 'antiquity' of those strangely original rough Hymns, or, indeed, with that of any other part of the Avesta. I reserve to this late place a remark with regard to what many might consider to be the crucial point of all — the identity of the names Bīshar and Tansar. I may say that the identification of the two is not at all so curious as it looks, and to my mind the probability of the identification is shaken merely by the fact that it is not so urgently called for; — that is to say, that it is not needed as an element of proof. The existence of such an high-priest with those functions, and the collection and revision of 'Scriptures', together with the re-organization of the ecclesiastical institutions and the ritual, were all certainties and matters of course. The identification of the *name* itself is of little importance so long as we see that the items mentioned were altogether commonplace; *both they and the name deny nothing, and they*

prove as little. The only item worth a moment's notice is the eccentric allusion to the Platonic character of this Bīshar-Tansar; and that, together with what corresponds to it in the 'letter', was one of the obvious affectations of a later century brought in by the sojourn of Simplicius at the Persian Capital in A.D. 533.

Scraps of philosophy lingered from that hour, doubtless, in many a linguistic school of Persia, and they were by no means absorbed by the intense Biblical fervour which took possession of Persian literature almost simultaneously through the Arabic conquest. Does, then, the Platonic character of this Bīshar-Tansar of the sixth, seventh, ninth, or thirteenth century prove or suggest any strong influence exerted by the Philonian Lógos in Persia in A.D. 226? I may say at once — though of course I re-open the question elsewhere — that any philosophic tendency following upon Simplicius' visit in the sixth century seems to me to be utterly bereft of all power as a source of proof in this connection with reference to A.D. 226, three hundred years before.

Having done my best to form an unprejudiced opinion of the value of this most interesting piece of literature as evidence of the existence of the philosophical habit of mind in Persia in the middle of the Reign of Ardashīr, it will be now my duty, after thanking the Editor and the translators of it, to go into similar details with regard to the Philonian philosophy itself.

III.

Preparation for the study of the Lógos.

But before we do this it may be as well to pause for a moment while we clear the atmosphere of our subject, by asking what we are really to expect in our search. Are we seeking to prove that because certain resemblances are traced by some persons between ideas in the Philonian philosophy and ideas in the Avesta, and that their arguments are satisfactory (which I deny), that therefore, and in consequence of such external, or even internal, resemblances, really supposing them to be demonstrated, it stands proved that there existed a close historical connection between the two; and that this was such a relation as exists between cause and effect? It seems to me to be highly desirable that we should once for all examine this matter closely and decide it; for we are exposing the truth to a very great risk, if we are to hazard everything upon a decision as to whether the two lores are at all alike, or not.

Is it then at all a fact that such supposed resemblances, even if they be shown to exist, really prove any such close historical connection between the Avesta and the Philonian philosophy as may be considered to be that existing between origin and result?

For without pausing to discuss this question as to actually existing resemblances further just at this point, it may be very useful indeed for us to stop and inquire whether a similarity, even such as was taken for granted by the authors of the suggestion

referred to, entails such an external historical connection between the two important lores as that to which I have alluded.

Similarity in details no absolute proof of identity in origin.

Let it be supposed for a moment, for the sake of argument, that the 'Vohumanah' of the Gāthas was 'like Philo's Lógos'. Is there not an important method of accounting for this resemblance before we take into consideration any such influences as those which might be derived from immediate external contact? For we need not pause here to prohibit the use of such a very unfit and conventional term as 'accident', which is a mere name for our ignorance.

Aside, then, from this last, let me fully state my problem, which is, that where two things of the nature of those here present are found to be alike, it is not necessary for us to assume that one of them is related to the other as cause is related to effect, not even when they have appeared at times closely near to each other. No resemblances, however close, and no apparent connection, however positive, are in themselves an absolutely certain proof of causality, or even a proof of immediate identity in origin, for these circumstances might be the consequences of more general laws, which necessarily control the forces out of which both the phenomena in question arose at remotely previous periods. In which case the likeness which exists in these ideas would arise from the same

causes indeed; but these would be seen to be causes so distant as almost to reside in the original unity of the forces of Nature. Certain of the ideas in the Gāthic hymns and some of those in the Philonian and in the Greek philosophies may therefore, as I contend, have arisen from causes which had nothing whatsoever to do with any immediate personal or national connection between the Iranian people on the one side and the Greeks and the Jews on the other in the historical period. But more.

It seems to be absolutely certain that such ideas as some of those which prevail in the Gāthas and in Philo not only *may* have originated independently of one another, but that they are such as *must* inevitably have so arisen in the minds of human beings of a certain not so narrowly restricted type; and this so soon as they have attained to a certain degree of development and of culture upon development, and so soon, also, as they come under the influence of certain never-failing quasi-external phenomena. Similar ideas not only do, but they must, arise independently in each human being, if they contain what we may term the 'necessary elements'. Why should they not? To some of us this seems to be so plain as to appear to be a mere feature in universal natural history (Naturwissenschaft).

The human organism is of exceptional delicacy and of remote ancestral origin, as are very many of the higher organisms beneath it. The inner life of these latter may (strange as it may seem to some of us) be the more familiar to science; and we may be more ready to concede a common pre-

destined similarity in ideas to them; if, indeed, the lower orders can be said to have 'ideas', which, however, I, for one, could not for a moment think of attempting to deny.

From what we might call the almost miraculous forces, which lurk in every inferior cerebral (or spinal) cell, and as the result of impinging approaches, which are indefinitely less than visible to the naked or even to the assisted eye, the fundamental tissues, out of which all life proceeds, find themselves in action and reaction, first as recipient and then as originating powers, supreme over the future course of the individual being, rudimental as that individual may be. And as each separate division of a lobe, from its central muscle to its remotest tendril, is a physical continuity to a remotely previous series, we might, if we possessed sufficiently minute perceptive powers, trace back the thread of its history till at last we find the point of common origin for all of them. This would be some primeval entity, containing within itself the possibilities of all that follow it as its parts.

And as everything extant and visible in the class of objects which we may be considering has arisen from that same original, this original must have been divided and subdivided, as its offspring have been reproduced, into portions, which must be to a high degree, and, in many instances, well-nigh essentially alike. These developed entities also, whatever we may term them individually, are not only of identical origin in their past, but they are subject to very nearly the same class of external

influences in their present and in their future. How is it possible that they can escape developing, in their turn, subjective tendencies, followed by motions or actions which are similar?

If their origin were not explained as external to Nature, we should be inclined to look upon them as a section of a circle in a perpetual motion of indefinitively previous origin and indefinitely enduring continuity. In a manner fully analogous to this, that higher organism, the human brain, has had its being; passing through very similar stages of development. And these have been, presumably, more marvellous than has been the case with any of the others. Both in its susceptibility to impressions from without, and in the intercommunication of the forces which enable it to co-ordinate those impressions, that is to say, in its *character*, it must be, comparatively speaking, far more fixed and vigorous, as the product of immensely more numerous antecedents, through an indefinitely prolonged preparatory history. Upon each internal receptive nerve-centre minute photographs (so to use such a figure of speech) have been precipitated for ages in the continuous line of life, and stored away unconsciously in the successive folds of memory. At given moments the action of external personal or impersonal nature touches the recipient organ, surcharged as it is with (accumulated) responsive vitality.

At each such impact, sensibilities are awakened more subtle than many of the otherwise occult forces, moving, (if we might make use of such a figure) in their reaction with a velocity of which the magnetic

current may afford an emblem. Apprehensions and desires spring into rapid life till full ideas are born. And from the first stir of a molecule to the finished elaborations of intellection all results must be just in so far essentially kindred in each as the substantive beings are in themselves similar, and as the ideas are fundamental and necessary. No two individual living objects are, we must suppose, actually the same, either in their texture or inherent energy; but no two of their particular class can be essentially dissimilar in their chief characteristics. The same ideas must arise from the same contacts of the same forces, under identical surrounding circumstances.

No such closely similar products could be counted upon as occuring in sporadic cases wholly isolated from each other. Each cerebral centre, as an organ of thought, is a part of its mates, though at present severed from them, for it contains a portion of that so mysterious substance from which each other one of the kind derives its origin.

And as the nerve-centres of distinctly defined human beings are yet to be considered as parts of one another in the sense expressed, so the scenes which unroll themselves before the vision and the other subjective susceptibilities of each are necessarily as similar to man, as they are to his brother of the lower orders. Not only are the constituent material elements, in the interests which operate upon people, practically the same, but the very combinations and detail of recurring objects and events are similar *History not only does, but must*

repeat itself. As the great commonplaces of meteorology have established themselves as regular, giving us the expectation of what makes our life possible as a period of sane activity, so the great throng of the detailed motions or events in the world are to be expected in their general character. Rising crops, accumulating ores, diverted rivers, tunnelled mountains, controlled electric forces, marts gathered in teeming centres, factories tremulous with fiercely-driven mechanisms, schools of practical learning thronged and busy. Anything and everything real, or merely seeming, reverts not in a circle unprogressive and vicious, let us hope, but in a spiral, with ever-increasing development. Each individual combination is coming on, culminating and redissolving into its elements from a past eternity, and so will each continue to do to a similar unending futurity.

The scene, with its big faults and its small advantages, streams slowly around us, now repulsive to the verge of the terrific, but again sublime. And all comes before the self-same expectant and receptive faculties, as well in men as in brutes, creating impressions and suggesting motives, till the thoughtful observer is soon convinced that the individual is but a part in one vast organism. How is it possible, then, that we should not experience at times the same fundamental surmises—nay, the selfsame identical conceptions even as to what may not seem so much to be the primal elements of things?

To sum up. Ideas arise independently in different parts of the world and in different minds, just

as they arise in the same narrow community and in the same mind at different times without the link of recollection. And not only do they so arise independent of all immediate external mental contact, from one region to another, but they cannot help but so arise, recurring and at certain quasi registrable intervals. It is not only not strange that the same ideas should arise in parts of the world so far separated, and in times so different as those of Zoroaster and of Philo, supposing the former to have lived several centuries before the latter; but the contrary to this would be strange. *The reproduction of ideas not only may, but it must happen.* Especially must this be the case when these so-called fundamental ideas which we are considering are the moral ideas, these latter being almost instincts, for we experience the immediate necessity for their application at every step.

This is to such a degree the case that the moral idea is often supposed to be discernible to some extent, even in the 'animal' world. And when we see gifted intellects elaborating in the main the same theories, though ending with different selections, it becomes simply ridiculous for us to expect to find no similarity between even widely-separated individuals of a similar class and in lores of the same general tendency. The moral ideas depend upon measure, and measure is the prerogative of man. The ideas in the Zarathushtrian Gāthas supposed to possess a similarity to certain ideas in the Philonian philosophy are chiefly of this character; and they are ideas which could not well possibly have failed

to emerge from any civilization which possesses the characteristics which are claimed by experts, both for the Iranian lore and for that of the Alexandrians.

We find also, as a matter of course, much the same ideas developed in India, to an extent only surpassed in the schools of Greece; and it was as inevitable that they should appear there as in Iran and in Egypt, though, properly speaking, we should treat the Indian and the Iranian lores as different parts of the same homogeneous thing.

It seems to me, then, to be in itself contradictory to all sound procedure in material as in historical science, to suppose that the ideas in the old Avesta are in any way necessarily connected with those in the Philonian philosophy, as either cause or effect. But supposing it to be evident that this relation existed between the two, and that one of them was the cause of the other as its effect, then I do not hesitate to assert that, beyond all question, it was the Zarathushtrian which was the source of the Philonian ideas (involved), and not the Philonian which was the source of the Zarathushtrian — that is to say, if these features of resemblance are such as they are supposed by some to be. But this latter I by no means hold to be the case.

Independence of origin further considered.

If then there exists any data forcing, or even strongly inclining us, to put the Gāthas at a different age from Philo, and to hold them to be otherwise

also separated from him in a manner which is absolutely effective, so that no intellectual intercourse, direct or indirect, were possible between them on either side; then in that case, in view of what has been said, the fact that the one could speak of individual character as divisible into the three distinct departments of 'thought, word and deed', 'of the bodily life and the mental', of 'the soul's own conscience becrying the wicked', and the other could speak of the Lógos with its kindred subconcepts [1] are things which could only be expected; and as such they do not necessitate the acceptance of the slightest external historical connection. And if it were not for other circumstances which prove such an historical connection, I should be strongly inclined to believe that the resemblances between the Gāthas and Philo were of this nature; that is to say, I should be inclined to hold that they had arisen separately and also necessarily, unconnected with each other by any influences which had made themselves felt during the historical period; for ideas of this description must inevitably have so arisen and independently of each other, just as the suns arise upon the horizon, the earth revolves, and vegetation develops.

And I for one, and as a matter of course, let me say it as if in parenthesis, would regard it as a far more rare and therefore prized result, if we could be sure that the noble and clear thoughts in the Gāthic Avesta and in the Jewish-greek philo·

[1] Supposing these to be nearly allied to the Gāthic concepts, which supposed circumstance I would however deny.

sophy severally arose each in its pure individuality, as christaline formations do, not degraded by any suppositions of a borrowed origin, either in the one case or in the other. And I also, really, even think it finer if we can imagine to ourselves such a lore as either of these even without successors, a purely isolated development of something that is good in our enfeebled, and too often degraded history.

I would not however press this last, but with regard to the first I should insist. We should sometimes look at mankind as artists look at them. Surely if the human race were in so far developed and educated into a capacity for fine ideas, and to such a degree that the results of this capacity could come out in more than one way in several different and isolated centres, there is little doubt but that this would show that the general character of the whole family of man was higher than would appear to be the case if that refinement were necessarily borrowed at every recurrence from one contemporaneous centre to another.

The way is now clear for our continued detailed discussion on the main question.

The Gāthas and the Philonian Philosophy.


We have studied with care Vohu manah, as in the sources of critical information [1], so also, Asha Khshathra, Āramaiti [2] and the rest. We have made

[1] See above on p. 17 flg.

[2] See the Five Zarathushtrian Gāthas with the Zend, Pahlavi, Sanskrit and Persian texts, Commentary vol. II. and Dictionary vol. III., first section, pages 623—821, ه to م.

a review of Tansar's letter, which document is supposed to have led a great scholar to see Philonian Philosophy in the Gāthic concepts.

Let us now in due course examine the Philonian Philosophy itself as closely as the nature of this treatise will admit, comparing it together with its Lógos with the Asha and Vohumanah* of the Avesta as we proceed, not forgetting however the other Amesha-spentas.



IV.

The Lógos.

The Philonian doctrine is of course Platonic in many of its main features, which for the most part engage our attention here. What then was Plato's doctrine of the Lógos or of the νοῦς (noũs), for so he for the most part called it. To introduce a delineation of this system, it will be necessary to go to the very root of the entire matter, and to trace the idea of the Lógos, so far as it arose in the Greek mind from the very first.

Accordingly I proceed to sketch its history. And if I seem to some readers to go too far back in the investigation, my answer would be one which should satisfy at least the adherents to the original Iranian lore, for it would be that the true sources of that lore have never been presented, or hardly even seriously discussed in the still so sadly neglected state of Iranian studies And then perhaps I may hope also to bring up, even before the teachers of Greek philosophy, some facts of high interest which, though known to Orientalists as of course, are yet seldom brought out of their almost forgotten texts, and placed in the new light of the present situation of ideas [1].

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[1] I would, however, advise some of my readers to pass for the present from this place to the chapter on Philo's δυνάμεις; see below, returning later here.

The Greek Lógos.

It is my task then to compare the Greek Lógos with the Amesha-Spentas of the Zend Avesta; — and as I have found reason to warn the literary public against expecting any proof of the existence of too strong analogies between the two developments, I am under a necessity to refrain, so far as possible, from colouring my statements as to what the Greek Lógos is, with those very arguments which I use to controvert its claims to analogy here. An obvious protest would be at once put in against any conclusions which I might draw, for it would be said: 'You have put in a prejudiced statement of the systems whose supposed historical influence you are anxious to deny'.

I therefore take especial care to cite the usual presentations of the subject, which are readily accessible in familar editions. First of all we must carefully recall our 'Zeller'[1]. After him Heinze[2] claims our attention; — and in fact, I will endeavour as far as possible actually to follow this last writer, so far as I can agree with his masterly disquisition. But I beg the reader carefully to note that where I approximately present Heinze's views upon the subject, even page after page, I by no means pretend to make even a partial translation of

[1] Zeller, Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung. Erster Teil, zweite Hälfte. Fünfte Auflage, pp. 623—740.

[2] Die Lehre vom Logos in der griechischen Philosophie, von Dr. Max Heinze. Oldenburg, 1872.

his language, or a full reproduction of his views. I cite only what of them I deem to be necessary, together with those of Zeller, and in language more free and readable perhaps, than a literal translation would be [1].

I proceed then to give my summary as nearly as possible unprejudiced by any of my own especially favoured and possibly preconceived theories, though of course I cannot be expected to refrain from stating my own long since settled views, as well as my latest immediate impressions, and in my own way.

Plato, Philo's real master, came early under the influence of Heraclitus (of Asia Minor, be it noticed), through his (H.'s) pupil Cratylus; and it was Heraclitus precisely, who first distinctly formulated the idea af a Lógos in the Greek philosophy; that is to say, so far as we are now aware of the history of those early literary or intellectual events.

Predecessors of Heraclitus.

Before the Lógos of Heraclitus, as is usual in the cases of all originators, the thing 'originated' was already present in its germ for his use in the half-formed surmises of his predecessors.

For it was none other than Hesiod who used a word and expressed an idea [2] which, together with

[1] It is also, of course, impossible to give a translation of an author when one is perforce constrained, with parallel procedure, to report the views of several writers at once, with one's own opinions upon them.

[2] Op. 692: *μέτρα φυλάσσεσθαι*, 718: 'the abundant loveliness of the tongue that moves in rhythmic order'.

the hints of other schemes, led up to the early concepts.

The first Greek naturalists believed, indeed, in an original substance of the universe out of which everything arose and in which everything consisted; they also attributed to it life and motion, and gave it different names. One thought it was 'water'. Another called it the infinite, (*sic*) [1], as undefined substance matter. At other times they thought it was 'air'.

Parmenides [2] had spoken of trusting only the Lógos, that is to say 'reason', while distrusting the senses, imagination etc.; but this does not seem in itself to possess much speculative importance.

He reduced everything to one in his philosophy and denied development. He did not like the idea of motion [3], and had no conception of the consciousness of the Lógos; nor had Heraclitus this latter for the matter of that.

His natural philosophy was so bad that he believed in the stationary character of all things as a *στασιώτης τοῦ ὅλου*, and he earned the name of 'no-naturalist', *ἀφύσικος* from Aristotle. We have no analogy with either Asha or Vohumanah here.

[1] cp. the Avesta conception of 'infinite time'.

[2] Flourished in the 69th Olympiade, 504—500 (B. C.)

[3] See Heinze, p. 59 and Zeller, part. I. pp. 553—584.

Heraclitus.

It was the keen discriminator of Ephesus [1] who first saw a certain something imperative, not to say imperious, in the rhythm of nature, of its motions and of its developments.

I would say of him 'this great generaliser'; for we must concede him that title, however much we may differ from his ultimate conclusions.

Heraclitus did not indeed definitively resolve those secrets which the labour of all these centuries has only just succeded in discovering or rediscovering, but he came so very near to this that we may fairly say that if he had possessed one fraction of the data which we now have, he would have surpassed most of us of these latter days in the depth of his intuition and in the keenness of his analysis; for he seems to have surmised what we now know to be the true definition of 'heat', as an everliving fire, 'kindling with regularity, burning out with regularity'; cp. the μέτρα φυλάσσεσθαι of Hesiod.

'The sun shall never pass his measure, for did

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[1] Died about 470—478 B. C. For his fragments, see Bywater's masterly edition quoted by Zeller, etc. Clarendon Press, Oxford. Bernays Gesammelte Abhandl. I, 1—108. Bernays Heraklitischen Briefe. 1869. Lassalle, Die Philosophie des Herakleitos des Dukeln, 1858. Gladisch, Herakleitos und Zoroaster 1859 (antiquated). Schuster, H. von Ephesus, 1873. Teichmüller, Neue Stud. z. Gesch. d. Begriffe I, 1876. E. Pfleiderer, Die Philosophie des Heraklit, 1886. Patrick, Heraklitus, Baltimore, 1889, etc.

he do so, the night goddesses, aid of justice, would find him out', cf. Plut., de exil., II. 604, 9.

We do not distinctly gather that he held to any unchangeable underlying substance of phenomena. All is 'becoming' with him. But surely one would think he must have seen that an eternal substance was necessary, the everlasting changing of the forms of which constitute perhaps existence, certainly 'creation' and 'events'.

The one underlying substance which exists according to his ideas was what he called, as I have cited, 'fire'. We should call it 'heat', the eternal perpetual motion; that is to say, its mode.

Nature moves in so far as it is subjected to, or better, in so far as it possesses 'caloric' (*sic*) from the slowly dissolving ice to the electricity of the atmosphere; and the march of nature is rhythmical; it has reason; for all things adapt themselves each to the other and fall into their places; and out of the clash of seeming discord life with all its developments, mental, emotional and moral arises; — there was reason 'Lógos' (here in this application meaning more 'a sentence' than 'mere speech').

And for this discovery or recognition a great church father reckoned him among the fold of Christians before Christ: 'They who live according to or 'with' the Lógos, are', said Justin, 'Christians, even if they were thought atheists; and such were Socrates, Heraclitus and the like among the Greeks' [1].

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[1] See the well-known place in Justin Martyr, Apol. I, 85, C.; quoted by Heinze, etc.

An incongruous grouping indeed, as we should say, but one which perhaps shows the power of the Lógos all the more.

The moral order of the life of Heraclitus was thought of; but it was his theory which was the occasion of the remark. The idea of reason as inherent in nature dominated his Philosophy. That Philosophy indeed impresses us with its 'one' arising from two opposites, while the opposites become knowable only after the splitting of the unit into two.

It was hardly however as some think [1], the march of motion by the sublated negation which Fichte and Hegel most prominently revived and elaborated [2]. It was moreover wholly materialistic, let it be noted well. Although as in the case of every similar supposition, we may always understand 'materialism' in a certain deeper and sublimer sense [3].

For matter must have been regarded by Heraclitus as a thing which contains within its potentiality all that we know of mind or morals. The Lógos of Heraclitus is the eternal law of motion in the strife of contending elements; that is to say in the embrace of opposites, 'splitting all things', but 'putting the split together' and again 'the split'; cp.

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[1] See Lassalle.

[2] Recall Hegel's remark to the effect 'that there is no sentence of Heraclitus which he had not embodied in his Logik'; see Patrick upon this.

[3] The word naturally grates upon ours ears and upon our feelings. But after all not a single item, in the myriad experiences of sentiment, is denied by any of the so-called materialists. All must concede that if everything is material, then material also is everything; honour, justice, mercy, devotion, everything arises from it, and intellect the first of all.

the pseudo-hippocratic writing '*περὶ διαίτης*' of the 'builders'. *Τὰ μὲν ὅλα διαιρέοντες τὰ δὲ διῃρημένα συντιθέντες* (Heinze); see also Philo quis rer. div. heres, I, 505, on this dividing; see H.'s XLIIId fragment, etc. By strife alone life, according to H., becomes possible; disease makes health good and pleasant. 'There is no harmony without the height and the depth (*sic*) (or between the flat and the sharp?), and no peace without war'.

And this creative all moving 'war' in nature was again the 'Lógos' under a different name and from another point of view. The Lógos is also 'fate', not a blind fate by any manner of means.

Fate as the Lógos was the Creator (*sic*) of all things from the running together or conflict of opposites.

Justice is also war, and war is universal; everything takes place with strife. The just, or more properly the exact, is the cause and result of fire (i. e. Heat), which is immanent; that is to say, permanently dwelling in the universe of nature. For this 'heat' has its law, according to which it unfolds and again folds up the world; that law is its rythmic reason, or Lógos. It is conceived of as material, as I have said, and the fire filled with spirit is another representation of the same Lógos, This Lógos is one and the same world-forming element as fire (i. e. heat), but viewed from a different side. The Lógos is as little immaterial as Fire.

It is material; but then, as before-said, matter must have been conceived of in a sense which has made it all inclusive, the sum total of universal sub-

jective experience. And he called this comprehensive concept 'Lógos', this being the first extended use of the term in this sense by a philosophical teacher in the history of Greek literature. Sextus Empiricus in his work Adversus Mathematicos VII, 2, flg. 5. 397 flg. quoted by Zeller, Heinze and others, speaks of this Lógos as the 'divine Lógos'; see Heinze, p. 44; but he hardly meant to report the expression as having been used by Heraclitus; the θεῖος and θεῖον are probably due solely to Sextus himself. And with all of this his Lógos was 'unconscious'. Such was at least most probably his opinion; and possibly von Hartmann started from some such hint.

It, the Lógos, was a reasonable force which inheres in the substance-matter of the world. There is nothing material without it.

It has no pre-existence (see H. page 25), except as all things pre-exist in their predecessors, of which they really form a continuous part. It rules all things and domineers over the realm of intellection and morality, eliminating all independence from each of them. Such was, in a few words, the scheme; — perhaps a little too much portrayed in the sense of Hegel by Zeller, and too much in the sense of mere 'nature' by the extremists on the other side [1].

On the fascinating depths of such a system, with all its errors or its truth, we may not dwell, and in fact I make the above remarks only with

[1] Surely the progress of development by the supercession of opposites applies to natural phenomena as well as to ideas. In so far Hegel most certainly was right in speaking of Heraclitus as he did.

reserve. I would return to the matter once and again before I express so fully all my personal opinions. I am not accustomed, as I hope will be conceded to me, to propound views not founded upon 'exhaustive' evidence[1]. But to one habituated to such investigation the gist of the matter is clear at once. We have here an astonishing and pregnant scheme strangely deep, yet strangely material. And this is the Lógos which is supposed by some to have been the ancestor of Vohumanah or of Asha!

We need hardly have waited for a full discussion of it before we decided whether such a Lógos was likely to have been their progenitor or not.

In some respects indeed both Asha and Vohumanah might have been proud of the connection; but that is not our point just here. A radical historical connection between such a Lógos and the Avesta of the nature of that between cause and effect is here not to be thought of.

It is in the sphere of purely mental, and as we may also say of moral, action that, strange as it may appear, we find one delicate item of analogy, though I fear my readers will term it rather far-fetched. Yet I present it for what it may be worth.

As we find in the fragments of Heraclitus the first statement of a self-moving reasonable or reasoning force, so it is in the Avesta that we have, of all possible lores, the first record of the soul's

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[1] See the Preussisches Jahrbuch, 1897, p. 68, Sonderabdruck. 'in gründlichster Weise'.

moral self-motion, if I might be permitted to make use of such a form of words, — a pulse of spiritual progress in the thought, in the word, and in the deed, from their inception in the first consciousness of a living subject to their consequences, felicitous or calamitious, first in the future of the present life, and then in a scene beyond it.

For these states of moral habit seem actually to be continued on of themselves, not merely as the occasions, but also as the constitutive elements of their own rewards or punishments in the present and in the future state. If this last idea was not fully grasped, it was at least strongly adumbrated. In Y. 30, 4, 'the worst mind' seems really to be put into the place of the 'worst fate'. While the 'best mind' is 'Heaven', the passage having been beyond a doubt one of the sources, and perhaps the oldest surviving one, of the use of the word 'best' 'bahisht' among the Persians for 'Heaven'.

And distinct departments in the future spiritual home-life had the very words 'good thought', 'good word', and good deed' for their names [1]. It is the sinner's own conscience which shrieks at him on the Judgment Bridge, see Y. 46; and it is his own good thoughts, words and deeds which meet him and conduct him to his final happy destiny [1]. Whether our full modern idea to the same effect was really intended, I mean of course the idea that 'virtue is its own reward', we may indeed doubt.

Zarathushtra would possibly have thought such a pointed view too extreme to be at all practicable,

[1] See Yasht 22, Westergaard.

or indeed safe; regarding it as dangerously refined and calculated to suspend all wholesome fear in inferior minds; but, that it occurred to him dimly at least and as if only to be rejected seems certain. At all events we have here a positively certain case where ideas, like events, cast their shadows before. These remarkable suggestions were the first of their kind, so far as I am aware in the entire history of speculation, the incipient glimmering of the noblest idea with regard to human conduct that has ever emerged from the consciousness of man. And the analogy which I would draw is the following; and I confess it is an exceedingly subtle one, and only thrown in for a *very* esoteric circle.

As Heraclitus was the first to formulate for us the idea of self-motion in the universe of physical nature, but yet as including more dimly the intellectual and moral world, so Zarathushtra gave us the first hint to our common, but so beautiful modern proverb, the idea of a sort of self-motion of moral economics, or in the forces which control them. This however is the mere phantom of an analogy, striking though it be so far as it extends. It is indeed 'a likeness in the air'; and it is mentioned as an interlude and as if in a parenthesis alone.

But aside from anything like this, to those who study the history of the idea of the Zarathushtrian Asha, a certain general analogy with the Lógos of Heraclitus when also more closely understood, becomes perceptible. The idea, like its Indian counterpart, *ṛitá*, arose from the observed regularity of natural phenomena, the rising, course, decline and

disappearance of the Sun and other heavenly bodies, the succession of the seasons, etc. These became imitated in the ceremonies of religious worship; and the priestly officials were termed the *ṛitāvan* and the *ashavan*; and there indeed we have what reminds us of the Lógos of Heraclitus, in so far as it is likewise a 'rhythm'.

But as to what the rhythm of material nature actually was, the systems were poles apart. As all must admit, Heraclitus must have been somewhat aware of the nature of the widespread Mazda-worship with which his successors were so familiar, for the Persian forces which looked to Ahuramazda for victory and abhorred Aṅgra Mainyu as the author of defeat, surged for years up to the very gates of Ephesus when Heraclitus was in his prime. He was even invited, as is believed by some, to the Court of Darius; and the false letters may be the echoes of the fact. It is therefore very possible indeed that the stories of the two originally antagonistic divinities of the Persian creed assisted those early impulses which impelled this man of genius as he proceeded to improve still more upon the simple downright statements of the Zoroastrian oracle; — but this is only possible.

The Zoroastrian dualism only by a very wide inference bears any marked likeness to its successor; while on the other hand, no one of the known Greek ancients, so far as I am aware, had any conceivably immediate influence upon the plain, though imposing, scheme of Zarathushtra.

With Zarathushtra opposition and war were

indeed in the nature of things, for there were 'two Original Spirits'; this was the foundation of his views. But we find no emphatic suggestion with him that this was in any sense ordained for good. According to some passages the 'evil are to lie forever in Hell', If this however is to be modified by Yasna 30, 12, 'Upon this shall there be salvation' (*ushtā** [1], the beatific state)', then we have indeed a happy result; but there is no statement anywhere in the Avesta to the effect that the strife in nature was conducive to better things even when regarded as an educator. Nor in fact are there any precise statements as to physical nature which are so conspicuous with the Ephesian.

Undoubtedly antithesis is the key-note of Zarathushtrianism. Even in the Gāthas we have conspicuously the beginning of the pairing. Opposite Ahura Mazda stands Angra Mainyu, the most formidable Devil ever developed, actually the maker of one of the two opposing worlds. Opposite Asha, the regularity and truth, we have the Drūj, the falsehood in the foe; opposite Vohumanah we have Aka manah, opposite Vahista manah Achishta manah. Opposite Khshathra the dush-khshathra; opposite Āramaiti taramaiti; opposite Haurvatāt and Ameretatāt we have descriptions of woe, as Garō-dmān, Heaven, is in the face of the Drūjō-dmān, Hell, while the eternal antipathetic antagonism between these forces is well expressed in the mutual repu-

[1] Really an adverbial form but idiomatically used as a substantive.

diation of Yasna 45, 2 [1]. In the later Avesta and in the later Persian they become still more completely paired and in the Gāthas this conflict seems to have become accentuated by the miseries of warfare, that is to say, if the woes of 'the Kine' were the echo of those of the people [1]. If the opposition of powers was the only point at issue, then the two systems were indeed related, and the dualism of Zarathushtra was only repeated in the 'war' of Heraclitus.

Beyond this point however Heraclitus must have made great strides in a definitively philosophical sense.

It is profoundly to be regretted that we posses such scanty remains of what he wrote or said. They do not occupy much more space than one of the longer Gāthas, and not as much as some two of them together.

Heraclitus, let me repeat it with emphasis, made this opposition, which Zarathushtrianism also so fully delineates, to be the constitutive law out of which alone all existing things arise and continue, while Zarathushtra only does this by inference, if at all. Here however we are not concerned with inferences.

Zarathushtra showed the grouping faculty in a remarkable degree and that compact hard reason which recognised even an horrific fact and an horrific being. He went no half way with his Satan. Heraclitus however went even beyond these views

[1] See the passage elaborately treated in my Gāthas, Commentary, first and second edition; but I must return to it later on.

and claimed the terrific in life to be not only its reality, but the source of its vitality, and Zeller is highly critical in seizing upon this point, though others still mention the fatuous 'Honover'. Zarathushtra worked out a clear polarisation of all the good and evil elements in preceding systems, if systems they could in any sense be called.

Out of all the Gods he grouped all the chief abstracts and deified them in one small company, even resolving seven of them into one in so far as he presents them as the attributes of Ahura. And he grouped all the evil into equally limited masses, and there he left them to fight out their battle in the awful encounters of human and superhuman existence; but Heraclitus quarrelled even with Homer because he seemed to disapprove too much of strife [1].

There was one great question however in which they were happily agreed; nowhere do we see any indication that Zarathushtra ever supposed evil to inhere in matter, while Heraclitus went so far as to pronounce a materialistic Pantheism [2]. As to the fire of Heraclitus, when compared with that of Zarathushtra, it is indeed possible that the smoke of the altars in the Persian camps around his city which remained so loyal to the Persian cause, and the rumoured echoes of their Adar Yasht or of its predecessors, may have attracted his attention; and upon reflection this may well have confirmed his

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[1] But I must return to this subject later on, where I will treat it more fully; see upon the Inscriptions and the Avesta.

[2] Or 'panlogism'.

own convictions as to the supreme position of the 'mode of motion' among the elements.

If so, Zoroastrianism did another great service to the world, if only by an accident; but of course the sublime concepts of Heraclitus went far beyond even the beautiful Zoroastrian worship of the holy thing, which was indeed far more with his successors than the mere 'altar fire'; and should be fully recognised as 'heat', not 'flame' alone, for we have its varieties at least in the later but still genuine Avesta as interpreted by the later Zoroastrianism; even the caloric seated in the plants was known as well as that in living creatures. But as to the two systems in their entirety, they were well nigh contradictory opposites. Zoroaster's (that is to say, Zarathushtra's) was a harshly limited monotheism, if such a contradiction in terms can be permitted for the moment, to convey a popular idea. It had its good creation and Creator in antithesis to its still more limited mono-demonism ('so' again) with its counter creation and Creator, That is to say it offered 'two worlds' and two quasi independent Deities; its dualism in a certain sense anticipated the more philosophically stated one of Anaxagoras, of Plato, and then of Philo; but Heraclitus banished at once both* God* and devil. His Gods were akin to men [1]. So that the Lógos of Heraclitus, while resembling the Asha of the Avesta as the rhythm of law, developing it, this latter, Asha, was with Zarathushtra's later successors, and let us not forget

[1] Notice where he says that 'neither any of the Gods nor men had made this world'.

it, also a name for 'fire', though chiefly through the ritual which was indeed an 'Asha' by pre-eminence. And though the Fire-lógos of Heraclitus must have been to some degree touched at least by the universal sanctity of fire upon the altars in India and Persia [1], as even also I must insist, in Greece, yet this Fire-lógos was in so far radically different from that of the Avesta that it was in no sense whatsoever *a created thing*. With Heraclitus there was no 'creation' with which to associate it and no 'Creator', while both Asha and Vohumanah at their second (logical) stage as personified concepts, were on the contrary both freely said to be 'created' by the Great Good Being as whose attributes they first appeared. He made them as the hypostatisation in personification of the great moral instincts of 'law' and of 'goodness'. While therefore this identification of the Lógos with the fire, or heat, should not disturb us much when 'heat' is understood to be merely the vital force, yet on the other hand a self-moved ever-living power which contains within itself the reason of all that 'becomes' and has never had a beginning, is a thing presented in a very different light from the Asha of Ahura Mazda, even though this latter be by a figure and

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[2] Recollect that Persia was on the way from India to Greece, (on one way at least); and that the vast Indian philosophies and worship are actually parts of the identical lore reached by Persian sages, the Indians having positively once lived in the primeval Iran, or near it, and formed one identical race with the authors of pre-gāthic Gāthas, if such a turn of speech may be allowed, or if indeed such an hypothesis as the existence of distinct predecessors to the Gāthas could be entertained.

only later called 'His son'. The 'Asha' of Heraclitus, to use some violence in language, was together with his Fire-lógos, a reason-guided and guiding force which evolves all things out of — what?; — out of itself?; — so it seems. But in the Avesta that 'Fire' was not at all originally identified with Asha, for the concepts in the Gāthas show no such connection. And the systems which at first sight look so closely related spread in their developments still further, worlds apart. So that aside from internal characteristics as a rhythm of motion, nothing could be so different from either Asha or Vohumanah, or any of the Ameshaspends, as the Lógos of the great Asiatic, magnificent though it may well be thought to be.

Yet this concept of the bitter misanthrope, so heterogeneous from Avesta, formed the beginning of the Greek idea of 'Lógos', and influenced all future thought up to the very days of Philo.

After Heraclitus.

For a long time Greek philosophy made little progress beyond Heraclitus with the idea of the Lógos. But his conception that 'everything is in motion', that is to say, 'in the act of 'becoming' something different in form' was more and more valued, people beginning however to demand that this everlasting 'becoming' should end in some positive 'being', till at last they thought of such a thing as the 'absolute intelligence' (see below).

Empedocles [1].

Empedocles had only used the words ὀρθὸς λόγος in the sense of the agreement of thought with what is actually real; and this is far short of the sense which I am endeavouring to trace in the word. His doctrine that 'love' and 'hate' are the causes of motion, love uniting things and hate scattering them, reminds one however of the Zarathushtrian dualism. The likeness is not however such as need detain us here.

Democritus [2].

Over the Lógos of Democritus according to which οὐδὲν χρῆμα μάτην γίνεται, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἐκ λόγου καὶ ὑπ' ανάγκης; Stob. Ekl. I, 160, we need also not linger, as it refers to a cause without which nothing happens rather than to a law of reason [3].

Heinze remarks that Alkimos (Alcimus), mentioned by Diogenes Laertius, attributes to no other person than a comic poet, Epicharmos (-mus), the leadership in the development of the pure doctrine of ideas, with what justice, I am unable to say; and there is much uncertainty about the passages attributed to him.

The νοῦς of Anaxagoras [4] who first brought philosophy to Athens in 426 B. C., circa (where Zeno [5] of Elea seems to have passed some years

[1] Born about 480 B. C., flourished in the 84th Olympiad.

[2] According to one account born in 80th Olympiad, 460—456 B. C.?

[3] See Heinze, p. 58, also Zeller. Erster Theil S. 839 flg.

[4] Anaxagoras, born about 500 B. C., died 428—7, Zeller p. 968.

[5] Zeno born 495—492 B. C.

with him) advanced decidedly toward the doctrine that the moving power was above and outside the world of matter. 'Matter had rested during endless time [1] motionless till mind, *νοῦς,* stirred it like a whirlpool'.

We see at once the difference between this view and that of Heraclitus, we might better say 'the contradiction' between them. And this starts us upon the road toward Plato and his later successor.

The *νοῦς* of Anaxagoras introduced the theistic element into philosophy. He leaves a suspicion that he held the *νοῦς* to be in everything; but he does not go into the relation of the *νοῦς* to the soul more closely.

Yet whatever his exact idea may have been, it had only the usual unavoidable external resemblance to any one of the possible conceptions of either Vohu Manah* or Asha, so far as we can define it. It, this *νοῦς,* was God himself, the One mental power which stirred motionless matter, and brought forth the phenomena of creation (cp. Genesis I.). And no one anywhere, as I suppose, has thought that either Asha or Vohu Manah* absorbed or obliterated the creative attribute of Ahura Mazda Himself according to the analogy of the noũs of Anaxagoras.

Socrates.

With Socrates the Lógos becomes intimately connected with causality; and here we continue to

[1] This most decidedly philosophical expression occurs in the Avesta, *zruni akarane,* vd. 19, 33 (Sp.).

meet expressions which to an unskilled person bear some distant resemblance to Vohu Manah (Vohumanah). The Cause of the world is the 'goodness of the World-maker', which (i. e. the world) is in consequence arranged in the best possible manner in accordance with design through an *αἰτία μετὰ λόγου τε καὶ ἐπιστήμης θείας ἀπὸ θεοῦ γιγνομένη*[1]. There was a series of causes between the Supreme Being and the created world. His 'goodness' was the first and His 'Demiurge' was the last so in later philosophies, especially in that of the Gnostics. The Demiurge is the last cause next to the creature, and the idea of 'the good' is the highest next to the creator. Heinze is of the opinion that perhaps the Demiurge is also to be considered as the summing up of the ideas, and that he is outside the world, that is to say, supranatural and transcendant like our Deity, and not a part of nature. I should say so, evidently.

These causes and particularly the last of them, the Demiurge, remind us of the Amesha-Spentas; but their function as Intermediaries between God and matter is heterogeneous to the relation between Ahura and the Ameshaspentas, for Socrates' notion of matter, as developed into that of Plato, was antagonistic to Zoroastrian concepts.

Plato.

Plato carried out these views of Socrates, and held to a *νοῦς* which was outside and beyond the

[1] Sophist. 265, C.; see also Tim. 38, C.: *ἐξ οὖν λόγου καὶ διανοίας . . ἥλιος καὶ σελήνη καὶ πέντε ἄλλα ἄστρα γέγονε.*

world and nature. That is to say, he held to 'a God'. But he thought out another νοῦς which is in the world, and as it were, a part of nature, and united with the Soul of the World; and this last Should conduct the World by means of convincing it toward a likeness with the 'ideas' by means of the overcoming of 'necessity' which was with him another name for matter. So also in the domain of ethics, this νοῦς was to lead to the resemblance of the soul to God, the absolutely good and beautiful.

With Plato, reason thus struggles with necessity, that is to say, with matter (*sic*), because there is a chasm between the two; and this is Plato's dualism [1], whereas with Heraclitus we have a monism, with him reason and necessity coinciding. In ethics especially, according to Plato, the opposition exists; the body, i. e. matter, hinders the true cognition and the unfolding of the ideas.

This νοῦς, also called 'Lógos', or at times the λογιστικόν, does the same duty in the individual man as in the universe. No knowledge or cognition can take place without it; the like is known by the like.

The mortal part of the soul is made out of 'Gods' (*sic*) which have developed into being, the immortal part is however developed out of the 'Soul of the World' [2]. Individual souls are not emanations

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[1] Compare that with Zarathushtra's! in Y. 30.

[2] I follow Heinze and the others closely here in stating the slippery fancies of the great phantast, with which I have personally only a moral sympathy. See Zeller of course for fuller expositions.

from the Soul of the World, but, like it, formed from a commingling of the same essential substances. Sometimes Plato seems to say that individual souls are 'pieces of the World-soul, as bodies are composed of the elements'.

This was also Socrates' theory; whether taken from 'the World-soul', or formed directly by God, reason was the most 'divine' attribute which we possess and enables us to approach the goal.

With the νοῦς the soul ever attains the good, but with ἄνοια the evil; T. 73, A. 88, B. Leg. 897. B.

With his 'World-soul' Plato opened new paths, and is regarded by many as the source of the Philonian and even of the Johanian Lógos. Why he used the word νοῦς instead of λόγος is not so clearly known, except that it was for the sake of more precision. Anaxagoras had however used νοῦς and with effect; so he adopted the word. In their nature of course Asha and Vohu-Manah (Vohumanah) hold a strong external analogy to the νοῦς, as was inevitable in using terms to express views on the same general subject.

Ahura thinks, speaks, and does things ashā, i. e. 'in accordance with His holy law'.

The holy man is ashavan, etc., and vohū manañhā means 'in accordance with His benevolence'. But this resemblance is upon the surface for the reason that the noũs-lógos of Plato was especially thought out as endowed with the power to pass over from the immediate domain of God into a world of material necessity, which he, Plato, together

with his predecessor and his friend, regarded as being in itself evil and repugnant to the Deity.

Neither Asha nor Vohu Manah were endowed with any such capacity for the simple reason that Zarathushtra did not conceive the need for it to exist.

But as the inferior νοῦς could not be called the full Lógos with Plato(?), the analogy which we are looking for should be found in the higher νοῦς; see above. But that higher νοῦς, if it was like anything in the Avesta, was *like Ahura, and not like Vohumanah or Asha,* and the conceptions here are as unlike in colour as they are in immediate origin.

Aristotle.

To approach the idea of the Lógos in Aristotle I must pause for a moment to notice the general features of his system, for it extends beyond that of his predecessors; and also beyond that of his great but too imaginative contemporary. He pressed the idea of design to a more advanced position than Plato; and originated the idea that a state of aim or design existed in the world of itself. And this is justly considered to have been a decided advance in the history of philosophy, though it was of course implied in the Monism of Heraclitus. The question in tracing historical developments here in this treatise, is however not as to what is implied, but as to what is stated. As design, or the aim held in view in the adaptations of nature, needs 'thinking', all nature is under the dominion of 'thought'. Nature does nothing unreasonable,

or in vain. *ἡ δὲ φύσις οὐθὲν ἀλόγως οὐθὲν, μάτην ποιεῖ,* De coelo II, 11, 291, b, 13. Of all possible things she makes the best *ἡ δὲ φύσις ἐκ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων ποιεῖ τὸ βέλτιστον,* De part. an. IV. 10, 687, a., 15, *ὅτι τὴν φύσιν ὁρῶμεν ἐν πᾶσιν ἐκ τῶν δυνατῶν ποιοῦσαν τὸ κάλλιστον,* De vit. et m. 4, 469, a, 28. *πάντα γὰρ φύσει ἔχει τι θεῖον,* Eth. Nic. VII, 14. 1153, b, 32.

But nature needs no previous reflection, for it would be foolish to refuse to believe that a thing was done for the sake of some object because one does not see the thing that moves it reflect. Art does not reflect, yet a design abides in it, Phys. II, 8. 199, b, 26.

Thought or reflection must be above nature, and yet exercise a power upon it, in order that it may move in accordance with reason. The driving principle as first motive power is the transcendent God; that is to say, it is God as outside of and beyond nature, not indeed as unconscious power [1], but as a conscious individual being, and at the same time as absolute thought.

But the unmoving God cannot bring matter into motion. This latter therefore was conceived of as the last aim to be striven for, as what is desired and thought, which, like the 'beautiful', exercises a moving power without moving itself.

This theory, says Heinze, has of course its difficulties; for if the thought of God influences the world, it would be under His active force in such a manner that a dynamic Pantheism would be shown

[1] See also above upon Anaxagoras.

to be Aristotle's view of the subject, all the substantial features of his dualistic theism having vanished

He seems, continues Heinze, to incline somewhat more toward a Pantheism in psychology; for his energetic νοῦς which works on what is passive, παθητικός, seems to be the Divine Mind itself, being simple, without passion, unalterable, and indestructible.

His 'thought' indeed approaches that of the Divine Mind, for it occupies itself not with the material of things, but simply with the conceptions of them; its thinking is identical with being thought. But this is merely an undeveloped tendency. In the Ethics man is declared to be endowed with free will; the business of this latter is to assure to the reason the dominion over the soul, so that the activity peculiar to men is exercised and the design which lies in it is brought to completion. And then so soon as it becomes the question in hand to determine action through reflection or discursive thought as opposed to moral intuition, the faculty in mind which effects this is called sometimes the λόγος, sometimes the λογιστικόν. The immediate seizure of the individual final object appertains to the νοῦς, as also in the sphere of the pure theory, the direct knowledge of first principles. There is therefore a 'practical reason'; and it can be reckoned among the virtues.

Discursive thinking, διανοεῖσθαι, is not the proper designation for the exercise of this practical reason. It is its direct θεωρεῖν (perception) which raises man to a kind of divine life, to the highest happiness,

to pure theory. As using this direct perception the *νοῦς*, as the practical reason stands over the Lógos as well as over the *ἐπιστήμη*, understanding. Both are dependent upon it, and must prepare the basis on which they stand by means of it.

If the Lógos in man thus had only to do with derived thinking, and not with the simplest and last principle, it could not be chosen as a designation for God, who always thinks without intermediary,

The Lógos plays an important part in the Ethics, since moral character is imparted to actions by means of it, through rational insight and by reflection: yet it has no objective character in that treatise: it is simply practical reason as it shows itself in individuals, now weaker and again stronger. It is like 'the judgment of a sensible man'. The *ὀρθὸς λόγος* has however a more objective form in the Ethics. The words were in common use, and occur even in Herodotus as equivalent to *ἀληθὴς λόγος* 'true speech', or simply 'truth'.

Plato uses the expression in the same sense, but as of a faculty in the soul united with the *ἐπιστήμη*. It is reason hitting upon the right. Virtue was defined, says Aristotle, by all who described it as *ἕξις κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον* 'a habit of mind in accordance with the correct Lógos'; not merely 'according to' the true Lógos, but *μετὰ τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου*, i. e. with it, so that the *orthòs Lógos* is not only the Norm, or rule, according to which the virtuous acts; but it is precisely one of the elements of virtue. He appears to mean that nothing is virtuous which is not intended to be such.

Correct reason is not an objective Norm or rule, but the *φρόνησις*, sagacity (?), in every individual man which determines the correct means for accomplishing any result, and to which therefore all human virtue is to be referred. The *ὀρθὸς λόγος* must remain in reciprocal action with virtue; it is itself a virtue, with which at the same time all ethical virtues will exist. It makes a man the *φρόνιμος*, the wisely prudent, and the correct means of his procedure depends upon its decision.

In the Great Ethics, the *ὀρθὸς λόγος* occurring less frequently, has still its important meaning, for the virtues are 'action according to the correct Lógos' which is elsewhere described or defined thus: *ὅταν τὸ ἄλογον μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς μὴ κωλύῃ τὸ λογιστικὸν ἐνέργεῖν τὴν αὐτοῦ ἐνέργειαν*; or *ὅταν τὰ πάθη μὴ κωλύωσι τὸν νοῦν τὸ αὐτοῦ ἔργον ἐπιτελεῖν*; when the non-logical part of the soul does not hinder the logical part from exercising its own energy, or 'when the passive does not hinder the *νοῦς* from doing its own work'.

No mention is made of this *ὀρθὸς λόγος* as an objective principle universally valid.

The Lógos has many uses with Aristotle. Heinze and the others have found it united, as if with an equivalent, with *οὐσια, τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, εἶδος, μορφή, τέλος, οὗ ἕνεκα,* with the principles called *αἱ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ἀρχαί,* also with *ἐντελέχεια* and *ἐνέργεια.* As formal principle it opposed matter, in which (matter) necessity was fixed, while in itself 'design' was predominant. It becomes also again enclosed in matter, and through this concrete 'essentiality' arises.

Where is the least likeness to Vohu Manah (Vohumanah) or to Asha, or the Gāthas (!) in all this?

God acts 'with His good mind' indeed, as in accordance with 'His law', 'Asha'; but what resemblance has this mode of action to what I have stated above, (it being the simple function of benevolent wisdom or regular exactness).

The ὀρθὸς λόγος is a refined idea interposed to account for the unmoved and unmoving God, and the moving, that is to say, the living, phenomena of the world.

In the Zend Avesta no such intermediary is in any possible way called for, as the mobility or non-mobility (*sic*) of God or matter is not discussed (as such). He is outside of the world just in the ordinary sense that our Yahveh is, and he simply proceeds to make it and Asha and Vohu Manah (Vohumanah) with it, now 'begetting them as a father', now 'forming them as a creator', now 'acting according to their interior meaning'.

Of course there is some external likeness between a word which means 'correct reason' and one which means 'good mind', and the external likeness certainly becomes close between the Demiurge and the Geūsh tashan, that is to say, if the Geūsh tashan be not another name for Ahura; but coming to closer inquiry, the resemblance fails utterly because the conditions of the scenes of action are totally unlike, the Greeks having thought out a dualism which was absolutely unlike the dualism of the Avesta or its fainter image the dualism in the

Ṛig Veda, and the dualisms in all the polytheistic theologies.

For the Greek dualism was one between God and matter, whereas the Zarathushtrian was one between a good God and an evil God, each original and independent, matter not being regarded as being in itself evil in any sense.

The Lógos among the Stoics.

Plato had supposed the general ideas actually to exist objectively, as an offset to the world of mere appearances in order that we might be able to attain and possess a positive knowledge of anything; and in the course of the statement of his system he had spoken of the Lógos and the orthòs Lógos as I have shown above; and I have found not a solitary interior trace of Vohumanah in it, and only such exterior traces of resemblance as could not fail to exist in ideas which were of the same general nature.

Aristotle, departing widely from his more fanciful contemporary, supposed all the forms of things with the exception of the highest as well as their substance to be closely united with (or 'bound to') matter; and made them as an integral part immanent in the first existences.

In the system of the Stoics, however, the Lógos is the working principle, matter, the unqualified unformed part of the same system, being the passive. *Δοκεῖ δ'αὐτοῖς ἀρχὰς εἶναι τῶν ὅλων δύο, τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχον. τὸ μὲν οὖν πάσχον εἶναι τὴν ἄποιον οὐσίαν, τὴν ὕλην, τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν τὸν ἐν αὐτῇ λόγον, τὸν*

θεόν· τοῦτον γὰρ ἀΐδιον ὄντα διὰ πάσης αὐτῆς δημιουργεῖν ἕκαστα. Diogenes, VII, 134 [1].

The theory is, as may be seen, up to a certain point similar to that of Plato and Aristotle. There is matter and working form in each; but the supreme difference is at once manifest when we see that they identified the Lógos, the working principle, with God; they did not regard him as a final cause *outside of the world.* Totus est ratio, God is the ratio faciens, dispositor atque opifex universitatis, Tertullian Apolog. 21. Kornut. N. D. XXVII, 205, *ὁ προεστὼς κόσμου λόγος* [1].

Inert and motionless matter is formed to the most beautiful and best world which is possible by the divine reason, or the reasonable God, who is the Lógos. He upholds all things in their forms and motions, as well as forms all things, giving them their motion, not satisfying himself with the first shock of incipient energy.

He is the Lógos according to which the world is continuously governed, he is omnipresent and everywhere visible.

As all is arranged according to design this could not be otherwise. Reasonable thought must appear throughout and permeate all things.

As the poet quoted in the Acts of the Apostles says — *μεσταί, δὲ Διὸς πᾶσαι μὲν ἀγυιαί πᾶσαι δ'ἀν-*

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[1] These are standard citations; see Zeller, p. 131, Heintze, etc. I do not regard it as very impressive procedure to cite the weaker passages simply with the object of making quotations never noticed before.

θρώπων ἀγοραί, μεστὴ δὲ θάλασσα καὶ λιμένες. πάντη δὲ Διὸς πεπλήσμεθα πάντες [1].

It was even a popular idea; cp. Vergil: Jovis omnis plena . ., and : deum namque ire per omnes terrasque tractusque maris coelumque profundum [2].

Nothing can happen, or be thought of, without the Lógos, for everything which exists has reason in it.

But this intellectual power of the Lógos is *material.* Not that they actually believed that everything happened through simple and *explicable* mechanical causes, as Democritus and Epicurus might have said, though this is possible; but all is bodily or corporeal, and so material.

As I should think, they must have recognised mysterious and incomprehensible forces in corporeal nature which was identical with the Universe. And these forces must have guided the development of matter in harmony with design to ever-increasing amelioration: they pressed the idea of the body further than was usual.

Body is 'firm and stubborn' *τοῦτο δὲ καὶ στερεὸν σῶμα καλεῖται.* No effect can take place without approach and touching.

Only the bodily can sympathise with the bodily; and *the soul itself* has the three dimension *τριχῆ διαστατόν* as being extended throughout the whole body.

The Soul of the World, *ἡ τοῦ ὅλου ψυχή,* is mentioned in Platonic language by Cleanthes and Chrysippus; but with them it is also corporeal, as

[1] The initial verses af Aratus.

[2] See Heinze, Zeller, etc.

is God Himself (N. B.) [1]: *οὔκουν ἀνθρωποειδὴς ὁ θεός... οὐ δὲ αἰσθήσεων αὐτῷ δεῖ, καθάπερ ἤρεσεν τοῖς Στωικοῖς. μάλιστα ἀκοῆς καὶ ὄψεως· μὴ γὰρ δύνασθαί ποτε ἑτέρως ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι* [2]. Tertullian, strange to say, is said to have himself approached the stoical materialism.

Rarely was the Lógos spoken of as 'corporeal', yet this sometimes happened *καὶ ὁ λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ* (a later Stoic expression) . . *οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἢ πνεῦμα σωματικόν* [3]. As however there was no difference between God and the Lógos, 'bodily' applies to both, a passage from Seneca to the contrary probably rests, thinks Heinze, upon a corrupt text.

The question of course reverts. What kind of 'matter' was this substance of the world. We have the four elements, *στοιχεῖα*, elements and *ἀρχαί*. If the moving force is outside of any of these, we come at once upon Platonism, a God outside of nature. They often called God, or the Lógos, pneũma, a *πνεῦμα διὰ πάντων διεληλυθὸς καὶ πάντ' ἐν ἑαυτῷ περιέχον . . . πνεῦμα κατ' οὐσίαν . . . οὐσία θεοῦ ἀεροειδής*, a sort of breath. 'Haec Cleanthes in spiritum congerit, quem permeatorem universitatis affirmat', Tertull. Apolog. 21. 'Divinus spiritus per omnia maxima ac minima aequali intentione diffusus', Sen., cons. ad Helv. 8, 3. This 'pneũma' gives form and substance to all, to the fruit, to the seed, to the trees. Sen. Quaest. nat. II, 6, 6. Note Seneca's expression 'intentio aeris'. The properties of things

[1] Ahura Mazda's 'body' is spoken of, but merely after the manner of Yahveh's, in figurative language; never in any strict statement, as the Stoics spoke of it.

[2] Clem. Strom. VII. 720, D.

[3] Orig. C. Cels. VI, 71 (Heinze).

are 'streams of air'. The strength of the body is sufficient tone in the nerves, that of the soul *τόνος ἱκανὸς ἐν τῷ κρίνειν καὶ πράττειν καὶ μή*, sufficient tone in the judgment, and in action, and in non-action. Changes in things which are formed are changes in the *πνεῦμα*. As God is a breath, so he is 'fire', 'animal heat', etc.; the world is a living being. There is heat in inorganic substances, as was proved by sparks from stones struck by iron, etc. (*sic*).

Air was sometimes looked upon as the forming principle, and sometimes heat.

The Aether combined the qualities of heat and air, and was called 'God' (*sic*). Some of the elements, were active, some passive. Heat and cold were active; moisture and dryness passive; recall Heraclitus. Motion is contained in the two superior principles and is original in them; and the *πνεῦμα* is *κινοῦν*[1], motion. The four elements are not of essentially different origin.

The original fire changes itself into air, then into water, then into earth.

The *διακόσμησις* is the development of individual things till the fire consume them all, to begin the world process anew, and so endlessly.

An inconsistency however exists, for a part of matter is without life and motion. This would make all the rest a moving God, so again introducing a Platonic dualism.

It would be a waste of words to pause here

[1] Notice how closely this approaches our late discovery that heat is a 'mode of motion',' Chrysippus by Stobaios, Ekl. I, 374: *εἶναι τὸ ὂν πνεῦμα κινοῦν ἑαυτὸ πρὸς ἑαυτὸ καὶ ἐξ αὑτοῦ ἢ πνεῦμα ἑαυτὸ κινοῦν πρόσω καὶ ὀπίσω.*

discussing the unlikeness of this Supreme Lógos to either Vohumanah or Asha; cp. also the Lógos of Heraclitus.

The Lógoi.

We now come upon the Lógoi, the Lógos in the plural, the Lógoi spermaticói. The Lógos spermaticus was the forming principle. The Stoics used the idea of the seed more fully than previous systems; cp. however above upon Heraclitus.

'Air resides in seeds; and by its expansion rocks are moved' . . . . From the seed of the organic being they began to speak of a seed of the Universe (*sic*), which they again called the Fire, i. e. heat. The substance-heat has a life-power in itself, pervading the world, which is a living being' [1].

Everything arises from it (heat); and all dissolves into it again.

The fire-heat is *καθαπερεί τι σπέρμα, τοὺς ἁπάντων ἔχον τοὺς λόγους καὶ τὰς αἰτίας τῶν γεγονότων καὶ τῶν γιγνομένων καὶ τῶν ἐσομένων*, Euseb. Praep. ev. XV, 14, 817, a (H.).

The seed has *reason*; it *is* reason, Lógos; all things lie in it in germ. Water [1], as the original substance, receives the seed Lógos. As the active principle, the Lógos, is the Demiurge, a term also applied at times (?) to God.

Here we must recall again the Gēush tashan,

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[1] Readers of the later Avesta are reminded here of the sacred water of Ardvi Sura Anahita, which purifies the seeds of plants, of women, etc., but no philosophical or scientific idea lurks in that at all.

the Herd-maker, who seems at first sight a sort of Demiurge, as the idea glints in the Gātha; but Ahura himself is elsewhere in the Gātha positively explained as the Gēush tashan 'former of the cow', or ox; see Y. 51, 7, 'thou who hast made (tashō) the cow'. None the less we must assert that here an idea of a distinct existence for a Demiurge in a good sense casts its shadow before.

With the Lógos in this sense the plural is more frequent than the singular, doubtless on account of the variety of the detail operated upon by the spermatic forces; 'Alexander and his groom both go to *εἰς τοὺς αὐτοὺς τοῦ κόσμου σπερματικοὺς λόγους* [1].

The *λόγοι σπερματικοί* are sometimes absolute; sometimes contained in the *πῦρ τεχνικόν*.

Like God, the *λόγοι σπερματικοί*, are original and not derived, being however first unfolded in the *διακόσμησις* of the world. As the world arose, or 'arises' (so better), these Lógoi are in it, *ὅτι λόγοι σπερματικοὶ λογικῶν ζώων ἐν αὐτῷ (κόσμῳ) περιέχονται . . . ὁ δέ γε κόσμος περιέχει σπέρματος λόγους λογικῶν ζώων.* Sextus ad. Math. IX, 103, S. 575.

They work ceaselessly in nature; and are the innermost essence of its force, its *δυνάμεις γόνιμαι* or *σπερματικὴ δύναμις*, vis omnium seminum singula proprie figurans. They are near the *ποιόν* the second category of the Stoics, the first being the *πρώτη ὕλη* or *οὐσία*, like the passive principle of physics.

The second category, like the Lógos, must bring the first to 'quality'. Plotinus and Plutarch

[1] See Heinze, p. 113.

complain of this that God seems derived from matter. The *λόγοι* have much analogy with Aristotle's *λόγοι ἔνυλοι*.

All things therefore develope according to necessity; fate rules in cause and effect; nothing happens without 'a first'; effect becomes at once again a cause; but fate must work according to reason. Says Chrysiphus: *εἱμαρμένη* is the *λόγος* of Jove, or the *τοῦ κόσμου λόγος*, or the *τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ προνοίᾳ διοικουμένων· ἢ λόγος, καθ' ὃν τὰ μὲν γεγονότα γέγονε, τὰ δὲ γιγνόμενα* [1] *γίγνεται, τὰ δὲ γενησόμενα γενήσεται* [2]. But this fate and Lógos are the same. Regarded as purely physical, the Lógos is called *εἱμαρμένη*. Design coming more into view, it is *πρόνοια* (i. e. forethought in the sense of 'providence'), the absolutely necessary is what is absolutely adopted to its end. Both are bound up in the absolutely 'logical'. Some of the Stoics, like Cleanthes among the earlier ones and Epictetus among the later, were animated by deep religious feelings and approached Theism, 'providence' being then the feature which they held most in view.

They tried to straighten out their ideas, so as to be in harmony with popular feelings.

Fate was *ἀνάγκη*; it was unconquered, unhindered, not to be turned aside, *ἀνεκβίαστος καὶ περιγενητικὴ ἁπάντων* [3].

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[1] Such expressions as these last of course occur in the Avesta, 'things that were, and are, and are to be, etc. The Gāthas have a few very marked occurrences of the presence of such a grip of ideas.

[2] Plut. Stoic. rep. 47. 1056, C. Stob. Ekl. I, 180; see Heinze, p. 126.

[3] Plut. Stoic. rep. 45 f. 1055 ff., Heinze, p. 128.

Neither freedom in God, nor chance in physics, was possible. There was no τύχη, nor moral and physical evil; for in view of finalities these do not exist. Heraclitus had long before preferred hidden to visible harmony.

All will be woven at last into one, and the seeming inequalities will disappear; κακία (evils) have their own object. Everything must have its opposite; there is no happiness without unhappiness, and even no truth without the lie.

For a moment Seneca seems to abandon his Monism inclining to Plato, for he said that 'God could not have avoided evil, on account of matter'.

Sporadic inconsistences are however universal. A man is not continuously of the same mind, nor indeed always of the same nature.

It is not necessary to enter upon any fuller discussion of this most interesting (if erroneous) system. We have reached at once what we need in it. Its Lógos, like that of Heraclitus, has absolutely nothing to do with Asha or Vohu-Manah (Vohumanah). If it resembled anything in the Iranian philosophy, it would be again of course Ahura Mazda; but the idea of comparing the Gāthic religious philosophy, with its 'two first spirits' with the Stoics' doctrine of two principles, one merely passive, and the other active, does not seem to have occured to any one at all; and no wonder.

In one particular this Lógos resembles Asha or Vohumanah; but it is a particular which is accounted for only upon the supposition that Asha or Vohumanah are parts of the world, even when re-

garded as attributes, and that they are 'bodily' spirits? (*sic*), cp. the *πνεῦμα σωματικόν*. It is this; viz. that the supreme objection to comparing Vohumanah with the Noũs-Lógos of Plato, and the Lógos of Philo, is removed, for matter is no longer described as evil, an idea, as I cannot too often repeat, totally repugnant to Zoroastrian philosophy; see also above upon Heraclitus.

Matter was with the Stoics, not an evil thing nor an inferior thing, needing an inferior God outside of the world to create it, and to manage it; and so evil negatively, that it to say, needing an emanation from God to save Him (God) from the degradation and humiliation of coming into contact with it. But God is the Lógos; and the Lógos is itself in a sense material.

If in this we can see a resemblance to Vohumanah, or Asha, who certainly did not disdain the material substance of the world, then I might say that science is welcome to it. I concede this the more freely because I can easily prove *that Vohumanah long antedated it.* But this last is not our question just here; see below and at the close.

The Eclectics.

While we could not expect much of importance from the Eclectics who succeeded the earlier Stoics, we yet find in the book *περὶ κόσμου* [1] of the time of Antiochus [2] the beginning of the Philonian Lógos,

[1] Among the works falsely ascribed to Aristotle.

[2] Antiochus, long a hearer of Philo of Larissa, mentioned and described the battle near Tigranocerta, B. C. 69, which approximately fixes the date of his death; Zeller 598.

so far as it was regarded as the summing up of the 'powers' of God, for it speaks of them for the first time in history as separated from Him almost as if they were regarded as persons, or as if at least, the first of them, was so regarded.

Curiously enough, Persian imagery is made use of, God being compared to a Persian king [1]. This seems of itself to point to the Persian invasion of Greece. If so, it brings us at once into a certain connection with Parsism, for the Persian Influence as well as the Persian arms extended over the (neighbouring) territories of Syria, and had been long previously also felt in Egypt. 'God sits on His Throne like a Persian King', while His power goes forth through all the Universe, moving the sun and moon, and pervading the whole heaven; it is the cause of salvation to those upon the earth [2].

In this work God is the *νόμος ἰσοκλινής* and 'the entire world', as constructed by Him, divides itself into the different forms of nature *διὰ τῶν οἰκείων σπερμάτων*, etc. But yet no special mention is made of the 'reason of the world' in so many words.

Alexander of Aphrodisias.

Alexander of Aphrodisias [3] speaks of the Divine Understanding as the Stoics spoke of the Lógos. The New Phythagoreans held to a mixture of Platonism, Stoicism, and Aristotelianism.

[1] So Heinze.

[2] 5, 397 b. 16, Heinze.

[3] Appointed to a peripatetic school at Athens, and thanks Septimius Severus and his son Caracalla somewhere in the interval 193—211 A. D. in the dedication of his book *περὶ εἱμαρμένης*, Zeller 686.

The phrase θεῖος λόγος, means, with one of them, mere 'divine reflection', not the 'reason of God' which 'streams out into the world'.

Consistency as well as originality are not frequent in this school.

Alexandrian School.

Alexandria however claims the honour of a true revival of mental science, seeming to anticipate the scholastics of the middle ages The latter brought the Bible to Philosophy, while the Alexandrian school first brought Philosophy to the Old Testament. The real substance of the Old Testament was spirited away; and the Greek Philosophy gave the model for the trick.

Aristobulus [1].

Aristobulus was the first to appear with the attempt to harmonise the Bible with science, though traces of Greek speculation were to be found in the translation of the Septuagint, Daehne. II, 11 flg. These were however easily explicable as common forms of expression used by cultivated persons in the schools of the period.

Aristobulus called himself a 'peripatetic'; but the Church fathers viewed him justly as the founder of the Alexandrian School. 'The limbs of God', he said, in handing his book to Ptolemy, 'are here

[1] Flourished about 160 B. C.

taken only in an allegorical sense'. He followed in this the methods used by the Stoics in treating the mythologies of Greece. He found everything which he wished to find, of course, in the old records of the Bible, claiming a priority for them as inspiring all other philosophical developments.

He has been accused of being in so far dishonourable that he altered texts to suit his purpose. Heinze gives a specimen, from the Orphic hymns, and other passages are also mentioned which strongly resemble the Mosaic writings. These were, however, curious pious frauds. His Sophia was like that of the Proverbs, not a separate personal subject. Like the *χάρις*, this Sophia was probably one of the 'powers' which he accepted between God and the world. These 'powers' seem in a certain sense to be separated from God.

There is no Lógos in Aristobulus in the purely Greek sense. His 'word' is the creative Word of God, which appears in the Old Testament, presented in allegorical colouring.

Heinze finds no trace of Greek influence in the Book of Job, the Proverbs, or the Koheleth, Baruch, and the Siracid. He finds the personification of wisdom in the son of Sirac to be merely poetical, and the 'wisdom-lore' of the above works he justly holds to be purely Jewish.

The pseudo-Solomon.

As to the pseudo-Solomon, his wisdom is a *πνεῦμα*. This *πνεῦμα* is the *πνεῦμα κυρίου* and the *ἅγιον πνεῦμα*. So also Jesus the son of Sirach makes these two concepts one.

This *πνεῦμα* is called *νοερόν*; which recalls the same words as used by the Stoics (see Heinze), and the Stoical pantheism is approached in the idea that this *πνεῦμα* pervades everything, as had indeed appeared in Aristobulus and the author of the *Περὶ κόσμου*. It is analogous to the omnipresence of the Stoic Lógos. Hitherto we have found absolutely nothing of the Avesta, Asha, or Vohu manah (Vohumanah) in the Greek, or Jewish-Greek; but 'the first of created beings', reminds us, not of the Vohu manah of the earliest Zend Scriptures, the Gāthas, but of the later Avesta, or its Pahlavi translation. Vohumanah was in no sense the first of the Ameshaspends in the Gāthas; and the expression 'first created' has no meaning for it. The 'firstness' of Vohumanah is due to a mistake of the Pahlavi translator at Yasna 28, 3. Yet the later but still genuine Avesta names it, or him, Vohumanah 'first'.

In the so-called Wisdom of Solomon we have what seems also to be an approach to the materialism of the Stoics, the Spirit *πνεῦμα* itself is called *πολυμερές, λεπτόν, εὐκίνητον* (H. 196) which look like the characteristics of what is corporeal, though its name be *πνεῦμα*.

That the style of the Stoics influenced the composer is rendered still more likely by an interesting coincidence. Heinze notices the predicates to the πνεῦμα in Wisdom VII, 22; and there were 26 predicates to the 'agathon' as mentioned by Cleanthes. And here we come upon a Zoroastrian analogy, for the wisdom here is not absolutely separated from God, although she is πάντων τεχνῖτις, τὰ πάντα ἐργαζομένη; that is to say, she is omniscient, omnipotent, governs all for the best, and continually renews all things; and directs the fate of men, especially that of the pious. Nothwithstanding these attributes and functions, she stands by while God Himself makes the world; and this was totally unlike the Lógos, and in harsh discord with the supposed needs which called him forth. Her influence is ethical both objectively, as a being, and subjectively, as a quality of the individual. Here indeed we have a resemblance in the Gāthas, and a strong one [1]; but mark well; *it has nothing to do with the Lógos.*

The Stoics used the expression ἀπόρροια of 'the All'; and the Son of Sirach speaks of God 'who pours his wisdom over all his works'; but the expressions made use of by the pseudo-Solomon, while implying the same ideas, may be regarded as merely poetical. With him 'wisdom' is the 'breath of God', 'the pure outgushing of all-powerful glory', 'the reflection of eternal light', 'a spotless

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[1] Thine was Piety, verily; Thine too, Kine's Creator, was Wisdom; see Yasna XXXI, 9, Gāthas, pp. 67, 456.

mirror of the activity of God', and an 'image of his goodness'. No exact philosophical ideas are here intended, and no 'emanation' in the sense of the Lógos. No such antithesis appears between Wisdom and God as appears in Aristobulus, and the author of the *Περὶ κόσμου*, nor any such as appears between God and His 'power', nor is any activity ascribed to Wisdom apart from God. The Wisdom of God pervades all, The Lógos of the Book of Wisdom occurs three times, each explicable from Biblical passages; the creation, the saving of Israel when wounded by the serpents in the desert, and the smiting of the first-born of Egypt. This Lógos is not synonymous with Wisdom, but parallel with it; (so Heinze, who has closely watched and compared all the occurences) [1]. Little Greek influence is to be traced in the 'Wisdom' or 'Lógos' of this book.

The Fourth Book of the Maccabees.

The unknown author of the fourth book of the Maccabees has a Lógos and a logismós which are remarkable, but have little cosmical peculiarities.

In the 'fabulous Aristeas' we have 'A God whose power goes through all', which does not offer the distinction between God and his 'powers'.

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[1] The reader can easily verify for himself, for the book presents no difficulty.

Jason of Cyrene.

So the little known Jason of Cyrene composed a history of the Syrian war, and in the second book of the Maccabees we have an extract from it. The 'Power of God' as it ruled in the Temple is here separated from His power when seated on his heavenly Throne, which seems to show a gleam from the ideas of the existence of powers intermediate between God and the world [1].

[1] So Heinze.



V.

The Philonian Lógos.

Preliminary Remarks.

Enough perhaps has been already said by me in different essays, and indeed in the foregoing parts of this Treatise, to give a brief general idea of the Philonian Lógos so far as it bears upon my subject. But it is very far indeed from the scope of this present inquiry to leave any one of its main features unsketched, much less to conceal my own impression of some of its chief phases, comparing them with our Vohumanah or Asha; for it is just the neglect of such an attempted thoroughness which, as I fear, has given rise to the entire misunderstanding.

Too many scholars, driven on almost against their wills by haste, are apt to copy one from the other statements, too often careless, about Philo and Plato without giving themselves the trouble to turn over their pages even in the translations, not to speak of their texts. But the works of these writers are extremely accessible; and have been edited, re-edited, and translated so often that any person of average capacity or taste for metaphysics, can not only verify assertions with a few days' labour, but enjoy an incomparably agreeable experience, examining the entire subject. The works of Philo Judaeus are especially accessible (at short notice) to all readers of Greek in the excellent* edition of Tauchnitz,

1889, which is at hand, at an extremely low price. This gives many, if not all of the variations which preserve any pressing importance; while the older editions of Mangey, (with Aucher) and Richter, may be found in any Library which lays any claim to be considered complete. Respectable translations also of the various parts of Philo's works exist; and among the best (?), or nearly complete ones, that of Pfeiffer (with text) may be referred to, while that of Mr. Yonge in Bohn's series is also extremely useful. It is indeed to be regretted that gentlemen in India, for whom this essay is chiefly written, are likely to be more versed in Sanskrit than in Greek; for the most excellent translation possible, seems hardly able to supply that something which one always gets from the sight of the texts of a work in its original.

But however familiar one may be with Philo's text, a person would be very much of a dilettante who neglected all the fine distinctions and remarks which have been made by specialists upon the subject, such as Heinze and Siegfried, in the course of their partial translations and their comments; while of course no one has any right to speak at all who is not familiar with our illustrious Zeller (in his masterly and engaging volumes).

Even in the light of lexicography we should search out every accessible opinion of every respectable author; and that of course even notwithstanding the universal fact that each of them without exception is of necessity even less than a beginner on some one side branch of the widely extended

theme. For it is precisely the least thorough of all writers upon a certain point under investigation who may, whether by wit or accident, hit upon the actual idea in the original. And it is in fact just the case with Mangey's edition, that while it may be quite faulty in some particulars, it more than makes up for the deficiency in others; for he suggested a throng of fresh readings of the text which have, many of them, been practically accepted by critics as sound or probable restorations.

Let us then with Philo's texts in our hands, and neglecting no commentator nor translator, ask ourselves, what really were the ideas expressed in Philo's conception of his Lógos, and as to how far they can be compared with the Vohumanah or Asha of the Zend Avesta.

Closer Discussion.

So far as originality in the writings of Philo is concerned, it must be looked for only in those less prominent characteristics which belong rather to detail than to substance.

Much of the colouring, and indeed some of the more important features in Philo's presentation of his Lógos were (as has been also said by me elsewhere) due to his more immediate predecessors, the Stoics. And the cast of most of his views in certain particulars is also, on the other hand, strongly Biblical. Indeed he himself would have claimed that they were wholly and really Mosaic; but this would have been a mere morbid excrescence of his diseased national, or personal, vanity; for intellec-

tually vain indeed he was, though a man of fervid genius, honest in his intentions, and laborious as a constructor.

The main features of his actual system are, however, to be found in Plato, as mediated by the intervening philosophical authors and compilers, especially by the Stoics, radically as Philo differed from the latter in the main. I do not however forget that some writers, and among them, even Zeller, have declared Philo's conception of the Lógos to be peculiar to himself, though presented in a Greek dress. His ideas were original, as it seems to me, more in the sense of being an original 'mixture'. More than one writer has also noticed a probable influence on the part of Parsism upon Philo.

I of course, as a former theologian, ought to be somewhat more at home with these particulars of his system than others; for I have been obliged to dabble in the Hebrew language, history, and literature throughout my entire adult life [1]; and of course I have been always deeply interested in Philo's curious Jewish Lógos, taking the very breath as it does, so to speak, out of the mouth of God, and as if that breath were a separate attribute, carrying also such a way of doing things, as Philo's procedure seems to do, to an unwarrantable extreme. I know of course that he was also influenced by the then existing Jewish Halacha and . . . Midrash . . ., etc. [2].

[1] Having necessarily begun it as an indispenable preliminary to the reception of Holy Orders, at about 1858.

[2] To which works however I have given no close attention at all.

The colouring and side-features of a system are important in many ways to certain investigators; and they are also above all of value in estimating the historical sources from which a system springs, and the connections which it maintains with contemporaneous and contiguous philosophies; but I am free to confess that the impression which the main structure of any scheme in itself makes upon me is of such a nature that I am perhaps too apt to yield my attenton to it, to the exclusion of its more adventitious characteristics [1].

The Intermediary.

The supposed necessity for an intermediate power between God and the world had been indicated in the philosophy which was prior to that affected by Jewish influences (see my frequent allusions to it above), and the idea had been further developed by Jewish speculation; but with Philo of Alexandria it was everything, strange as it may seem to us.

With him every element in philosophy must be traced to the Scriptures, whether from fanatical conviction, or from the supposed necessities of his

[1] It may be well for me to recall just at this point that I began all my personal intellectual activity in literature with an incipient study of Philo, and that at a very early age. I may also add that I felt much the difficulty of pursuing interior investigation throughout the years of my pastorate, actually breaking away however only in '72, and devouring the closer results of philosophical and linguistic criticism. My interest had centred in the Gnosis; and it was not till '76 that I turned to the Avesta to study the history of Hegel's procedure by sublated negation.

situation, which might be described as a sort of lay priesthood; and allegory made it easy for him to find in those Scriptures whatever he liked. He found Moses to be full of Greek, having first however richly sown the scriptures with classic lore [1].

Plato and the Stoics contribute the larger part of the subject matter with which he deals, but he affected all the Greek philosophy, and he finds Plato the 'holiest, and the great (... omnino magnus Plato ...'), Heraclitus, 'the great and famed', 'Parmenides, Empedocles, Zeno, Cleanthes, are a 'holy union of divine men' [2]; but he found them all in debt to Moses.

He brought everything into connection with the Jewish Scriptures or Jewish Philosophies. His idea of God was so exalted that he denied Him all qualities; and called Him ἄποιος 'not having a manner', which at once seems to eliminate Vohumanah and Asha, both of them, at least from His character. He surpassed Plato and Aristotle in his abhorrence of anthromorphism; his God was the 'being one', the ὢν, or again simply 'being' (τὸ ὄν). He was not only unnameable, but inconceivable. He was unalterable and simple, above and exempt from the conditions of time and space, since He created them. He alone is 'true being'; other things, which are subject to the conditions of time

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[1] Siegfried mentions somewhere** that a speech of one of the Patriarchs is much decorated with Greek classical expressions.

[2] Qui omn. prob. II, 447, ed. Mang.; De provid. II, 42, I, 77, Aucher; Qu. rerum div. her. I, 503, De provid. II, 48, I, 79. Auch., etc. (Heinze).

and space, have a merely apparent existence. He stands in no relation to other things, not being *πρός τι*; He is self-sufficient and possesses absolute completeness, is free from all evils, and alone possesses true happiness and blessedness. He is the highest good and beauty, the highest blessed one, and even 'better than the good' (which, strange to say, is a Gāthic expression, Y. 43. 2 [1] but not applied to Asha or the rest). He is more beautiful than the beautiful, more happy than the happy, etc. [2]. And yet he had 'no qualities' with all this),

He was the 'mind of all things', not just here the 'Father', as Ahura is of Asha and Vohumanah. He is the working force operating upon soulless and motionless matter, which was simply passive, recalling once more the main feature of the Platonic dualism, which is simply contradictory to the implied doctrines of the Avesta.

Philo is a little pantheistic with it all (this by an accidental departure), at times following the usual inconsistency of speculative composers; and he by no means shakes off the Stoics, whose very expressions he seems to use, radically opposed as his main doctrines were to theirs. For, if God be the *νοῦς τῶν ὅλων* 'the mind of all things', He could not be said to be so absolutely separate from them.

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[1] But though quite possibly equivalent to the summum bonum, that 'better than the good' in Y. 43, 2 is there not applied to Ahura, let it be noted well, in any sense whatsoever; it is the ideal goal of the beatified man; its form is approached by that of Indra Ṛ.V. 461, 3, (6, 20, 3) 'stronger than the strong'.

[2] Leg. ad Gai. II, 546; De septen., II, 280, De m. opific. 1, 2.

But such inconsistencies, let us constantly recall, are nearly universal, and therefore only to be expected. Likewise, and let us note it again (in passing), if God were Himself the 'mind' of all things [1], He needed no 'good mind' within, outside of, or beyond Himself to be either His attribute, or His agent.

Like Plato and the Stoics, Philo found the world to be the most excellent possible. But as the 'world' is here the 'Universe', we must not be led astray by the expression. It included of course a 'Devil and all his works'. Though the Authors of the Avesta, if closely cross-examined, might have possibly, or even probably, assented to the idea that the world was 'the best possible', yet the Avesta nowhere gives a definitive suggestion in this sense, although it really underlies all meditative common-sense.

To say that the world is 'the best possible' is not really to say a great deal. It could, according to Philo, neither have originated, nor could it have been maintained without God's constant activity; the world was therefore, as the Stoics said, 'full of God'. He, God, embraces everything, but is embraced by nothing; He is every-where and yet nowhere (*sic*), for He only created space when He created objects. He has filled all things (Leg. alleg. III., 1, 88), and 'gone through all, and left nothing empty of Himself' (De Sacrific. Ab. et C. 1, 176). Yea, He is Himself the All, (though this should not be considered irreconcileable with what

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[1] De m. opific. 1, 2; De migrat. Abrah. 1, 466.

was said immediately before; viz. that there was 'no space' for Him in the entire world). There is little doubt that Philo was a good deal of a Stoic at heart (as I have hinted just above) notwithstanding his final decisions. But whatever he really or occasionally thought, he openly taught a doctrine quite inconsistent with the Stoa, viz. that *God only touched the world through intermediaries.*

The opposition between God and the world was too abrupt; so he held. He would have been defiled, had He touched it, even to bring it into form (unlike the God of the Gāthas and the entire Avesta, who especially 'formed ('tashaṭ (tashō, tashan)) the herds, the waters, and the plants' (so indeed in all Zoroastrianism, early and late). He could not have created the world by direct action, much less could He have had to do with evil.

The Ameshaspentas in Philo.

At this juncture we have the opportunity to introduce what has been supposed to represent the Ameshaspends in the works of Philo. When God said 'let us make man'; in these words He (the Deity) is supposed by Philo to have called upon assisting-beings to undertake the work with Him, they attending to its more painful elements. *Ποιήσωμεν ἄνθρωπον, ὅπερ ἐμφαίνει** συμπαράληψιν ἑτέρων ὡς ἂν συνεργῶν, ἵνα ταῖς μὲν ἀνεπιλήπτοις βουλαῖς τε καὶ πράξεσιν ἀνθρώπου κατορθοῦντος ἐπιγράφηται ὁ θεὸς ὁ πάντων ἡγεμών, ταῖς δὲ ἐναντίαις ἕτεροι τῶν ὑπηκόων· ἔδει γὰρ ἀναίτιον εἶναι κακοῦ τὸν πατέρα τοῖς ἐκγόνοις.* De m. opific. I, 17 flg. 'It behoved the Father to

be no cause of evil to His children', He left this, or, this was left, to others of His servants.

De profug. 1, 556: *ἀναγκαῖον οὖν ἡγήσατο τὴν κακῶν γένεσιν ἑτέροις ἀπονεῖμαι δημιουργοῖς, τὴν δὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἑαυτῷ μόνῳ.*

Such a God was of course in a certain sense really as limited as Ahura, whose domain did not, for a period, extend over the boundary line of 'the good'. But even at this stage we cannot fail to be struck with the total dissimilarity of these other Demiurges to the Ameshaspends. *Where do the Ameshas ever mingle themselves with Ahriman, playing catspaw to the limited good Deity, doing the evil work for Him?* And indeed how much higher is the simple scheme of the Avesta than this well-meant, but really degrading hypothesis of Philo (and his Platonic predecessors), which seems to us to be as conspicuous for its weakness as for its meanness [1]. We must not however suppose that Philo attributed this arrangement to the will of God. It seems to have been thought out as being in the nature of things; which relieves the situation. God could indeed create the ruling faculty in our souls, but not the subordinate capabilities (? *sic*). The subordinate faculties were not evil, but made evil possible. He, the Deity, therefore gave over to His subordinates the construction of the way to sin (De confus. ling., 1, 432). This looks however as if the arrangement originally issued from His will.

And this, as Heinze points out, is an echo of

[1] It may however be explained as the result of a failure of all attempts to define the *θεός*.

Plato (see Tim. 41, B, flg.), who, as Philo does, makes the highest God leave the evil work to the lesser lights of the Pantheon.

So with punishments, He, Philo's Deity, puts them off upon His servants, while He Himself enjoys the luxury of the indulgence of His love, De profug. I, 556. He recommends the penalties indeed: . . . *ὀυκ ἄνευ μὲν ἐπικελεύσεως τῆς ἑαυτοῦ βασιλέως ἅτε ὑπάρχοντος, δι' ἄλλων δέ, οἳ πρὸς τὰς τοιαύτας χρείας εὐπρεπεῖς εἰσι,* De Abram II, 22, De somn. II, I, 690.

It seems really meant to be suggested by Philo that He (the Deity) was as well entitled to an intermediary executioner (hangman) as other 'Kings'; and this would be anthromorphic indeed. In this sense he was the 'Prince of Peace', while His servants were the 'Chiefs of War'. The Right (was it Asha?) sits by His side; and while hating evil, has for her (the Right's) business its punishment, De decalog. II, 208. (Asha in the old Avesta is indeed often spoken of as the 'companion' [1] of Ahura, though he, or it, is still all the same the rhythm of holy law in the Universe, the State, and in the Church, and though he, or it, gave its very name to the saints, who are the 'ashavan', that is to say, 'the ones endowed with Asha'). He, the Deity of Philo, even leaves smaller benefits to His servants. He gives health directly. So in the Avesta 'health', that is to say, 'complete wholeness' is indeed one of His Own attributes; and it is also, as here, a gift which He imparts to His faithful. But

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[1] See Y. 32, 3.

this is one of the most prominent concepts in the entire Avesta lore. With Philo, however, He leaves the 'healing of disease' to His subordinates; not so Ahura; so He leaves also 'the avoidance of sin' to them. He is the 'Feeder; or 'Nourisher'; so by construction at least in the Avesta, as in every other similar Bible; but His Lógos is the Healer [1]. Did not the Lógos have the nobler duty of the two? God could not approach these lesser benefits, for they lay too near the evil! He was so absolutely pure and sublime; and was otherwise so far removed from the material substance of the world that the Intermediaries were indispensable even here. There is some trace of reason, to some of us, in the idea that it would be helpful to us on our side to have Intermediaries between our highest conception of a sublime personal God and ourselves; His very benefits might appal us. But to speak personally for one moment, it has always been totally incomprehensible to me how a religious mind could ever tolerate the idea of an Intermediary between God and itself, unless that Intermediary were indeed a part of God, especially representing mercy, and unless this Intermediary be, as by every necessity, thus *one* with the Father; so that the 'Father' is never robbed of the sublimest attribute of which a God can be thought to be possessed. But where is there such an idea in the Avesta as that of 'mediation' in connection with the Ameshas in any clear or definite sense, or indeed at all?

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[1] Leg. alleg. III, 1, 122.

They indeed ask for the very 'sight of God' to consult Him even as to the interests of agriculture, though these were vital to the last degree. God speaks to the soul directly and repeatedly, though the expressions themselves are of the nature of poetical representations, that is to say, the questions and answers are used as poetical representations of the immediate conference of the soul with God. And these interlocutions formed so graphic a feature that they became themselves objects of sacrifice; cf. the sacrifices made to the questions and answers in Y. 44. There is plenty of analogy between the descriptive characteristics of Philo's Lógos and of his female quasi-Lógos, the Sophia. It is, however, the chasm between God and the world which in Philo makes all the difficulty. The Infinite could not, according to Philo, operate directly upon the finite, nor 'being' upon 'becoming' (*sic*). The Intermediate Beings are therefore necessary to bring phenomena to pass, to maintain them in a world, and to satisfy the bias of men towards things above, (De somn. I, 1, 641, De gigant. 1, 263). The very air which we breathe was full of these bodiless souls (*sic*). Philo makes a great business of describing and naming these Intermediate Beings at the apex of which stood his Lógos.

Philo uses the idea of the Lógos as if it were already familiar to his circle of hearers and readers. He must have found it practically ready to his hand; he seems even to say so, *μᾶλλον δέ, ὡς εἶπέ τις* (a quite remarkable point, the suggested emendation of Mangey seems perfectly gratuitous), (*τὸν θεῖον*

λόγον) ὅλον δι' ὅλων ἀναχεόμενον καὶ αἰρόμενον εἰς ὕψος, De somn. II, 69, p. 334.

How far this θεῖος λόγος, with which his public were familiar, was a developed idea in the Philonian sense, who can say;? but the question possesses considerable historical interest.

His Lógos is the former of the world and its maintainer, also 'the tool or instrument of God', De cherub. I, 162, Leg. alleg. III, I, 106. Here I gladly concede that both Asha or Vohumanah are often spoken in the instrumental case as qualifying the creative action of Ahura. But here is a whole system of so-called philosophy fully adopted from the Platonic school, and elaborately extended with no little *scharfsinn* to make definite and fixed the one point that God did not create the world, except in a *very* remote manner indeed, touching its substance with tongs (so to speak); whereas in the Avesta, if He makes everything with Ashā, it means simply with His 'accuracy'; and, if with Vohumanā, it means 'with His good will'.

But Philo's Lógos is again 'the rudder' with God as 'the steersman' (De migrat. Abr. I, 437). Where are such figures of speech applied in the Avesta?, which is thought by some writers totally to ignore the sea. If the Avesta-writers were familiar with Philo, all this would have left its traces.

God saw (De mundi opific I, 4) that nothing could be blameless in the world which had no antecedent ideal pattern in its formation; He therefore formed His intellectual ideas of the world which was to be, as an architect might form his ideas of

a future edifice. He formed the mental sketch of an ideal city. And, as an architect might carefully compare the advancing work with his drawn and measured designs, so God proceeded in the building of the Kósmos. As the brain of the architect is to his work, so is the divine Lógos to the world; it is even called the 'book' in which the essential elements of all other things were written; Leg. alleg. 1, 1, 47, *Βιβλίον δὲ εἴρηκε τὸν τοῦ θεοῦ λόγον ᾧ συμβέβηκεν ἐγγράφεσθαι καὶ ἐγχαράττεσθαι τὰς τῶν ἄλλων συστάσεις.* Neither Vohu manah nor Asha was ever a 'book'. There is some very serious doubt indeed whether any 'books' existed at the place and time in which the Gāthas were composed. The Lógos is also both 'tools' and 'chart'. It is even the 'ideal world' itself after which He (Philo's God) would make the real world, De m. opific. 1, 5.

This seems a reversion to Panlogism and the Stoics, though not an absolute, nor a complete one. But where are such things said of any of the Ameshas of the Avesta in the Gātha, or elsewhere? Asha is not that 'ideal world'; though the word, sometimes comprehends 'the community' in the Gāthic scene, but only in the higher, though familiar, religious sense as 'the embodied Law'. So Vohumanah is often the typical saint, the orthodox citizen, but only in the purest sense in the Gāthas; (see 'the Personified Asha' and 'Vohumanah in the Gāthas' in the Journal of the American Oriental Society, 1900 already once referred to). Or, will any one recall the fact that Asha in the genuine but still later Avesta represented 'the Fire'!, and

so the chief element in the physical Universe as if according to Heraclitus (see above). Asha as the 'fire' in the later time had reference to the altar flame primarily beyond a doubt; so Āramaiti was also secondarily 'the earth'; Khshathra though only secondarily, 'metals'; Haurvatāt only later 'water'; and Ameretatāt 'plants'; (but these points must come in again with us in our discussion later on).

The Lógos unites within himself, or within itself, the foreseen conceptions of the world which was to be. He (or 'it') is the 'idea of ideas'.

Here is an assumption of the identity of the projecting power with the projected scheme; but both Asha, Vohumanah and the rest were *regulative* ideas within the mind of God; and only grand ideal constructive and originating forces projecting a world, and at the same time being that self-projecting world itself, by an enlargement, or expansion of their ideas.

Among the various tropes with which Philo tries to express his idea is that of a 'seal'. The seal is indestructible, while it impresses an indefinite number of images upon the wax. The 'ideas' were called 'seals', De profig. I, 547. No such image is familiar to the Avesta; and it is the business of my opposition to accumulate analogies. The lightest and most trifling often strikes us most, and is indeed of the most value as an evidence of historical connection.

The Lógoi.

This introduces us once more to the word Lógos in the plural; see above, where we discussed it in connection with the Stoics. As there were many 'ideas', so there were many 'Lógoi' in the sense of reasoned-out intellectual schemes. They are associated with the 'Angels' (*sic*), which might recall the Ameshas (see below); but where is any one of the Immortals of the Avesta ever called the 'Father' except Ahura Mazda himself? Such is the Lógos of Philo in De som. II, I, 683. If the Lógos is the 'Father' of all the Lógoi *πατὴρ λόγων ἱερῶν*, surely neither Vohumanah nor Asha was that (see also above). He, the Lógos, fructifies with the best thoughts, like a husband; see De leg. spec. II, 275; but in the Avesta no such gross indecency is immediately suggested; the idea of 'wife' is merely used sporadically. But this suggestion refers only to Ahura Mazda, not at all to Asha, nor to any other of the Ameshas; none of them is ever a 'husband'.

Philo deals with the *ideas*, as Plato does; but with him they *proceed*, from the thinking or thought of God, while with Plato they are underived. *Πλάτων φιλωνίζει ἢ Φίλων πλατωνίζει*, Phot. Biblioth. 86. b, 26.

The ideas as genus and species.

The ideas were both original imagined schemes according to which the world was to be formed, and they were also genus and species, to which the

individual object was relegated, a curious and interesting turn of thought, Leg. alleg. I, 1, 47.

As genus and species were the inevitable subdivisions under which the ideas would arrange any subject matter submitted to them, they seem to have been regarded as parts of the ideas themselves; as they certainly are concepts indispensable to all analysis. The ideas are eternal and remain ever 'equal to themselves' (*sic*), De cherub. 1, 148 (Heinze). They are not only the original formers, genuses and notions of everything which is intellectual as well as of what is sensuous, the proper essence of arts, sciences and virtues rests in them. De agricult. I, 326. De mutat. nom. I, 600. The highest 'idea' is the Lógos, the supreme category which subordinates all things to itself, recalling the Stoic doctrine of the *τὶ*. The Lógos is also 'manna'; and we are fed with it (*sic*), (see Heinze, p 223); the Lógos is also the indefinite *τί*. The Lógos is the most productive or generative, after God; but *τὸ δὲ γενικώτατόν ἐστιν ὁ θεὸς καὶ δεύτερος ὁ θεοῦ λόγος.* But again we have the statement that 'the Lógos is called God', De somn. 1, 39 (I, 655). Where is Vohumanah the same as Ahura in the Gāthas? Where is there anything of 'the Ameshas' in all this? The Ameshas are ideas fast enough in their original meaning; but this is their nature in common with many other Avesta notions and words, Ashi, Sraosha, etc., and also in common with a throng of Vedic ones; but where is the smallest similarity in the treatment of the two sets of ideas? What have Asha and Vohumanah and Khshathra to do with

genus and species, any further than that they are characteristics which of course possess and express specific qualities? Where is Vohumanah or Asha 'eaten as food'? Ameretatāt did indeed represent plants, as instances of life, and they were for 'food'; but this was because ameretatāt *meant* 'deathless long life'.

More definitive discussion.

To proceed with our exposition of the main points in Philo's system. The problem was to account for the influence of these Lógoi (ideas) upon matter; — *how* was the unchangeable 'metallic seal' to imprint an image upon the pliant wax? *Who* was to form the changeable phenómena after the eternal and unchangeable pattern? With Plato the ideas were probably 'living powers', 'working causes' (Heinze p. 223). 'Only an idea can make a thing what it is' (so H.? Phaid. 100 (so), D.?). So Philo followed; but he expresses himself differently.

God could not Himself approach formless matter. The original images of things must themselves possess the power to impress themselves. They seem lifeless enough when spoken of as qualities (ποιότητες), measures μέτρα, or numbers ἀριθμοί. But these names did not hinder Pythagoras from using one of them to express what were living forces. (His 'numbers' may have been thought of as possessing 'self motion', one might suppose because of the infinite and unrestrainable progress of the mind of itself in subdividing or in counting, which process can only be arrested by turning the thoughts away from the subject). Then the λόγος

ποιός of the Stoics goes over into physics; so Philo followed suit, and called his 'ideas' 'forces'[1]. And they are busy enough, according to him; De monarch I, 11, 219. They put the disordered into order; they define and limit the undefined and unlimited, and make each individual thing an individual *συνόλως τὸ χεῖρον εἰς τὸ ἄμεινον μεθαρμοζόμεναι.* Again the Lógoi seem to be in so far above and separate from the ideas (or from other ideas) that He (the Deity, or the Lógos (?)), uses them to form lifeless matter after their pattern, De confus. ling. I, 414. The Lógos was therefore not a lifeless original image, but a living Being at times (with Philo), who contained the forms within himself, gets 'matter' into his power, and through his own might (though it was not original), brings motion into the inert mass, and constructs the forms in which it is to be developed impelled by his own moving energy. So Philo came in fact almost to Plato's scheme, only that with Plato they were 'original essences', having their causes only in themselves, while Philo derived them from God.

The source of their existence was outside of themselves. So far as this goes it is true enough of the Ameshaspentas, as of any other qualities ever attributed to God or man. In Plato all came to an apex in the idea of 'the good'; — was this Vohumanah? If so, it was composed *after* the Pahlavi translation of Yasna 28, 3, where vohu manah (so) is erroneously described as the 'first creation'. With Philo all the ideas are *included* within the

[1] Plato had of course previously made use of such a term.

Lógos. He, the Lógos, does not represent any especial one, not even that of 'goodness'. With both Plato and Philo 'the ideas' are 'living' (so) (see above).

Plato himself (thinks Heinze) may have only meant 'reason' by 'the good'; certainly he only meant this sometimes, Phileb. 22, C. Heinze recalls also that the new Pythagoreans had already before Philo considered the Lógos as the antecedent ideal image, in imitation of which the world was made. Where are either Vohumanah or Asha represented in such a sense, as prototypes, ideal images in accordance with which God made the world? They are the divine characteristics which influenced all His actions, not the pattern or model, except in an indefinite, remote and almost intangible sense; and we are here largely concerned with what is palpable and calculated to strike the mental eye, and so to induce imitation.

The Lógos as the Splitter.

The Logos was the forming power, because he was also the 'divider', the 'splitter'. The first thing to do was to separate and sift; see Genesis I. That is the nature of all preliminary intellection; the more it divides, the richer the store of objects before it becomes. He, the Lógos, had to form both heaven and earth; and he (or 'it') divided *ad indefinitum.* He divided matter into light and heavy, fine and coarse; the fine he split again into air and fire, the coarse into water and earth; — subdivisions followed. Even the soul was divided into its reason-

able and unreasonable parts, speech into truth and the lie, and perception into that which seizes an object and that which does not seize one (*sic*). As species, so at last individual beings, must come to light more and more by means of division and distinction.

So, in reconstruction, the more varied the materials out of which a composite object has been constructed, the richer will be its fabric. It is a compounding together of opposites and without these contradictions and oppositions nothing can be thought of as species.

Nay, the world itself consists of oppositions and contradictions; recall Heraclitus. Like Heraclitus, curiously enough, Philo made 'strife' the moving principle and 'war' πόλεμος, 'the father' of all things, and still identical with the Lógos! (see Heinze 228). This does not seem to harmonise very well with the system of the Avesta, or with the idea of Vohumanah or Asha.

Strife is indeed the beginning; and the fierce battle of good and evil is the history of Zoroastrianism; but neither strife nor Vohumanah is the 'father'; nor is 'strife' stated to be an ameliorating factor; it remains an evil till it is finally overcome.

This non-formative factor in Philo is not immanent in matter, nor the same thing with it; but it has come to it from without. With Heraclitus however it is an eternal principle, and no progress is thinkable without it. Philo however seems to make progress dependent on continuous dividing and separation; (Hegel is our most prominent

modern example of this). But both make the development of the world nothing else but the unfolding of 'reason'; everything is to be deduced from this; and is therefore logical. Philo associates this process with the activity of human thought; he approaches the idea of the identity of thinking and being, but however as derived and not as absolute (see Heinze p. 229).

It is needless to say that there is nothing of Zoroastrianism in all this, unless it be Zoroastrianism developed from a long previous age. The simple is never derived from the elaborate; let it be well noted.

Philo's Jewish colouring.

But it is time for us to turn to the Jewish colouring in the works of Philo. Of course the separation of God from the world; that is to say, His transcendence, must have been derived from the Greeks; but Philo found it (so at least he persuaded himself) also in Moses, as the word *ῥῆμα*, and so the Lógos, which he claimed to have antedated at least that of the Greeks; God's word was His work *ὁ λόγος ἔργον αὐτοῦ*, De sacrific. Ab. et C. I, 175. But neither Asha nor Vohumanah are a 'voice', not even 'a creative voice', nor even 'a reasonable voice'. There is not the smallest similarity between the ideas. The two spirits create their worlds with no dramatic commands, not even so many as we find in Genesis. The Lógos on the contrary was often distinctly this latter, viz. a 'reason in speech'. He was more than mere 'sound'. But Vohumanah

is never 'sound' at all; though Ahura 'spoke' with both Asha and Vohumanah that is to say 'with truth and kindness'. Then again he, the Lógos, is sometimes called the 'house' in which God, the *νοῦς τῶν ὅλων*, 'the mind of all', dwells. I am not aware that Ahura Mazda is ever spoken of as dwelling in either Vohumanah or Asha, as 'in a house', where He 'arranges his ideas before He brings them out into the world'; see De migrat. Abr., I, 437. But, of course, as God created the world by His word, so Ahura must have created it 'with good mind', not indeed so much as '*with asha consenting*' [1].

What scheme of creation ever said anything else?

Not pausing to solve the question which arose between Heinze and Zeller as to whether Philo supposes a double Lógos to exist, one corresponding to the Lógos endiáthetos (*λόγος ἐνδιάθετος*) on the one side, and one to the Lógos prophoricós (*λόγος προφορικός*) on the other, the planning and the executive Lógos in men, or whether he meant by his somewhat corresponding terms, Kósmos noetós and Kósmos aisthetós (*κόσμος νοητός* and *κόσμος αἰσθητός*) only analogous divisions in the manifestation of the Lógos [2]), let us simply ask at once whether the two worlds of Y. 28, 2 or 3, Y. 30, etc. stand related here.

Philo certainly speaks of 'two worlds', one a

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[1] See what I have said elsewhere on 'the priority of Asha'. Notice the distinct difference in colouring, whereas copied lore reproduces the colour of its original.

[2] See the footnote on p. 160.

younger son of God, inasmuch as it is sensuous; for the older, he said, was no (οὐδένα) *sensuous* (?) [1] one, being intellectual; and, as the elder, it was considered as deserving to abide by Him, and not to go forth as the **προφορικός, ὁ μὲν γὰρ κόσμος οὗτος νεώτερος υἱὸς θεοῦ, ἅτε αἰσθητὸς ὤν· τὸν γὰρ πρεσβύτερον τούτου οὐδένα [2] εἶπε νοητὸς δ' ἐκεῖνος, πρεσβείων δὲ ἀξιώσας παρ' ἑαυτῷ καταμένειν διενοήθη.**

But this latter difficulty does not affect our question. What shall we say as to the 'two worlds', or 'two lives' of Yasna 28, 2 or 3?; see S.B.E. xxxi, p. 18 flg., 29 flg. also Gāthas, at the place, pp. 4 and 394.

Of course the two general ideas are kindred, like all the other similar concepts in the two systems; but as to any resemblance in the definite points involved, it is wholly absent.

How has 'the bodily world', a practical religious concept, anything to do with a Lógos prophoricós, an entirely speculative postulate? Or what has a 'world of mind' referring to intellect and

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[1] Qu. D. s. immutab. 1, 277.

[2] As to the οὐδένα which gives Heinze trouble, as well as Keferstein, who would read 'εἰκόνα', and Richter who suggests ἰδέαν, it seems awkward enough, as must be confessed. It possibly refers to some lost words which once intervened; or it may be a defective mode of expression: 'he said that the one older than this was no *sensuous kósmos*, but that one is intellectual' . . . Or again is it not better to transfer the whole sentence, for, as in oriental writings, a sentence doubtless often became displaced: . . . for he said that there was none older than this': let this be considered explanatory; and it may well have stood originally at the end of the passage after διενοήθη: 'the younger was sensuous; but that one, *the older*, was intellectual, and as being older and deserving to abide by him, he was thought out (?) *for this honour*, for he (God) said that none was older than this one': so everything comes into order.

Heaven, for the matter of that, anything to do with a Lógos endiáthecos, as Philo understood such a thing.

Ahura himself arranges and plans; *He* is the ἐνδιάθετος; and Asha in one place is the *object*, not the subject of mantā, cp. Y. 31: He (Asha) constitutes however a good προφορικός (with his companion attributes), but then *he is inferior* to the original reason. It is by the exercise of his Asha or Vohumanah, and other attributes that Ahura Himself performs those acts of creation and providence which are denied to Philo's God as beneath His sublimity.

The kósmos aisthetós and the kósmos noetós look very like our 'two worlds' in Yasna 28, 2; but they are not lógoi. No one ever thought of denying such resemblances as exist between such concepts.

The dim presence of these distinctions in the Zend Avesta is not only not remarkable; they are simply unavoidable because necessary to all speculation of the kind. And the activity of Ahura in exercising these attributes is entirely simple, corresponding to the activity of a supreme good Creator in all theogonies, though it is often actually impossible to tell whether the passages in the Gāthas mean to describe God as immediately working through His attributes, or through the men in whom those attributes have implanted themselves; see above on Asha and Vohumanah. Both Asha and Vohumanah are 'executive', fast enough, 'bearing forth' the plans of God, but they have no such

position as the Lógos; see above. And, moreover, Vohumanah and Asha are not either of the '*two worlds' of the Gāthas in any sense whatsoever. These two worlds are 'intellectual religion' referring to Heaven, and 'pious bodily life' upon earth.*

So far said then, according to Philo, the world is created through reason **νοῦς**, or its manifestation, the Word, the Lógos. This world is an imprint of the Divine Reason; and so the most complete work. Moving ideas which were the *forces propelling* life were active; and the Lógos was the sum of them.

It is easy to see that neither Vohumanah nor yet Asha correspond to such a Lógos; they are more like one of 'the ideas'. It is Ahura Mazda Himself who is nearer the Philonian or the Stoic Lógos, as I have already repeatedly said or implied; for it is He who unites the ideas. And such a general scheme of divine attributes and powers must have been common to every school of thinkers of the same type the world over without any regard to the kind of language in which they clothed their thoughts or to the dates at which they were uttered. So also in the matter of *keeping together* what has been once formed. Here again the Lógos would be Ahura; for although the Jewish-Greek had the θεός behind the Lógos, still the Lógos was an uncreated part of Him (so to speak). The Lógos keeps the kósmos in order, and the regular changes in the seasons are preserved by him; so Heinze finds, I think correctly. Compare this with Y. 44, 3, 4; Ahura was Asha's father, asha being in that place the rhythm of the physical universe, 'the thing pro-

duced', and only in the most subordinate sense 'the producer'. He was *a* lógos, as I have always said, but of a fifth degree lower dignity than *the* Lógos of Philo. It is again *Ahura* who does this thing, that is who creates something physical, which was considered impossible to Philo's God. It is not Asha who does it.

The Lógos was also used in the sense of 'the Law', as Asha was. He was the unbreakable band (δεσμὸς) which binds all tightly together σφίγγει. Otherwise the entire earth would be dissolved by the seas, the 'air would be set on fire by the fire and the fire extinguished by the air (*sic*)', De plant. N. I, 331; De profig, I, 562, De confus. ling. I, 425. This indeed would be the use of Asha, and we actually have the expression 'whose bond binds the saint' Y. 48, 7; though some might not agree to my rendering; and the terms are not positively certain.

Here we have an analogy fast enough; but it is a wonder that such similarities do not appear more frequently. Asha is under God the rhythm of order, keeping all things in balance within the solar system (not at all so of Vohumanah); but in the Avesta this rhythm is the *thing produced.* It is He himself, Ahura 'who through Asha keeps ruin from all Y. 44, 2'. Ahura is 'Asha's Father', let me repeat, whereas it is the Lógos who is sometimes called 'father' of the other ideas; see elsewhere above and below.

The Lógos may indeed be 'God's Son' in some of the side issues, and by implication, just as

'laughter' was; but not in its main application. It was the Kósmos which was more distinctly God's Son (see above); or the two Kósmöi, a younger, the sensuous, and an older, the intellectual.

The Lógos 'goes through all' like God Himself. He leaves nothing empty of himself. *τὰ πάντα τῆς οὐσίας ἐκπεπληρωκώς*, Quis rer. div. her. I, 499; De som. II, 1, 691: *τὸν θεῖον λόγον . . . μηδὲν ἔρημον καὶ κενὸν ἑαυτοῦ μέρος ἔχοντα, μᾶλλον δὲ . . . ὅλον δι' ὅλων αναχεόμενον.*

Quest. in Exod. II, 68, II, 515 Auch.: Dei verbum nihil omnio in natura relinquit vacuum, omnia implens; see Vita Mos. III, II, 154. And he is continuous and never severed; his smallest part, like the coriander seed, even when divided infinitesimally, possesses the power to fructify (sic; see Heinze p. 237).

I am not aware that either Vohumanah or Asha correspond to this description. Far from it, for Asha and Vohumanah have little or nothing to do with the domain of the Evil Spirit, Angra Mainyu, at least not, except to attack it at its borders; *while the Lógos was especially contrived to pervade nature in the unlimited manner described.*

The Lógos puts on the world like a garment *ὡς ἐσθῆτα*; in the Avesta it is God 'Who clothes Himself with the heavens', not Asha, much less Vohumanah [1].

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[1] I think Yt. 13, 3, also refers to the Heaven (with emended text) as the star-spangled garment which (Ahura) puts on; others differ.

Philo's scheme approaches the Panlogism of the Stoics at times; and this is radically different from the concept of Ahura and His Asha or Vohumanah; that is to say, Philo's Lógos is largely taken from the Stoics, save as to the one fundamental and vital principle that the Philonian Logos is (in a curious sense), separated, and is therefore distinct from God, emanating from him, and also separated from matter, though acting upon it, whereas the Lógos of the Stoics was essentially one with both, God and material substance.

The parallelism between much of the Stoic Lógos and that of Philo was naturally quite evident to the latter, inasmuch as he derived the outline and much of the substance of his scheme from his predecessors. As I have cited above, both Zeno and Cleanthes, were saints in his eyes, together with Plato, and Heraclitus (a curious group).

Still more closely defined particulars.

Descending into particulars; one of the subdivisions or aspects of his (Philo's) Lógos was that of nature *φύσεως*. His originals had spoken of it as 'material'; but in a certain lofty all-inclusive sense; Philo uses the term oftener in a narrower moral sense. The good man's actions should be *πρὸς τὸ βούλημα τῆς φύσεως, καθ' ἣν καὶ ὁ σύμπας κόσμος διοικεῖται,* conformed to that purpose of nature in accordance with which also the whole world is regulated.

Here indeed we have an approach to Asha as

again the 'rhythm of nature' and a closer one than before; cp. Y. 44, 3; see also above in several places. But the question is as to the status and relations of this Lógos, not as to its final operation. Here the two views are radically dissimilar; and we can never present this point too often and in too varied a light. The Philonian Lógos, let me repeat, as I understand from the overwhelming majority of Philo's expressions concerning it, was *positively invented*, or at least applied, for the purpose of supplying the Intermediary between God and matter to which allusion has been so often made, and the necessity for which was never dreamt of in the Iranian system; see above.

The Lógos Spermatikós.

To proceed; — like the Stoics, Philo held to a 'reason (Lógos) in seeds', which directs their development; and this might be said to be like the ritá (asha) of the Avesta, but only in the vaguest and remotest possible manner, which the mere words 'law of nature' must always convey. Otherwise we have a total absence from the Avesta of this fine detail. The lógoi spermatikoí were forces driving on the expected and predestined changes through seed, root, branch, leaves, and fruit, back to seed again. Rather cp. Gen. I. than the Avesta.

Philo strictly distinguishes between the material substratum of the seeds (of everything) which he holds to be entirely corporeal, and the living germs of reason which determine from within what

forms the future being (plant or animal) will take. These germs have nothing material about them, according to him, not even in the noble sense of the Stoic philosophy; but otherwise they correspond closely to the *λόγοι σπερματικοί* of the earlier school. Leg. alleg. III, I, 117 an *ὀρθὸς λόγος* is spoken of as *καὶ ὁ σπερματικὸς καὶ γεννετικὸς τῶν καλῶν*; and Quis rer. div. heres, I, 490, as 'the unseen, seminal, formative, divine lógos; *ἀόρατος καὶ σπερματικὸς καὶ τεχνικὸς καὶ θεῖος ἐστι λόγος, ὅς προσηκόντως ἀνακείσεται τῷ πατρί*, a very interesting passage.

These things might of course have been said by a devout and inventive person of a philosophical turn concerning Asha, and many more things of a similar kind, (not so much with any accuracy of Vohumanah); but then they simply were *not* said in the old Avesta in any definite or direct sense; and not at all, so far as I am aware, in any sense. Philo seems however again at times to approach the lofty materialism of the Stoics, almost committing himself to the view that the Lógos was the pervading source and essence of life as head (I fear that *he* did not recognise it 'as a mode of motion', as his predecessor came so near to doing; see above); but occasional expressions occur in authors in almost any sense. What we are discussing here is the main body of Philo's thought, without being baffled by occasional lapses into the higher schemes of the Stoics, (things indeed in themselves so impressive as to present constraining attractions to any one capable of comprehending them). On the other hand he, Philo, at least indirectly calls the fire

'spiritual'; ἰδοὺ ὁ νοῦς, ἔνθερμον καὶ πεπυρωμένον πνεῦμα [1]. (I am sorry to say that we are only warranted in seeing an allusion to Fire-worship in a Parsi sense by interpreting their so-called Fire-worship as the recognition of the mysterious (?) [2] perpetual motion resulting from fire as the eternal force which propels the ever changing forms of matter.

If 'heat', as the mode of inexplicable (?) [2] motion, driving on the universe in its cycles, and forcing it to return everlastingly to the same forms, be the wonderful thing adored by Fire-worshippers, we can little cavil at their weakness. Then indeed 'Philo's spirit-fire' is of the same kin.

But, as always, this leaves one question untouched, Philo does not exactly assert the identity of the πνεῦμα and the Lógos. The fire was also the 'causing cause'; but he speaks of it as the all-filling power, as he does of the πνεῦμα which pervades all things; and the fire was as one of them, the causing cause. The word πνεῦμα as here used came from the Stoics (see above on the Stoics, page 128).

We have indeed a striking analogon to the concept, the πνεῦμα, in the Spenta Mainyu, the 'bountiful', or with some, 'the holy', spirit, which, like the 'Holy Spirit' of the Old Testament, and indeed also of the New Testament, is often difficult to distinguish from God Himself.

We read of 'the first *gift* of the bountiful', (or 'holy'), spirit of Mazda, as being 'all actions (cere-

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[1] De profug. I, 566. [2] Do these things need explanation?

monial, civil and moral) done according to the Law; i. e. with sacred justice and regularity (Asha)'; see Y. 28, 1; see also Y. 47, an entire section being devoted to this 'spirit' (cp. my Gathas, pp. 274 to 285; 563—567). But the delineation is exceedingly scant, sparse and disjointed at the places.

Let me say here, as if in passing, that the very sparseness of the epithets applied to Asha in the Gāthas proves of itself almost conclusively that their Author could never have been influenced by anybody like Philo, whose epithets are very numerous indeed. Epithets multiply in the *derived*, seldom in the original document. This *πνεῦμα* however inevitably reminds one of the Spenishta Mainyu just as any similar intellectual term would remind one of Vohumanah.

But this *πνεῦμα* is spoken of as 'understanding'. It is *καθ' ἕτερον δὲ τρόπον ἡ ἀκήρατος* (unmixed) *ἐπιστήμη, ἧς πᾶς ὁ σοφὸς εἰκότως μετέχει*[1], cp. 'the Spirit of Wisdom' of the pseudo Solomon. It is like the *ὀρθὸς λόγος* as principle of morality; so in the Avesta the Zoroastrian saint was filled with vohumanah. What could be more natural? It has never been asserted by me or others that the Zoroastrian Lore was utterly unlike every other religious lore of a similar general description. In fact Zoroastrianism, as being more especially a religion depending upon definite compositions, belongs by its very nature to the same general class as the native Jewish religion of Philo.

[1] De Gigantibus, I, 265.

Philo uses the word πνεῦμα almost in an Old Testament sense, mixed however with Stoical conceptions; and like the Stoics, he seems to accept 'fate'; the Lógos is the ἀίδιος νόμος.

And he often apparently forgets for the moment his Platonic dualism, being temporarily lost in the Monism of the Stoics (see above).

Self-contradictions are however universal and only to be expected in sporadic occurrences in the works of all ancient writers, and in fact also in those of all writers, ancient or modern. His doctrine of fate seems inexorable, like that of the Stoics; The Lógos is 'the steersman' of everybody's destiny. (see also above), De Cherub. I, 145. Qu. D. s. immutab. I, 298.

Fate, if it be alluded to at all in the Avesta, seems referred immediately to the 'will of God'.

Cp. the Gāthas at Y. 29, 5, and at p. 419 flg.: 'To us shall it be as he willeth': 'Ahura is most mindful of the decrees', etc.

In this extremely valuable Y. 29, 4, we have a fine example of what I have noticed as the 'adumbration' of a coming idea. Like events, ideas cast their shadows before. And as I hold it, we have in the Avesta the foreshadowing of some of the greatest intellectual conceptions that have ever emerged from the human consciousness: 'to us shall it be as He willeth' refers definitively and immediately, as I hold, to the sahvār(e) 'the mandates of decree' which Ahura was most mindfully pronouncing: (see the place in my S.B.E. xxxi, also Gāthas, new edition pp. 23, 24), 'which mandates

of decree had been carried out hitherto with regard to (this is a new item which I now suggest) Demon-worshippers and (holy) men, and which shall be carried out hereafter. He is the discriminating arbiter; to us shall it be as He shall will!' This last does not refer immediately to personal destiny here; so it is safest to suppose, — *but it started a train of ideas which infallibly lead up to that doctrine.* And the same is true also of the great doctrine that 'sin is the soul's own punishment, and goodness its reward'; it was perhaps not fully intended in our present modern sense; but *it infallibly led up to it;* see elsewhere above and below.

The Dynámeis.

We now come upon Philo's doctrine of the δυνάμεις; and this, as I need hardly say, especially interests us; for these concepts have been especially supposed to be an echo of the Ameshas, or vice versa.

Philo had absorbed so much pantheism from the Stoics that he could not think of a world which did not partake of the nature of God; but as this could not be, in his opinion, without Intermediaries (see above on the motive of the Lógos), etc., he proceeded to formulate such conceptions. So he tried to bring the Deity into nature so far as he could without giving up the idea that God transcended nature; that is to say, that He was not a part of nature, immanent in it. 'The power' of God is not separated from him, but yet it stretches

out so that He fills the world with himself, through His 'power' which goes out to the utmost confines of the Universe (De posteritate C. 1. 229) and binds each part in the best harmony with every other.

Ἐπιβεβηκὼς δὲ καὶ ἔξω τοῦ δημιουργηθέντος ὤν· οὐδὲν ἧττον πεπλήρωκε τὸν κόσμον ἑαυτοῦ· διὰ γὰρ δυνάμεως ἄχρι περάτων τείνας ἕκαστον ἑκάστῳ κατὰ τοὺς ἁρμονίας λόγους συνύφηνεν. It would seem to us to be natural enough that a Deity should possess 'powers', and that He should be allowed to possess them 'in peace'.

But in the De confus. ling. 1, 425 these 'powers' of God begin to be treated as in antithesis to himself.

He is the *ὑπεράνω τῶν δυνάμεων ὄν.*

This seems sufficiently ridiculous to those not accustomed to the sore perplexities of these investigations; but it is not at all ridiculous in view of the unsolvable problems which, nevertheless people were then forced at least to attempt.

They, the Powers, encompass everything with invisible bands, which recalls what was said of the Lógos; see above.

They, these 'Powers', were really at bottom identical with 'the Ideas'; see above, De monarch 1, 11, 218. God could not operate upon impure matter, so he made incorporeal 'powers' as a go-between; these were 'the Ideas', and Zeller proceeds to remark that 'the ideas' were not merely pattern pictures, but working causes, p. 362; as if God could not have an idea without its producing its effect. For the matter of that this latter seems

sound enough; and both Asha, Vohumanah, Khshathra and the rest were ideas of God clearly enough; and we may well grant, nay assert, that God's ideas were also necessarily 'working powers': they must as of necessity fill up the existing Universe and keep it in life; — but Zoroastrianism knows nothing of the necessity for them as a go-between on account of the impurity of matter. These powers are the *contents* of the Lógos, just as the Ideas were; see above. We might almost blend the two names and say 'Ideal Powers'.

They also possess productive as well as controlling energy; see De confus. ling. I, 431 *δι' αὖ τούτων τῶν δυνάμεων ὁ ἀσώματος καὶ νοητὸς ἐπάγη κόσμος, τὸ τοῦ φαινομένου τοῦδε αρχέτυπον, ἰδέαις ἀοράτοις συσταθείς, ὥσπε οὗτος σώμασιν ὁρατοῖς.*

Heinze thinks that their office as original images for imitation in actual creation here falls into the background, while Zeller, p. 362, found them in this place in that function. Heinze thinks that the application of the terms here differs in the above respect from their application elsewhere. 'They surround God, like his court in untold numbers (not yet like the numbered Ameshas)'. De confus. ling. I, 431 (34). *Τίν' οὖν ἐστι, σκοπῶμεν. Ἐις ὢν ὁ θεὸς αμυθήτους περὶ αὐτὸν ἔχει δυνάμεις ἀρωγοὺς καὶ σωτηρίους τοῦ γενομένου πάσας, αἷς εμφέρονται καὶ αἱ κολαστήριοι.* But to this I will return later.

Here some might say that we come upon an item in Philo's presentation of these 'Powers' which at once annihilates their claim to be considered

analoga to Asha, Vohu manah and the rest of the Ameshaspentas.

Their 'untold' number does not very well accord with the 'immortal' 'Seven'. But we should not quibble about such a point (just here); for a few of them become excessively prominent; and these may be considered to be numbered: see De sacrif. Abel., 139, A, 173, M., also quoted by Zeller where two of them are selected.

Philo, like every other investigator of the kind, varied his mode of presenting such conceptions. He 'felt about' so to speak, as everybody does, till he got his system into shape. Or he may have become disgusted with his old results; and have varied them, half giving them up, sometimes doubtless from accesses of hypochondria, for he had his 'demon' worse than Socrates, suffering of course from irritation of the brain; cp. De s. Abelis et Caini, 1, 173: *ἡνίκα ὁ θεὸς δορυφορούμενος ὑπὸ δυεῖν τῶν ἀνωτάτω δυνάμεων ἀρχῆς τε αὖ καὶ ἀγαθότητος, εἷς ὢν ὁ μέσος τριττὰς φαντασίας ἐνειργάζετο . . .;* reminding us at once of Khshathra and Vohu manah. Cp. also De Abrah. 11, 19: *Καὶ ἡ μὲν ποιητικὴ θεός, ταύτῃ γὰρ ἔθηκέ τε καὶ διεκόσμησε τὸ πᾶν;* with the *βασιλικὴ* he ruled it *ἡ δὲ βασιλικὴ κύριος, θέμις γὰρ ἄρχειν καὶ κρατεῖν τὸ πεποιηκὸς τοῦ γενομένου.*

Notice that the *ποιητικὴ* is apparently called *θεός, θεόν*; cp. De profugis. 18 (1, 560: . . *ἐπὶ τὴν ποιητικὴν καταφεύγειν δύναμιν ἣν Μωϋσῆς ὀνομάζει θεόν,* see Heinze also, p. 247 'Diese ursprünglichste kraft wird auch geradezu *θεός* genannt'. This most original power is also often spoken of as *ἀγαθότης,*

χαριστική, εὐεργετική, and therefore reminds us of Vohumanah.

The βασιλική makes even a better Khshathra. All must be maintained in the order which has once been established; 'Government' is its duty. The name came direct from Plato; see Phileb. 30, D. quoted by Heinze, p. 67 though it (the name) also bore in mind the Septuagint, and it is called ἐξουσία, ἡγεμονία and κύριος, De cherub, I, 144. It possesses justice, δίκη; and so it appears legislative and punitive νομοθετική, κολαστική, Quis rer. div. her. I, 496.

It has taken all in its bosom and penetrates the parts of all, De confus. ling. I, 425.

Heinze remarks in passing that the names given are not merely synonyms of the two higher powers, the ποιητική and βασιλική; they seem to proceed in order. The beneficent follow from the world-creative and the legislative from the royal, De sacrific. Ab. et C. I, 173 (see above) also quoted by Zeller and Heinze, and Δορυφορούμενος οὖν ὁ μέσος ὑφ' ἑκατέρας τῶν δυνάμεων παρέχει τῇ ὁρατικῇ διανοίᾳ τοτὲ μὲν ἑνός, τοτὲ δὲ τριῶν φαντασίαν, De Abrah. II, 19 referred to by Zeller and Heinze, De monarch, (VI) II, 219, M. quoted by Zeller Ἱκετεύω δὲ ἐγὼ τὴν γοῦν περί σε δόξαν θεάσασθαι· δόξαν δὲ σὴν εἶναι νομίζω τάς σε δορυφορούσας δυνάμεις ....

But we have not only two of the δυνάμεις brought forward; we have actually six grouped in a single place; — and as the Amesha Spentas are six exclusive of Ahura Mazda. This certainly looks at least like a coincidence.

And one commentator, Siegfried, supposing that Philo was here intending to present a correspondence between the number of the 'cities of refuge'; and the holy number 'Seven', thinks that we should consider the ὤν, with which Philo designates the Supreme Being, to be understood here, so making up the number six to seven; as to this see again below.

The one well-known place in Philo is (De Profugis 18, 1, 560) where the Powers seem for a moment to be limited to six. This has naturally struck the attention of those who have been looking for coincident similarities between the Philonian pieces and the documents which mention the Ameshaspentas of the Zend Avesta. For, as one commentator, Siegfried, has supposed, some of us might consider his treatment of these six Cities to be equivalent to the citation of seven (as to which see below), this also equalling the number of the 'Immortals' of the Avesta [1].

I will first cite the passages; for they differ naturally from Philo's method of arrangement elsewhere, as he, in common with all authors of his class, differs from himself at different times in his life and at different phases of his experience.

Numbers XXXV, the Cities and the Powers.

The matter in hand is Philo's treatment of the passage in Numbers, xxxv, 6, where the names of the six Cities of Refuge occur. He allegorises as

[1] The Amesha Spenta (Amshaspends) are the 'Bountiful Immortals'; some render the 'Holy Immortals'.

usual keeping up his reputation as being the boldest of all writers, we might almost say, who have ever indulged in that method of procedure.

The First City.

The first 'City of Refuge' which he mentions is a 'metropolis' rather than a city. It is the *Θεῖος λόγος*. This has been supposed by some to be a correspondent to the Zoroastrian Vohuman (vohu manah). Is it necessary to repeat here what I have already said (see above)?; which is that even if the entire delineation were purely Zoroastrian, yet this would be a mistake, for the *Θεῖος λόγος* is only to be classed with an *asha* = *ṛitá*, the 'rhythm of law' in universal nature; see above upon the Lógos of Heraclitus and the Stoics.

The Formative Power.

The other five Cities he calls rather 'colonies', and chief among these was the 'Formative Power', the *ποιετικὴ δύναμις*. This might make a far better Vohu manah (Vohumanah) than the 'City' just mentioned; for the idea of 'creative formation' in itself implies 'benevolence'; and a good many expressions in consonance with this appear in connection with this *ποιητικὴ* (see below, where I endeavour to recapitulate).

The Kingly Power.

The third is the *βασιλικὴ*, the 'Kingly Power', according to which the One 'Who has created' governs what has been brought into existence.

This certainly, at first sight, looks like Khshathra, as has been said; but see below

The Power of Mercy.

The fourth, the δυνάμις ἵλεως, is the 'Power' of 'Mercy', through which the 'Constructor is tender towards and pities His own work', and this ought to correspond to Ā̄rámaiti.

The Legislative Power.

The fifth 'Power' conceived of as a 'City' is the 'Legislative', the νομοθετική, through which He forbids what ought not to be done; and this should correspond to Haurvatāt, 'Healthful Weal'.

The Kósmos Noetós.

The sixth is the κόσμος νοητός, not mentioned in De profugis, 18 (1,560), from a loss of text, but legitimately supplied from the De confus. ling., 1,431, and from elsewhere; and this should correspond to Ameretatāt, 'deathless long life'!

Now let us ask what is the truth as to the whole matter. And first we may recapitulate the particulars and enlarge upon them. I was for some time inclined to regard any objection to the figure of speech made use of as a quibble, unworthy of the discussion. But we should not be too hasty even here. The Gāthas make no use of such an illustration as that of 'Cities', whether as 'Refuges' or otherwise; nor are 'Cities' much more familiar to the later Avesta than they are to the older Veda.

Cities are rarely mentioned.

Among those mentioned in Vendīdād I, Ragha (Rages, *Ῥάγα*, etc.) is the only one that is really prominent as occurring in the later Avesta; Bawri, which is Babylon, is mentioned incidentally merely, while the list at Vendīdād I, just referred to, is also very late, and is not at all in analogy as to the number 'Seven', or as to any other particular; and I naturally dismissed the association as possessing little influence upon our results one way or the other.

Our Search is for Signs of Origin.

For we are searching for mere signs of origin, just here, as for other more serious analogies, that is to say, we are searching for graphic items which indicate literary relation. Such details should be of greatly more importance for this purpose than others which possess in themselves far more significance; and these features are wholly lacking in the Avesta. We have no 'Six', nor indeed any 'Seven', Cities of the kind depicted. But what have we to say to this supposed number as here present in Philo?

The Number Seven.

First of all, it really does not exist at the place; the Cities are Six, not Seven. To be sure, the Ameshaspentas (as distinct from the Supreme Being), i. e. the Archangels, were also Six. The number 'Seven' as involved with them is, indeed, not insisted upon in the Gāthas, nor had the name

Amesha Spenta (so, Amshaspends) been applied to either the 'Six' or the 'Seven' Personified Attributes in those early Hymns. But when the name was invented Ahura became immediately included with the 'Six', under the general designation, and the 'Seven' became a most marked, if not a supreme, element in the general concept, as it appears in the later Avesta; yet here we have but Six.

Were the Cities 'Seven'?

It struck Siegfried indeed, as I have said, that Philo intended to play upon the number 'Seven' here; and that we should supply the ὤν here with which he represented the Supreme Being, otherwise designated by the tetragránmmaton *y-hw-h* [1], so making up the Six to Seven; but the 'ὤν' does not seem to occur in the vicinity of the passage, and the point did not strike Heinze, who has searched the expressions closely. The Author of the Book of Numbers may have retained in his mind some idea of the 'Six' days of creation with unexpressed allusion to the Seventh. We are, however, in search of expressed analogies in mere external diction, for the moment; and this 'Six' of the Refuge Cities makes* but a lame 'Seven'.

Let the Cities be considered 'Seven'.

Yet let us concede the matter freely, even throwing in the 'ὤν', as I do not wish to push any accidental advantage. Philo's Cities, let us

[1] 'Philo von Alexandria als Ausleger des Alten Testaments', S. 215.

suppose, were indeed 'Seven'; and so we may call his *δυνάμεις* 'Seven', notwithstanding the harsh violence necessarily present, if we include the '*ὤν*' within the number of His own 'powers'. What, then, does the analogy amount to?

What, if the Cities were Seven?

The mention of it even should be censured. 'Seven' is everywhere absolutely common property in similar Religions, chiefly on account of the natural divisions of time, while from the three here involved it would be especially difficult to exclude it. Whole masses of discussion in Philo abound in occurrences of 'Seven' (this in allusion to Genesis), while 'Seven' is as marked in the Indian as it is in the Iranian; cf. the seven *dvīpás* of the Indians corresponding to the seven Karshvars of Avesta (regions of the Earth). Then there are the seven *hótṛi's* (or *hotars*), the 'seven-wheeled car', the 'seven tongues of Agni' (fire), the 'seven-horsed sun', etc., etc. 'Seven' is even used for 'many'; see *saptá-pada.* 'Seven' could not well, or even possibly, be absent; and its occurrence, even if it really were genuine at De profugis, 18, 1,560, would possess no force whatsoever as a factor in the analogy between the 'Cities' and the Amesha Spenta.

The θεῖος Lógos.

Let us pass to the *θεῖος λόγος*. At first sight this concept seems to make an excellent Asha, for 'Asha', as *arsha* and *ṛitá*, is, in fact, an Indo-iranian

Lógos, as I would hold, of a certain sort. But it is conceded that the θεῖος λόγος, like its predecessor among the Stoics, generally included all the lesser lógoi, the ideas, or the δυνάμεις. He, this θεῖος λόγος, is here the 'Metropolis', not one of the 'Cities' without qualification.

Asha as a good Theîos.

Wishing to help out the argument that I am opposing, I will recall that Asha is exceedingly prominent among the Ameshas in the Gāthas; compare the expression 'with Asha consenting', etc.; a point lost sight of by those whom I am opposing.

But he, or it, so little included the others that vohu manah (Vohumanah), owing to a mistake in the Pahlavi translation of a certain passage, really elbowed itself, or himself, into the foremost place within the later citations; but let us concede this too, and call the θεῖος λόγος a good analogon.

Philo's Lógos claimed to be Jewish.

Can we forget that Philo's λόγος, θεῖος, or otherwise, though arising from his Greek predecessors, had just been seized by him (amusingly enough) as a product of his own Holy Lore (stolen property recaptured)? Remember even Zeller's perhaps extreme remark that his 'Lógos was Hebrew under a Greek dress', for his Lógos was the 'Word', that 'Word of the Lord by which the heavens were made', such as 'let there be light' and 'there was light' (see above).

This compared with the Gātha.

What trace is there of any such 'Lógos anywhere in the Gāthas, or even in the later but still genuine Avesta? Surely no one will seriously recall the time-honoured allusion to the Honover (*sic*), a singular mistake which curiously illustrates the total absence of even incipient study on the part of so many who make allusions to the Avesta. That Honover is, indeed, referred to in the late piece, Y. xix, as 'It was that Word which was before the sky and before the water, before the plants, and before the fire, and before the Saint and before the Demon-gods', etc. (see Y. xix at S.B.E., xxxi, 260 ff.).

The 'Honover' not Relevant.

Surely people should *look*, at a time so late as this, before they make their points in argument. This wonderful Lógos at Y. xix is the mere corrupted name for the post-gāthic piece, the *yathā ahū-vairyō* [1], *ahū-vairyō* having become *hono-ver.* It has nothing whatever to do with a Lógos in any interior or exterior sense whatsoever, either in the Avesta or elsewhere, or with anything analogous to one, save the name 'Word'; moreover, it may be very late Avesta, as it is Zand, or 'commentary' as well. How is it possible that either the Gāthic, or the later Avesta idea, could derive its origin from the

[1] A short formula in the Gāthic metre of Y. xxviii-xxxiv. The later name by which the earlier Y. xxviii-xxxiv was known was taken from that of this piece. Y. xxviii-xxxiv is called the Gātha *ahunavaiti;* i. e. like the *ahū-vairyō;* but the Gāthic metre was the original.

Jewish-greek Philonian one; and so soon after Aristobulos (-bulus) or Philo: and yet show no trace anywhere of such an origin, all the shreds and fringes of resemblance being lost?

Asha is at times Incarnate.

The one which is 'above all of them, the θεῖος λόγος', says Philo, 'did not come into any *visible manifestation*, as not being like anything visible to the senses; but it is itself the image of God'. How does this accord with even the Asha of the Gāthas, which is sometimes so 'incarnate' that the word often represents the 'Holy People' in their entirety, the 'Congregation', while in the later Avesta and later Zoroastrianism it actually often means the 'Fire'? Was not that a manifestation 'visible' enough?

Asha as the Charioteer.

One expression occurs (but not just here, with reference to the 'Cities') which recalls a strophe in the Gāthas, as it would recall strophe upon strophe in all anthologies, or poetry. The Lógos is named the 'Charioteer', [1] and the 'God' gives orders as to what concerns the straight charioteering of the 'All'. The Gātha place speaks of 'the 'yoking-on' of the mighty steeds with the Law (*asha*) and driving to our help'. And in the later Avesta the Sub-deities, some of them, drive in chariots. What is the force of this as an analogon? I ought not

[1] De profugis, xix, 1,561, ὥσθ' ἡνίοχον μὲν εἶναι τῶν δυνάμεων τὸν λόγον.

to have introduced the point, as it deserves no answer.

The image is universal. Moreover, the colouring of the Gātha at this place is all Vedic (see below), the most so in all the Hymns.

The Poietiké as Vohumanah.

Then the ποιητικὴ δύναμις, which, be it understood, is ranked among the 'Colonies', so coming second and not first, as in the later Avesta, might still make a tolerable Vohumanah. That is to say, at our first glance at it (though Vohumanah is supposed by my opponents to be the First and to correspond to the θεῖος λόγος), for the ποιητική, as representing the 'formative power', naturally calls up creative 'beneficence'. See also the expressions made use of in allusion to it, ἀγαθότης, χαριστική, εὐεργετική; they certainly apply well to Vohumanah, but this curious vohu manah and λόγος (as some will have it) is actually called 'God' by Philo in one especial place; see further below; see also Heinze, p. 247, where our place is followed up. Where is Vohumanah called Ahura in the supreme sense in Gātha or late Avesta? He was included, of course, as one among the minor ahuras in the inferior sense at Y. XXVIII, 8 or 9, but so are all the others. Even the human prophet was a 'lord', ahura, the word being used in this sense also; but neither Vohumanah, nor any of the Six, is termed Ahura quite alone, and in that highest sense which alone is applicable here.

Vohumanah sometimes as man.

And surely no one intends to ignore such features as the human side of Vohumanah; he (or 'it') not only often represents the Orthodox Citizen very seriously at times in the Gāthas themselves, but he is also closely used for the 'Church member' in the later Avesta, the Vendīdād, so much so that he is actually spoken of as being 'defiled', precisely as one would speak of a Jew or a Brahmin being 'ceremonially unclean'.

Where does the ποιητικὴ δύναμις appear in any such a light in Philo? There is no telling what odd occurrences may be noticeable in obscure passages, but in the Avesta the occurence is not odd, nor indefinite, where it really exists.

The Basiliké and Khshathra.

The third δύναμις, the βασιλική, might be thought to be a good Khshathra; and according to De Cherub., 1, 144, it possesses 'justice' and becomes 'legislative' (see above).

Khshathra has governing power indeed, or, rather, he is 'governing power', and would be by implication 'punitive', but he is nowhere 'legislative'; it is Asha who is par eminence the 'Law' in his leading rôle. Still, let us not be too exacting; let us pass the βασιλική, together with the ποιητική and the θεῖος λόγος. I will not even insist upon the fact that Philo might have omitted his βασιλική altogether, if he had not blundered with the Targum on Psalm LXV, his Hebrew being rusty, for it is Elohīm

there Who is *(sic)* 'legislative', and he, Philo, makes use of κύριος — cf. the βασιλική (thinks Siegfried, p. 214) — under the impression that it was the best word for the Elohīm as 'legislative', not noticing, or being aware, that the Septuagint use it, κύριος, for the tetragrámmaton *stehend*[1] while they translate Elohīm with θεός.

It is indeed true that we might have had no βασιλική had Philo been a better Hebraist, or one at all. But then, again, the βασιλική was Greek fast enough and good Platonic[2], entirely aside from either the tetragrámmaton, which he represents as the 'ὤν' or this Elohīm, which is his (Philo's) κύριος.

And our point just here, let us distinctly recall, is 'literary colour'. We are not discussing here (at this place) the history of the doctrine at the Philonian stage, but the strange question of Philonic influence upon the authors of the Avesta, even of the old Avesta, the Gāthas.

In this light we do not care where or how Philo arrived at his βασιλική δύναμις, except to look for the traces of this origin in what was said to be its 'echo'.

The βασιλική and Metals.

But, again, where is the βασιλική taken to represent 'metals', for which Khshathra came to be used sometimes, even in the later but still genuine

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[1] Do they?

[2] Cf. Phileb. 30, D.: οὐκοῦν ἐν μὲν τῇ τοῦ Διὸς ἐρεῖς φύσει βασιλικὴν μὲν ψυχήν, βασιλικὸν δὲ νοῦν . . . See also H., p. 412.

Avesta, and in the later Zoroastrianism almost predominantly? for I think it is fair, though not absolutely necessary, to ask such a question. And with these three, or (with the 'ὤν' dragged in) with these four, even such a halting analogy, as might be supposed to exist comes utterly to an end, the 'ὤν' being before all of them the flimsiest representative of its impossible successor; for the 'ὤν' was, of course, the 'being', but still the 'non-existent [1] God' (*sic*). And what Parsi would like that said of his Ahura?

The δύναμις ἵλεως and Ārâmaiti.

The δύναμις ἵλεως, 'in accordance with which the Creator is tender toward His own creatures', should correspond, as I have said, to Ārâmaiti. But Ārâmaiti is thought to be a feeling of reverence from the creature toward the Creator by some, and by others (so better) it is rendered 'zeal'; while at the next stage in the historical development it represents the 'Earth', owing to the just sanctity of early agriculture; for, as I would hold, the 'ar' of Ārâmaiti is the 'ar' 'to plough', cf. aratrum, etc., and ārâmaiti was originally perhaps the 'ploughing zeal'. This may shock some tastes, but we must endeavour to freshen our suggestions, and explain this idea of the 'Earth'. Where does the δύναμις, ἡ ἵλεως represent any such object? It comes direct from the

[1] He was among other things 'everywhere and nowhere'; see De confus. ling., I, 425.

Jewish ἱλαστήριον (Mercy-seat); where is there a trace of this in its supposed descendant?

Siegfried justly thinks that the ἵλεως was included under the 'goodness' of the 'formative power'; see the abstracts applied to this latter concept as cited above. And I for one, among others, have little doubt that Philo was merely spinning [1] out the number of the 'Cities' to the required 'six' (by no means 'seven'), and that this ἵλεως has not significance in the supposed analogy.

The νομοθετική and Haurvatāt.

Then, as to the νομοθετική, the 'Legislative power', it hardly deserves more notice, being clearly an after-thought included under the βασιλική, which itself only by an error (see above) was made so 'legislative'.

Yet it should correspond to Haurvatāt, Healthful-weal' 'freedom from illness', the supreme desire of so many then as now. Still more pointedly, let us ask: 'What has 'Legislation' to do with 'water'?' Even supposing that they thought of 'water' as a source of health, hydrostatics at that period did not

[1] And let us never forget that the Powers in general 'streamed forth from God' sometimes just as 'light' does. They were, as elsewhere, viewed 'infinite'. Zeller, for one, attaches little importance to this sixfold or sevenfold delineation; see p. 369 on Philo, He dwells upon the two first only, the ποιητική and the βασιλική, with the λόγος between as a bond of union, to which last Heinze justly takes exception. The λόγος was indeed a bond uniting those two most prominently, and as 'a bond' he is momentarily spoken of as intermediate; but it is inconceivable that Philo could have meant to refer to the Lógos as occupying an inferior position even just here. He was between the wo, but he included both.

occupy the attention of Governments local or more general; but the Haurvatāt of the date of Philo was mostly used for 'water'.

Where is the point of junction?

The κόσμος νοητός and Ameretatāt.

The bearing of this question is of course not at all so effective as that concerning the ἱλαστήριον which was marked in Philo while considered for the moment, for the sake of argument, to be the prior lore; but the question is fair. The last δύναμις, the κόσμος νοητός (De confus. ling., I, 431), seems to be intended to include all the other five retrospectively a parte(-i) post (so), as the θεῖος λόγος included them prospectively a parte(-i) ante (so); but who would ever assert that Ameretatāt, even if it were otherwise fully in analogy, included all its preceding colleagues?

And what has the κόσμος νοητός to do with 'deathless long life', the hope to 'live a hundred autumns', as we have it in the other Lore (the Veda)? The κόσμος νοητός of Philo did not refer to *futurity* in any sense, nor to a millennial scene where disease, old-age, and the rest are absent; see Yasht XIX, etc. It was, on the contrary, the great concept of an *ideal pattern* in accordance with which the Universe was to be evolved. Deathlessness is indeed 'ideal'; but there are other things 'ideal' as well. And what has the 'Ideal World' to do with fuel? For ameretatāt actually means 'firewood' in certain places in the later but still genuine Avesta, just as haurvatāt means 'water', and both are used together in this sense in the peculiar dual con-

struction. It might indeed be said that these uses of 'Ameretatāt' and 'Haurvatāt' in the Avesta were posterior to Philo, and therefore out of point in the question of Philo's influence upon the Iranian documents; but they show a dissimilarity none the less.

Yet, supposing for a moment that a relation existed, what could that prove? This thought of an 'Ideal World' is almost universal in religions. I would even volunteer to produce analogies; if there is none between the 'ideal' world and 'good old age', or 'firewood', there certainly is many a trace of an 'ideal world' in the Avesta. Recall our very striking summum bonum at Y. XLIII, 2, the 'better than the good'; see also again, the state called 'best mind' at Y. XXX, 4, which gave(?) the Persians their name for Heaven as the 'best' (see above).

If we understand Philo's κόσμος νοητός as an 'ideal state' free from illness, thirst and hunger, etc., there was indeed enough of it in the Avesta, as in every Religion of the kind. But we are looking for definite analogies as signs of *parentage*; and these should be incisive and unmistakable; and the κόσμος νοητός had none such with the 6th or 7th Amesha, the 'Immortal', Ameretatāt. It is in spirit a thoroughly Platonic concept. These 'six' Cities, or 'seven' if you will, have absolutely nothing to do with the Avesta, either as cause or as effect, except in so far as the Avesta, in common with the Veda, and more closely than the Veda (because geographically nearer), exercised an original influence upon the entire Greek development through

the School of Heraclitus as well as otherwise. In fact, as Zeller says (see above), of all these six or 'seven' δυνάμεις only the two which correspond to the 'goodness' and 'might' of another passage have significance as united by the Lógos, De cherub., 112 D., 144 M. Qu. in Gen. I, 57; IV, 2, etc. (Zeller's figures; see Siegfried)[1].

The Eschatology of Philo.

The Eschatology of Philo is, of course, fully developed in many respects, as much so as that of the Avesta, if not as much so as that of the New Testament. He lived at the very moment when Jewish thought was ripe for the Lógos of St. John [2].

Philo's religious Reflections.

His remarks about these symbolical 'Cities of refuge' are very evangelical in the moral-spiritual sense. They (the Cities) are 'in every way beautiful as Refuges for souls that are to be saved, having the best of walls'. 'They are effectively useful and philanthropic, for they arouse men to hope for the good'. 'He (God, or 'the author of the Numbers') urges the fleetest to make breathlessly for the highest City (i. e. the furthest in the Territory of Grace), the θεῖος λόγος, that, drinking of this fountain (*sic*) of wisdom, he may find eternal life as his reward in place of death.' Here we have 'eternal life', as in the Avesta; but the idea was

[1] Cf. also the 'goodness and severity' of God in Romans XI 22 ff.; see also IX, 22 ff.

[2] Whether it appears so early, or whether later.

by that time entirely Jewish also, and, if we must take notice of it, it should belong to Ameretatāt, 'deathless long life', and not to an Asha like this *θεῖος λόγος,* nor indeed to a Vohumanah; whereas, as against the Ameretatāt of the Avesta, we had the utterly dissimilar *κόσμος νοητός* (see above).

The 'sinner not so fleet was to try to reach the next highest or 'farthest' City, the *ποιητική δύναμις,* which Moses called 'God'' (see above); 'for »when a man comprehends that the 'all' has been »created, he acquires a great possession of good; »and this good is the understanding, or knowledge, »of the One Who has made him. And this im»mediately persuades the created thing to love the »One Who has brought him into being'. I am not aware that the 'good mind', Vohumanah, was particularly speculative; its interior sense was pietistic, or moral, at most 'orthodox'; though Philo's wording here is well enough in point, if we wish to trace analogy; but see again what has been said above. 'The sinner flying from vengeance, but still »less swift (than the one in the state just mentioned), »has the 'Sovereign Power' as his City of Refuge, »the *βασιλική δύναμις,* so Philo proceeds; 'for by the »fear of his Ruler a subject is admonished; even if »as a child he is not warned** by his father's »kindness, still this fear will to him good'. This is all excellent and sufficiently near the New Testament, cf. St. Paul's 'behold, therefore, the . . 'severity' of God', but it bears no literary resemblance to anything in the Avesta, certainly not to the migrations in the Vendīdād, which present a picture

totally dissimilar to these (see above). The 'still slower »fugitive is to head for the *δύναμις ἵλεως*, which en»joins what we should do and forbids what we »should not do, for he who understands that the »Deity is not implacable but benevolent will repent »of his sin, influenced by the hope of pardon'. Here we have St. Paul's '(Behold the) goodness ... of God'.

Once more very excellent, but not exactly Āramaiti, which was 'Zeal' in the Old Avesta, and the 'Earth' in the New. 'And he who accepts the opinion that God is a legislator, *νομοθέτης ὁ θεός* (probably thinking of *τίθημι* as a root for *θεός*, which some might ridicule [1]), obeying whatever He prescribes, will be blest'. All very well again, but not very similar to 'Healthful Welfare', the genius of good luck, plus the 'waters'. While the last of the fugitives will strive for the *κόσμος νοητός*, which Philo neatly defines as an 'escape from evils, if not, indeed, a participation in the more preferred advantages'. This, indeed, is far enough from either 'eternal life', 'long life', or our 'fuel'.

Asha, Vohumanah, and the δυνάμεις personified.

Above I have emphasized the very singular usage in accordance with which Asha represents the 'people', Vohumanah the 'saint', etc. I did not mention at that point a similar development among the devices of Philo. These *δυνάμεις* are in a sense personified; they are 'Servants surrounding God's Throne', they are 'Ambassadors making known His

[1] Recall -đāo as nom. of -đāh to đā (d'ā).

will', they are 'Mediators between Him and finite things'. And they are especially called 'Angels'. This looks like the Amesha; nay, they are actually called 'souls'. The historians only accede cautiously to a true personification here, and Zeller, with Heinze, adds a last word in query as to whether Philo, or, indeed, his earlier Greek master, had really ever reached a full idea as to what 'personality' in very truth might be supposed to be; surely the 'Soul of the World' was not 'a Person'. But what of the analogy, here at this place? Beyond any question at all it certainly exists. The Amesha Spenta are first abstracts, expressing the quality of the actions of the Deity, then those of His Saints, and at the next stage they become Archangels, and at a still later one the Community and the Saint, and finally the genii presiding over man, fire, metals, over the earth, the waters, and the plants[1]. And what of this? We must firmly answer, as before, that a similar personification, or hypostatisation, whether rhetorical (as a figure of speech), or positively believed in, was and is nearly universal in every known or conceivable religion of the sort. Moreover, the entire body of the Philonian, as of the Platonic concepts, is here wholly excluded in one compact mass by the simple fact that the Philonian Lógos was first introduced to bridge the supposed gulf between God and impure matter; for the idea of the impurity of material substance was abhorrent to the Iranian mind (see the Asiatic Quarterly Review for July 1900).

[1] See this elaborated in JAOS, '99, 1900; cited at p. 20.

The Abstracts and their Vedic analoga.

If those so noted abstracts with which we have become now familiar, have been shown by the reasoning employed above to stand in their own long history independent of any Philonian influence, how much more do they gain in position when their still venerated, if less distinguished, Vedic sisters take their place beside them?

And here we come again upon a great fact which should awaken the acute interest of all persons everywhere who are at all capable of appreciating what is really indeed an almost sensationally interesting particular. I have been forced to allude to it before, but now I will dwell for a moment upon it.

The Vedic Concepts.

While we study our comparatively restricted, but still devoutly pious and profoundly earnest Zend Avesta, we become gradually aware that we are in the possession of certain sublime ideas of a special character and of remotely ancient origin.

That is to say we are dealing with venerable facts which control the acutely interesting situation which is here under discussion with all that it entails.

The impressive masses of the Ṛg Veda Hymns, with their wide extent and great variety, come once more very clearly into view, as having the closest claims upon our attention while grouped with the Iranian fragments. And Parsis should not be adverse to the association (see above at p. 1, flg.).

The Association of the ideas is honourable to both the Avesta and the Veda.

Parsis and Hindoos as originally kinsmen.

It is highly desirable that both the Parsis and their kinsmen** should appreciate this and the advantages which it affords for the true understanding of their primeval literatures and their early Faith. Surely any people must gain in respect for their Creed and for their Holy Books when they become aware that they form no merely isolated structure cemented together by technical and localised expert authorities, carefully elaborating a tribal temple of merely immediate origin. A system should not be the more valued as being exclusively of private bearing, a sort of sealed-up mystery kept for the nation's handful and wrapt in occult half-stifled ceremonies which are devoid of interior meaning save to an initiated few.

The day is past, and let us hope forever, when Parsis, or their ancestral cousins should look askance at one another for any adventitious reasons, and at their Sacred Books.

The higher tone of sympathy.

A deeply sentimental and religious race must gain indefinitely in conscious self-respect when it becomes aware that the lore which it reverences, and the ritual with which it worships, is part of a great system of noble truths which were once common to them with the ancestors of the whole Aryan Race, widely extended, as it is, over the Globe, and distinguished in philosophy, literature, and in

every department of the arts of peace, as indeed also in those of war. Petty animosities, which may be fermenting for the moment in our minds in regard to those who profess what seems to us to be rival forms of worship, should be, in so far as may be possible, thrust aside, and we should be willing not only to forget acerbities, but to set apart antipathies to the systems whose lores, notwithstanding every conceivable perceptible defect, would yet prove, if they were fully known to us, to be so memorably great.

Iranians and Indian, their Ancient Faiths.

Iranian and Hindoo may indeed fear and still feel that the inveterate growth of centuries of misconception, aggravated and intensified by the pitiable play of much personal and tribal (local) friction, will forever make it unthinkable that they could experience reciprocal sentiments of delight in the very ancient Faiths whose relics they so profoundly venerate; but yet I, for one, at least, would indulge the hope that the Irano-aryans who worship Áhura and the Indo-aryans whose early cult still lifted some strains of adoration to Ásura, may be able, for a time at least, to forget all that is accidental which divides them and to recall those more deeply valued and vital issues which should once more unite them.

Veda and Avesta.

The advent of the Vedic and the other so-called Sanskrit literature was a well nigh incom-

parable intellectual event for Europe, when we bear in mind all that followed from it. See above at the first pages where I freely acknowledge that, as a literature in itself considered, the more strictly so-called Sanskrit accumulations would easily engulph the entire Avesta in case there arose any competitive estimate of the strangely kindred two, upon the grounds of mere artistic merit. But soon again we begin to inquire as to the time and place of the origin of each.

The Aryan Indians were once identical with the Northern tribes.

That the so-called Aryan Indians, the creators of the wonderful School of Indian thought, ancient and modern (if indeed we could call such a continent of various mental centres at all 'a School') were originally indigenous to India no educated person has supposed for decades.

The discovery of the Relation.

Was it not Burnouf who, searching for traces of Indian influence toward the North-West first came upon the signs of its relationship to the Avesta? The matter is so notorious that I hardly pause this time to verify my facts [1]. Not only are the Aryan Indians of the West and South-West of the Peninsula and of the East of it to be traced to those of the North and the North-West, but the North and North-West

[1] It has been said that the discovery of this relation of the Avesta to the Veda was actually the point of departure in the recognition of the Indogermanie unity of all the related languages; but I do not fully adopt this opinion as yet.

Indians are to be followed up indefinitely till we come upon the lands of the Avesta, which places were once also their homes (those of these now Hindoos), or others regions near them; that is to say, these were the common domiciles of the two.

The Indians notwithstanding their long, gradual, and, in the end, mighty migrations, at one time actually lived with the ancestors of their now Iranian kinsman somewhere in the regions themselves called later Iran [1], (or 'Eran'). Could we not even say that the Aryan Indians were themselves Aryan Iranians once: nay are we not under an obligation to make this statement? Their blood was doubtless as near akin to that of their old neighbours as was their language (see above); and the very metres [2] of the Hymns which they once sang together help on the proof of this, as they are still the same in the now so widely separated scenes [3].

Original identity of Aryans.

Their prose lores also, which are still so largely similar so far as the Iranian survives for a comparison, were then of course the same. They carried with them in that wonderful slow march not only the same Gods, but the same habit of making other deities to match the old by turning abstracts into personals; and it is here that we are to search for the proofs of the true origin of the great Concepts [4] in regard to which we are endeavouring to exercise so rigorous a search.

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[1] See above. [2] see the Tristup in the Gāthas.
[3] The scenes of origin. [4] Vohumanah, Asha, and the rest.

The Ādityá of the Veda.

The Veda, far off in the Indian East, beyond all reach of Egypt, was near akin to the Avesta; nay, I have boldly called it the same lore in its extreme South-eastern home; and everywhere there we have the same kind of abstracts appearing, and likewise generally soon personified, not always all of them, but the great mass of them. Take the very Ādityá with their 'mother', as we might indeed so call it, or her. Áditi is at first the abstract 'unboundedness', 'infinitude', 'unfettered power', and then the 'mother Goddess' of the idea ('infinitude'); so bhága is 'good luck' and then the same personified; dáksha is 'cleverness', and then the God of it; ánça is 'property', the 'sharing', and then its God, etc. So also where it is not the abstract idea, but a material object which meets us we have the same procedure; Váruṇa is the 'enfolding heaven', and then Váruṇa the God of it. Sūrya is the sun, and then Sūryā́ its Goddess; Agní is the fire, and then Agní, its endeared Protector. So also, where the word is first a common descriptive (of a living person), as mitrá 'the friend', and Mitrá 'the friendly God'; aryamán 'the ally', and Aryamán 'the god', etc.

And, among other abstracts, all of our Iranian Ameshaspentas, instead of being the recrudescence of Philo's Cities, or in any other sense the echoes of his teachings, are some of them, even more familiar to the Indian Veda than to parts of the Iranian Book; and of course they appear as abstract

there as here; and in fact, sometimes they never reach the state of Gods at all, as the Iranian forms which we are treating, so fully do.

The 'ṛitá*' of the Veda is the 'asha' of the Avesta, as no one doubts, a true Indo-iranian Lógos; and it, or he, occurs close on three hundred times in the Veda Ṛk. and in its very most ancient parts, say, some of them as old as 500 to 800 years before Philo lived in the Egyptian town. Kshatrá is Khshathra, and it occurs some forty-four odd times; arámati is āramaiti, and it occurs about eleven times, and often (as Sāyaṇa also understood it in the Veda) even of the 'earth'. Sárvatāti is Haurvatāt, and it occurs some score of times; while Vasumanas, which is vohu manah, is the name of a Vedic seer.

Here are all the Ameshaspentas which some would trace to Philo's cities. They thronged as household words (some of them) for centuries before even Plato, Philo's real instructor, weaved out his theories far off from the line of travel between these Indians and Iranians.

There was no Greek School at all in Egypt anywhere when Indian Ṛishis first sang these ancient names; nor, for the matter of that, were there as yet any Greek Schools in Greece, both far enough away. The whole suggestion of Philonian parentage or influence upon any important part of the Avesta system seems puerile in the extreme, unworthy of the source from which it came—the slip of a gifted brain, pre-occupied. The Avesta and the Veda are ancient sisters, as no one now pretends to doubt;

and if Philo inspired the abstracts of the one, he inspired those of the other also; and this would be a clear 'reductio' to the 'silly' [1] for it would be a 'reduction' to a joke. Both the Iranian and the Vedic concepts go back till they are lost in the mists of the ancient East; and as far back as we can trace them they are wonderful indeed; for they are, some of them, the deepest and (at times) also the most beautiful that the human mind has reached [2]. If their character therefore was not a simple fact, it would indeed be hard to credit it for they prove an advanced mental religious life in an early public and in a scene where other features remained completely undeveloped. And those which appeared in the Iranian Veda (the Avesta) became personified, just as those sister Concepts did which I have named.

Philo's self-consciousness and that of souls in the judgment.

We may conclude this section with an allusion which might however seem to some of my readers to be indeed satirical, not that it is intended to be such in any sense. I mention it in parenthesis.

[We have, all of us who are at all versed in Philo, been amused at the quaint vanity which he manifests, at times, and we have a curious case of it in what he says about his 'own soul' and the things it (his soul) told him, in these connections.

It happened in one of his customary moments of 'inspiration'. Upon this occasion he piques him-

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[1] ad absurdum. [2] see above at Section I.

-self especially upon his astuteness, calling himself σπουδαιτέρος; (or should it be 'his soul' which was so clever?); the grammatical form would decide rather for the first. It seems that this interior in-dwelling person 'his soul' furnished him with an opinion, to the effect that the two Cherubīm (see above on previous pages) represented, the one the αγαθότης and the other the ἐξουσία of the ὤν; see the passage De cherub. 9 (1, 143).

He calls upon 'his mind', so varying the expression, addressing it in the second person, and, as it were, a separate being, ὦ διάνοια! It is not at all necessary to cite the passage, as its subject matter is quite parallel with what has been already so elaborately said, and it is substantially also included within it. It is sufficient merely to state the singular particular. He holds a detailed conversation with 'his interior self'; and it is not at all impossible that he may have been literal in his intention to represent this exchange of ideas thus.

Does then this odd fancy find any analogy in that memorable feature of the Avesta already mentioned above; see page 100, the agency of the soul's own conscience in its future rewards or punishments. Recall where the 'man's own soul' speaks to him in the Gāthas, at Y. 46 and in Yasht XXII? The answer is, that *it would be an insult to the Avesta to compare the two;* for the Avesta in the thought compared led the world of its time and place in one of the most important ideas which humanity had yet experienced. Nothing Philonian can approach it, much less this petty, but yet to

some of us most interesting effect of diseased cerebral action.

Philo's fancy, pardonable indeed as it is, with one subjected to acuter mental strains, was yet none the less a pure egregious egotism. The two conceptions, his and that of the Avesta, had contents totally dissimilar. It seems almost trifling to discuss them in the same inquiry. Philo's 'mind' was indeed 'speaking' to him and upon a serious subject, — a question in the theological exegesis of a passage in his Scriptures; but it concerned something of mere remote detail, a matter of little practical moment, however it might be considered. But Zarathushtra's point was vital and immediate, of the utmost critical effect to the immortal destiny of the human subject, and wholly moral. I may well fear that I do it dishonour to mention it in such a connection, or in such a tone.]

Up to the dates of those statements in the Zend Avesta men's thoughts as to future recompense, so far as they have been recorded, were all mechanical, ruthless and inconsiderate. The law of interior recompense, was perhaps not so consciously at hand in the thoughts of Zarathushtra, but his deducible ideas forecast it; subjective rewards and punishments are certainly foreshadowed.

And this was epoch-making for the time and place, the first clear statement of such conceptions in all literature. The conscience becomes the executioner, if it indeed does not constitute the very pains of Hell; and in a corresponding sense an approving voice within fills the being with

pervading peace, and it meets the saved man like fragrant breezes to a traveller approaching home. See Yasht XXII [1].

As time and circumstances are pressing me on; and as I am publishing the first portion of my argument, which is, in so far as I can make it, in itself quite thoroughly complete, I add a passage which should otherwise be in place only at the close of the entire Book. For without such a summing up inserted here and published with this section the threads of the various arguments would seem hardly to be gathered up; and some untoward event might interrupt the printing of the finished treatment.

What I then intended to say, and still intend to repeat as the last word in my discussion in regarded to Philo would be briefly this.

The Summing up.

The Avesta in no sense depends upon the Jewish Greeks. On the contrary, it was Philo who was in debt to it. He drank in His Iranian lore from the pages of his exilic Bible, or from the Bible-books which were then as yet detached, and which not only recorded Iranian edicts by Persian Kings, but were themselves half made up of Jewish-persian history. Surely it is singular that so many of us

[1] From here on I have large masses of Manuscript, almost, or quite, ready for the type-setter dealing with 'the Sophia' of Philo, and finding in it many analogies with the Avesta doctrine. But my results would be unvaried; see everywhere above. I hold my severely written pages possibly for another work, but more probably for my posthumous cremations.

who 'search the Scriptures' should be unwilling to see the first facts which stare at us from its lines. The Religion of those Persians, which saved our own from an absorption (in the Babylonian), is portrayed in full and brilliant colours in the Books of the Avesta, because the Avesta is only the expansion of the Religion of the sculptured edicts as modified. The very by-words, as we shall later see, are strikingly the same, and these Inscriptions are those of the very men who wrote the Bible passages [1]. This religion of the Restorers was beyond all question historically the first consistent form in which our own Eschatology appeared [2].

Before the Exile the Jewish creed was very dim indeed as to Resurrection, Immortality, forensic Judgment, and all we hold most dear [3]. The people of Ragha (Rages, Ῥάγα, etc.), whose name the Alexandrians knew so well from their Tobias, or from its sources, lived and died under the strong personal influence of these beliefs, with other elements beside them so searching that we can scarcely trust our eyesight as we read. Even the harsher features are recalled; the very Demon [4] of the Gāthas figured in the tales of Philo's youth.

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[1] Sceptics, indeed, might doubt the Scripture passages, but what sceptic can utterly doubt the sculptures of Behistān, not that all they say is accurate. In Part II they will, it is hoped, be thoroughly discussed.

[2] Not that ours was derived from it, but only matured and ripened through its influence under the providence and will of God.

[3] See the dogmatic of the Old Testament.

[4] Ἀσμοδαῖος is, however, really not more original than the Hebrew form, though the book itself was probably first worked up in Greek.

And these facts no serious expert will dispute. It is a case of simple record. The Irano-vedic lore developed in Iran the first definite form of our own ideas as to the future state, according to the obvious data in the case. There are more traces of the doctrines named above, with Heaven and Hell, as Orthodox Christians hold to them, in the texts of the Avesta than in all the Pre-exilic Books.

What has now been said will, I hope, be regarded as a careful synopsis of the argument against the Philonic origin of either Asha or Vohumanah in so far as the Greeks are concerned; and for the bulk of my readers it will be considered all-sufficient; that is to say, in so far as they cherish any confidence whatsoever in my studies and in my opinions. I have done my best to elaborate a critical delineation of Vohumanah and Asha, the only as yet one ever at all attempted; and I have given a preliminary summary as to the Logos of Philo, shewing how little the one corresponds to the other.

I have asserted with suggested reasons that Philo must have felt indirectly a Babylonian-persian influence with the conclusion that any similarities supposed to exist between his writings and the Zarathushtrian system must have been owing to ideas which made their way from that system, or from a congeries of closely connected systems of which Zarathushtrianism was a prominent unit; and I have constructed a provisional conclusion from these premises in so far as they are now presented.

A study of the

Five Zarathushtrian (Zoroastrian)

Gâthâs,

with

text, translations, etc.

(being the first attempt as yet ever made to treat the subject with full exhaustion of materials),

i. e. with the

Pahlavi translation for the first time edited with collation of manuscripts, and now prepared from all the known codices, also deciphered, and for the first time translated in its entirety into a European language,

with

Neryosangh's Sanskrit text edited with the collation of five MSS., and with a first translation,

also

with the Persian text contained in Codex 12b of the Munich Collection edited, transliterated, corrected and collated

together with

a commentary, and dictionary,

being the enlarged literary apparatus and argument to the translation of the Gâthâs in the XXXIst volume of the Sacred Books of the East,

by

Lawrence H. Mills, D.D., Hon. M. A.,
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VOL III, DICTIONARY

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I.

The Anthem (beginning) with "Uštâ".

Free tr. Praise to you, the sacred Gâthâs!

Salvation to this one, to him whomsoever,
Let the absolute Mazda give it, He Ahura; * imperfect proof-sheet.
Long-lasting strength be ours, of Thee I ask it.
For the upholding Right, this, Piety*, vouchsafe us,
Distinctions*, blest rewards, the Good Mind's life.

(Rhythm only is attempted, heavy syllables sometimes counting as two.)

shahîh. [7] DJ. ghal. [8] all tvaskhishnŏ, or tûkh°. [9] D. î. [10] ins. î. [11] D. om. [12] D. om. zak î; DJ. om. î. [13] corrected; DJ. râyê-h°. [14] D. om. î. [15] see P. [16] Zend. char. =°hya

Pahl. trl. Praise to you, O Holy Gâthâs. Hapy* is that one; for whomsoever (oblique by position) *is* that which *is* that happiness, [that is, for every man *there is* happiness from his happiness. (Some say that this benefit is his from this Religion, even from the Religion with is the benefit of every single person (individually))]. (b) Aûharmazd also grants *it* to him according to the sovereignty of *His* desire (or 'pavan-kâmak-shâlîtâîh as compos. = He who exercises authority at will'), [*i. e.* according to his desire]; (c) *and He grants**[1] (?) the energy of the powerful *ones* (or 'energy which *consists** *of** powerful characteristics*') [the strength of (or 'which *is*') powerful *qualities*]; *they are* a desire to (i. e. *desired by*) me in their coming from thee. (d) That which *is* the giving of the possession (or 'maintenance') of Sanctity, [that which they shall give me as* a reward, the possession (or 'maintaining') of Sanctity], that may Spendarmaḍ give me, (e) and that which is the glorious thing which *is* the venerating* (*recognition** (?)) [discipleship (?)], and life in accordance with a good mind, [that is, may no life-extinction be mine].

*[1] Or tûkhshishnŏ î t°. are governed by the force of kâmak = vas(e)mî; see the Gâthâ.

Ner.'s sansk. text. Namo'yushmabhyaṁ, he Gâthâḥ puṇyatmanyaḥ[1]! pratyuttaravâk* Hormijdasya; prakṛishṭâ vâk Jarathuçtrasya. [1] Sundaraḥ sa yasya çubhaṁ kebhyaçchit*, [kila, kebhyaçchit* manushyebhyaḥ çubhât* yasya çubhaṁ. Asti kaçchit* evaṁ brûte yat çubhaṁ Dînitaḥ; Dînitaḥ sarvasya kasyachit[2] çubham[3]]? (b) Asya svechchhayâ râjyaṁ Mahâjñânî dadâti Svamî, [samîhitenâ 'sya] (c) adhyavasâyasya* balavataḥ* prâptau tava kâmât. (d) Yat puṇyagrahaṇasya dânaṁ tan mahyaṁ dadâtu pṛithivî, [kila, yaḥ prasâdaḥ puṇyasaṁgrahe dîyate taṁ mahyaṁ dadâtu Spindârmadâ] (e) çuddhimate bhaktimate* [çishyâya] Uttamaṁ cha jîvitaṁ Manaḥ* [Gvahmano* 'maraḥ], [kila, me apajîvitaṁ** mâ bhûyât]. Dvivâram vâchyo gujastaḥ, etc.

[1] P. [2] so J.[3], J.[4], J.[6] [3] C. adds to this at length. (Sandhi is only intermittingly applied and Sanskrit of every period is used with unusual application.)

Ner. transl., etc. Praise to you, O sacred Gâthâs. The answer of Hormijda;

Jarathuçtra's declaration). Prosperous* is he whose prosperity is for any one (meaning 'for every one' (?)). Some say that *the rendering should be* that *this* welfare *is* from the Dîn; *and* from the Dîn is every *man's* prosperity *derived*]. (b) At his own will the Lord the Great Wise *One*, bestows *upon that one* (or '*upon us*') the sovereignty in accordance with His desired *object* (or 'desire') (c) for* powerful zeal in its acquisition in consequence of thy desire (or 'prayer'), ([or from His desire for thee in the acquisition of strong zeal']); (d) let therefore the Earth* (sic) = Âramaiti) grant me that gift which *is that* of the apprehension of sanctity, [that is, let Spindârmadâ grant me the grace (or 'reward') which is *given* in the apprehension of Sanctity]; (e) and let the highest (i. e. the good) mind [the immortal Gvahmana] *give life* to

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[illegible] 2. **Text.**

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

Verbat. trl. (with paraphrase). Itaque huic [sancto civi (vel 'nobis (?)'] omnium optimum (b) beatitate**-(vel 'gloriosa-indole*')-praeditus vir [propheta] beatitatem* [vel 'felicitatem illustrem**'] det ([vel fortasse ex contrario 'pro hoc sancto (vel 'pro nobis') sibi-det (i. e. accipiat (?)) hic vir beatitatem** sacrae Causae* nostrae']); (c) Tuo, [i. e. per Tuum spiritum]* plene-revela*1-et-indica per* [Tuum] beneficentissimum* spiritum*, O Mazda, (d) [eas doctrinas et disciplinam] quas* statuisti Sanctitate [ut] Bonae sapientias[-tiam]-caelestes[-tem] Mentis (e) omni die [in omnes dies*2] longaevitatis* beato-incremento. *1Vel fortasse 'observans tuere (vel 'ordine constitue''). *2 vel 'huic [sancto] summum bonum sit] omni die (in dies)'

Pahl. text. translit. Aêtûnŏch zak î[1] min harvispgûn[2] pâhlûm (b) avŏ valman î khvârîh-hômand gabrâ[3] khvârîh[4] yehabûnishnŏ [[5] mozd]. (c) Lak pêḍâkînŏ, [aigh, [6]Lak yemalelûnŏ[7] aîgh[8] khvârîh-hômand[7] gabrâ[7] mûn[7], mamanash [9+7] pavan[7] Lak[7] pêḍâkîh], afzûnik mînavad î[10] Aûharmazd, [aîgh, Lak khavîtûnih aîgh khvârîh-hômand gabrâ mûn],, (d) mûn[11] yehabûnêḍ[12] râst[12+13] pavan[12+13] zak î[12+13] Vohûmanŏ[12+13] paḍmânŏ [Dînŏ*] (e)[14] pavan[15], hamâk[16] yôm pâvan[17] dêr zîvishnîh hû-ravâkh-manîh madam[10] yehabûnishnŏ[18].

[1] DJ., D. ins. î. [2] so DJ. [3] P. ins. varman râ (so D. late). [4] DJ. khvârishn; D. om. va. [6] P. ins. pavan âgh. [7] Mf. om. [8] D. for mûn. [9] DJ. ins. ash. [10] DJ. om. [11] DJ., D. om. zak. [12] DJ., D. have line *d* so. [13] M. Ahârayih shapîr for râst and om. pavan z. î V. [14] M. ins. î. [15] P. om. ash. [16] so D.; DJ., °mâî. [17] D. om. [18] DJ. °ûnêḍ.

the pure *and* religious *one* [to the disciple, that is, let it be to me no decease]. *This* text is to be repeated twice, etc. (NB. Notice is again given to the student that the translations of the Pahl. and Ner. are throughout rather expositions than translations, as final translations of either in the ordinary sense are wholly misleading and therefore worse than useless; see Introd. pp. XIV-XVII, XXV).

Parsi-persian Ms. frlt. Va niyâyishn ân shumâ, Gâsân *i* ashô! Nêk û kih ân *i* [] nêkî har-kudâm, [kû, har-kudâm âdamî az nêkî *i* û nêkî * Hast hih êdûn gûyad; în nêkî [] az [] Dîn [] *i* har kas [] nêkî], * (b)]] pah kâmah pâdishâhî dehad Hormuzd*[1], [pah lâ'ik (?) *i* û] * (c) Kûshishn *i* tuvânîhâ, [zûr [] kûvatîhâ] ma-râ pah rasad* (?) az Tû kâmah * (d) Ân *i* Ṣavâb dâshtan dehad [ân *i* [ma-râ = *am*] pah [] Ṣavâb dâshtan bih dehand], [] ân man dehâd Spendarmad * (e) Ân *i* rûzmand, *i* bandagî [] [shâgird = *âhavisht*] [] [ân man] pah Bahman jân [dehad (sic) = *ân ra pavan Vôhûmân adâ* (sic pro khayâ) *dâbûna(ê)d** (sic)], kûm [] [bâz**-(?) = *dûz**- (? *dûr**-)] -jân nah bâshad * *[1]Ôr° (?). (NB. *v* is used for *w* in this Gâthâ; see note on page 2, Parsi-p.)

Free tr. And to*[1] this one that best of all things (*[1] or 'for')
May that the glorious man bestow*[2], the glory; (*[2] or 'obtain')
Reveal* Thou, Lord, to us with*[1] Spirit bounteous (*[1] or 'O spirit bounteous')
What truths by Right* Thou giv'st, and Good Mind's wisdom,
With life's rejoicing* increase and on every day.

Pahl. trl., etc. Thus also that which is of every kind the best, (b) the beatitude (not merely 'the welfare') is to be give to* (?) the beatified man [*as* a reward]; (c) do Thou therefore make manifest, [i. e. do Thou declare who the glorified (or 'beatified') man is (so in this erroneous gloss), for through Thee is his manifestation], O bountiful Spirit who *art,* (or 'Spirit of') Aûharmazd, [that is, Thou understandest who the glorious (or 'beatified') man *is*]; (d) and *do Thou also make manifest* what Ye* give (or 'he gives') *as* just (or 'aright') in accordance with (or 'as') a good mind's regulation, [i. e. the Religion] (e) during every day as the joyful-minded giving-on* of a long life.

Ner.'s sansk. text. Evaṁ cha tasmai viçvebhya*[1] utkṛishṭatarâya (b) çubhamate* narâya, çubhaṁ pradâtavyaṁ, [prasâdaḥ], (c) Tvaṁ prakâçaya, [kila, Tvaṁ brûhi yat çubhamân naraḥ kaḥ], Tvaṁ mahattaraḥ* adṛiçyamûrtir*, Mahâjñânin, [kila, Tvaṁ jânâsi yat çubhamân naraḥ kaḥ], (d) yo dadâti satyaṁ uttamena pramâṇam manasâ [Dîniṁ] (e) viçveshu vâsareshu dîrghajîvitatayâ** utsavasya dâtâ. [1] So J.*, P. C.

Ner. transl. (a, b) And so to this man more excellent than all *and* beatified (or 'glorious(?)') happiness (or 'glory (?)') is to be given [the reward]; (c) do Thou therefore manifest, [that is, do Thou declare, who the beatified man is], Thou the greater[-est] Spirit, O Great Wise *One*, [i. e. *it is* Thou *who* knowest who the beatified man is], (d) who gives the true regulation

Gâtha(â) Us̆tavaiti(î).

I.

1.

1. Text.

NB. The Commentary here refers also to my former printing.

Verbatim trl. (with paraphrase). Laus vobis Gâthae sanctae! In*-salute* [esto, i. e. salus esto (us̆tâ locat. adverbialiter usurpato loco nom.)] huic cui-[-cumque]; in*-salute* esto, i. e. salus [esto] alicui [cuicumque (sancto civi)]! (i. e. yahmâi kahmâichîḍ(ṭ) = cuicumque). (b) Secundum arbitrium suum (-infinite)-regnans-et-dominans det M. [vel 'constituat'] Ahura (c) continuos-[Suos-]duos-[ministros, i. e. duas proprietates Ahurae, unam ut ministrum salubritatis (sanitatis, incolumitatis omnino)*, et unam ut ministrum immortalitatis animo conceptam, i. e. ministros duos suae voluntatis alentes felicitatem et vitam longinquitate productam hâc et illâc] validos-duos. [Ad me] accedat**[1] [hoc donum quod precibus meis expeto, i. e. 'Amen! sic fiat[1]!', id] a-Te expeto [et exoro] (d) [ad] Sanctitatem [legis Tuae sacrae] sustinendam, [i. e. ad auctoritatem ejus ubique in patria nostra defendendam et augendam]. Hoc mihi des, O Pietas*[2], [O Spiritus devotionis ab Ahura in nos inspirate (e) insignia-potestatis (vel 'divitias'*(?) in gratiam Causae sacrae Tibi praecipue devotas' (cp. îs̆tîm, Y. XXXII, IV et raêkhnaṅhô, Y. XXXII, XI) praemia-sacra, [i. e. emolumenta bene merita] Bonae vitam Mentis]. [1] Vel lege 'gatê = venire', longe non; fortasse est 'geḍ(ṭ) = Sansk. gha + id legendum = immo vere!' [2] vel lege '°tî 'des Tu. O Aĥ., per Pietatem in nobis efficacem'.

Pahl. text translit. Nîyâyishnŏ avŏ lekûm, Gâsânŏ î[1] aharûbŏ! (a) Nadûk (*sic loco nêvak) valman mûn zak î[2] valman[3] nadûkîh kaḍârchâî, [aîgh, kaḍârchâî anshûtâ min nadûkîh î[4] valman nadûkîh. Aît mûn aêtûnŏ yemalelûnêḍ: aê nadûkîh ash min denman[4] Dînŏ*, va min Dînŏ* î[1] kolâ aîsh I[5] nadûkîh]. (b) Afash pavan kâmak shalîtâîh[6] yehabûnêḍ Aûharmazd [pavan avâyast î[2] valman[7]]. (c) Tûkhshishnŏ[8] î tûbânîkîhâ, [zavar î[9] patûkîhâ], am pavan yâmtûnishnŏ[10] min Lak, kâmakŏ. (d) Zak î Aharâyîh dârishnŏ dahishnŏ[1] [zak[1] î[1] pavan[1] mozd[1+11] Aharâyîh[1] dârishnîh[1] barâ yehabûnd], zak[12] avŏ li yehabûnâḍ Spendarmaḍ. (e) Zak î râyê-hômand[13] î[14] tarsakâî (sic) [hâvisht-homandîh avŏ[15] li[15]] pavan[15] Vohûman[15] jân[15], [yehâbûnêḍ[15](-nâḍ), aîgham apagayêhê[16]** (?) al yehevûnâḍ[17]]! [1]DJ. om. [2]DJ., D. ins. [3]D. om. [4]DJ. ins. [5]DJ., D. om. [6] D. pâḍakh-



Yasna IX.

The Vision of Haoma to Zaraϑuštra.

Y. IX, 1—48.

Pahl. text translit. 1) **Pavan hāvan′ ratīh [1] [pavan′ hāvan′ ī [1] gās] hōm madam sātūnt′ [2] av′ zartūšt′, 2) pavan ātaχš [3] pīrāmūn′ [4] yōsdāsarēnešnīh [amataš [5] ātaχš gās [6] kāmīst′ [7] χalelūnastan′ [8]] (pavan) gāsān′ srāyešnīh [5] [amataš [9] zag ašem vohūk′ [10] ī [11] III gūft′ man′ [12] fravarānih [13] av′ levīn′].

** χ is here used for kh. [1] A (DJ), B (D, Pt. 4 om. ī. [2] B (Pt 4) raft. [3] A (DJ) om. gās here which the others insert. [4] B (D, Pt 4) pirāmūn′, and ins. va. [5] B (D, Pt 4) om. from amataš to srāyešnīh inclus [6] diff. word from gās above; cp. gātū. [7] M kāmist′; A (DJ), E (K[5] Sp.) kāmīst′. [8] so A (DJ); E (K[5] (Sp)) sūstan′. [9] A (DJ) om. aš. [10] so A (DJ) -ūk′. [11] A (DJ) ins. ī. [12] A (DJ) om. man′. [13] Citation from Y. 12 (13), 1.

The Pahl. Text transl. At the hāvan ratu [1] (the hāvan prayer-time) [the hāvan gāh [2]] Haoma came to Zartušt (Zaraϑuštra) (2) when he was cleaning [3] around the fire, [when he wished to wash the fireplace [4], and when he was intoning [4+5] the Gāϑas, [when he uttered the ašem voh I which is thrice [6] said, and which is* before the fravarānih (i. e. the fravarānę) [7]].

[1] See note on the Avesta text.

[2] See note 4.

[3] Lit. 'in his cleaning'. I cannot accede to this homely rendering just here, with Nēryosangh and Haug; I regard the original word as meaning 'consecrating'; see SBE. xxxi, p. 231, 'served and sanctified', two words to express the idea.

[4] Notice the close proximity of the two identical forms gās, with yet totally different meanings, one from gāϑa and the other from gātu.

[5] Lit. 'in his making heard the Gāϑas'.

[6] 'Or which is the three-said'.

[7] We should have naturally rendered: 'the III ašem vohu's which have the fravarānę before them'; so possibly; see also Nēr.'s yat p'raūarāne prāk. In our present texts some ašem vohu's occur *before* the fravarānę and not the fravarānę before them. The fravarānę is mentioned because it would be naturally associated with any special mention of the ašem vohu. We remember that it was with the Ahuna Vairya that Zaraϑuštra repelled the demons after his temptation, so the ašem vohu, thrice repeated, followed by the fravarānę, Yasna XII (XIII), an especial confession of faith, would equal an Ahuna Vairya. Aside from the reasons given, I should render as indicated above in my alternative.

The Vision of Haoma to Zaraϑuštra.

Trl. At the hāvanī ratu [1]
Haoma came to Zaraϑuštra
while (ritually) cleansing [2]
about the (sacred) Fire
and intoning the Gāthas [3].

[1] The hāvanī-ratu (prayer-time) was from six to ten A. M.

[2] He was not merely removing soil, but engaged in initial sacrificial work.

[3] For the free critical rendering see SBE. XXXI, pp. 230—235 (1887), which I still regard as the best possible form for the general presentation of this Yasht preserving, as it does, the rhythm.

Ner.'s sansk. Text. Heading. Hūmastūmasya [-stomasya] mūlaṁ. Hūmasya muktijananeḥ sanmānakṛtaye kila, ānandakṛtaye, ārādᶜanāya namaskaraṇāya, mānanāya prakāšanāya; pūrvoktivat jñātavyaṁ.

Text. Hāūaṇāyāḥ gurutāyāṁ [5] [kila, hāūanasaṁdᶜyāyāṁ] hūmaḥ upeyivān jaratᶜustraṁ [prāptavān] ([2]) agniṁ paritaḥ pāvayantaṁ, [kila, agnistᶜānaṁ parivartulaṁ snāpitum abᶜīpsantaṁ] gātᶜāšča samudgirantaṁ [tat ašim vohūtrayaṁ bruvāṇaṁ (bruvantaṁ) yat pᶜrauarāṇe [5] prāk].**

** The various restorations of Burnouf and Spiegel are mostly good. The Mss. show débris. It would be mere affectation to report the irrational variants.

Ner.'s Introduction Trl. The beginning of the hūma-praise-song (Yašt). To the honouring[1]*, that is to say, for the rejoicing, for the sacrificing-to, for the homage-making-worship, for the venerating-consideration [1], for the celebrating praise of hūma the holy (lit. free-*of-birth) [2], etc. to be understood as aforesaid (i. e. as above) [3].

Ner.'s text trl. In the ratu [4] of hāūanā, [that is to say, in the time of the hāūanā] hūma came* toward Jaratᶜus*tra* [came up to him], cleaning around the fire, [that is to say, wishing to wash around the fireplace] and chanting the Gāthas, [and (also) saying that three-fold ašim vohū which is [5] before [5] the pᶜrauarāne [5]].

[1] Namaskaraṇa corresponding to nīyāyesn, gave us our accepted rendering for نیایشن as 'praise'; mānana should correspond to snāyĕnītarī and χšnaoϑra. Prakašana represents a frāz afrīganīh in the sense of 'celebrating praise' as in frasastarasča.

[2] 'Free' seems peculiar to Ner.'s kind of Sanskrit. He uses muktātman for aharūv'.


[3] Referring to previous occurrences in the Yasna.

[4] Gurutā is used by Ner. apparently to imitate a leading definition of ratu; but as the gloss shows, he means a ritualistic division of time.

[5] My instinct would be to regard pᶜrauarāne (so J.*) prāk as a quasi-compositum; but see the note upon the Pahl.

Parsi-pers. text. translt. Pah hāvan ratīh pah hāvan gāh hōm avar raft ([ān]) zartušt (2) pah ātăs [gāh] pīrāmūn yaςnī-pāw-u-pāw-yād-[1] mī-kard [] kis ān i asem vehī (sic) i III (si) guft mūn (sic for kih) frarūnī (*sic* for fravaranē) pah pēs.

[1] 'attending to' the cleaning? yād however may not have been meant; yet what could bād (or?) mean here?



A DICTIONARY

of the

GÂTHIC LANGUAGE

of the

ZEND AVESTA,

being

Vol. III

of a

Study of the Five Zarathushtrian Gâthas,

the Commentary, vol. II, completed in lexicographical form, with full grammatical details, as the sequel to the XXXIst Vol. of the Sacred Books of the East, pp. 1—XXX, 1—194

by

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itâ; pers. *nah-khvâstar*, and *nâ-khvâstar;* cp. for form ind. *anehás.*

[Avestan], y. 28, 9; 32, 15; 53, 8, instr. pl. m. n. of [Avestan] (which see) through these, illis; (trad. curious-lyerrs).

[Avestan], hostile, or nt. hostility, displicentia; n. du. masc. (returning for form to Justi), or instr. s. nt.(?) [Avestan], y. 44, 15; cp. ind. *ókas* + *a* priv.; rt. *uc*; cp. *ὀπυίω*(?); *uxor;* goth. *bi-ûhts**, [the Pahl. trlr. is here in error or confused; see explanations in the comm.].

[Avestan], other, alius (atque);

n. s. m. [Avestan], y. 29, 1; 50, 1; 53, 5 (pahl. *zakâî min.*)

acc. s. m. [Avestan], i. e. [Avestan]

acc. s. m. [Avestan], that is [Avestan], y. 53, 5. ([Avestan] = length. [Avestan] = ([Avestan])[Avestan]).

acc. s. m. [Avestan], y. 34, 7; (one M. S. [Avestan]) 46, 7.

inst. s. m. [Avestan]

dat. s. m. [Avestan]

gen. s. m. [Avestan], (as deciphered [Avestan], not *'anyêhẹ'*);

n. m. dual. [Avestan]

n. pl. m. (?) [Avestan] (?)

n. pl. m. [Avestan]

acc. pl. m. (?) [Avestan](=*[Avestan])

acc. pl. m. [Avestan], y. 44, 11; 45, 11 (pahl. *zakâî min*)

inst. pl. m. [Avestan]

dat. abl. pl. [Avestan]

gen. pl. [Avestan]

gen. pl. (?) [Avestan]

fem.

acc. s. f. [Avestan]

nom. pl. f. [Avestan]

nom. pl. f. [Avestan]

nom. pl. f. [Avestan]

acc. pl. f. [Avestan]

acc. pl. f. [Avestan]

gen. pl. f. [Avestan]

n. acc. s. nt. [Avestan]

n. s. nt. [Avestan] or* [Avestan] (J.).

n. acc. pl. nt. [[Avestan]-] [Avestan]

inst. pl. nt. [Avestan];

cp. *anyá*, old pers. *aniya.* [Is a formation from [Avestan] + [Avestan] probable ?; a connection of [Avestan] with *alius* seems difficult; cp. armen. *ayl*, etc.; see the usual occurrences cited; but cp.(?) *ollus* for *on-lus*, *-ûllus* (?) from an orig. **ono* which is also set for *ana*, [Avestan](?); the pahl. led with *zakâî*; Ner. *anya-*; pers. *dîgar*].

[Avestan], 'otherwise', aliter, y. 51, 10; pahl. *zakâî-khadûînak;*

2

pers. *dîgar âyin.* (notice the total difference of Ner.'s sk. from the pahl. here, he having read a pahl. *zak* instead of *zakâî*); see [Avestan]; cp. ind. *anyáthâ.*

[Avestan] ([Avestan]), among, between, inter (as separating; cp. inter-dico); see [Avestan] and [Avestan]; y. 33, 7; 49, 3 ([Avestan]); 51, 1 ([Avestan]) pahl. *andarg;* Ner. *madhye,* y. 33, 7; *antarâle* y. 49, 3; 51, 1; ([Avestan]) is first expl'd at y. 49, 3 by *min . . . javîdak; vibhinno bhavâmi* (a by no means obvious distinction of the highest importance followed by all critical writers); cp. ind. *antár,* old pers. *añtar,* ἔντερον; *intrô(d);* old irish *eter, etir* (W.), (lost nasalisation of *e*); etc.

[Avestan], read [Avestan], gain, attain, attingere, stem [Avestan] for [Avestan];

3d s. conj. [Avestan]

1st pl. opt. [Avestan]

1st pl. opt. [Avestan]

part. perf. med. [Avestan]

stem [Avestan]

3d pl. indic. med. [Avestan] (so Fick); causative [Avestan]

1st s. indic. act. [Avestan]

3d s. indic. act. [Avestan] y. 32, 11.

3d pl. indic. act. [Avestan]

3d s. pret. [Avestan]

2d s. imper. act. [Avestan]

2d s. imper. act. [Avestan]

2d s. imper. act. [Avestan]

2d s. imper. act. [Avestan]

1st s. conj. act. [Avestan]

1st s. conj. act. (?) *[Avestan]

3d sg. conj. act. [Avestan] part. causative prest.

g. s. m. [Avestan] (= [Avestan]° irreg. transfer to an *a* declens.); cp. ind. *âp, âpiré;* lat. *apio, apiscor, adipiscor.*

[Avestan], [Avestan], f. water, aqua;

n. s. [Avestan]

acc. s. [Avestan]

acc. s. [Avestan]

inst. s. [Avestan]

abl. s. [Avestan], transf. to [Avestan]

abl. s. [Avestan], trsf. to [Avestan] decl.

g. s. [Avestan]

g. s. [Avestan]

g. s. [Avestan]

loc. s. [Avestan]

loc. s. [Avestan] ([Avestan] is a post position)

loc. s. *(?) [Avestan], if to [Avestan], [Avestan], then (?) to an *a* decl., [Avestan]° = (?) [Avestan]° (?), or read [Avestan], or [Avestan] (?)

dual in (?) [Avestan]—

dual (?) —[Avestan]

n. pl. [Avestan]

n., voc. pl. [Avestan]

acc. pl. [Avestan], y. 51, 7.

acc. pl. [Avestan], y. 44, 4.

dat. abl. pl. *[Avestan] (mistranslit.)

gen. pl. [Avestan]

gen. pl. [Avestan];

pahl. *mayâ;* Ner. *âpo;* pers. *âv;* cp. ind. (*áp*), *apấ*, *apás* etc., *ὀπός*; lith. *ùpê* (?), etc.

[Avestan], y. 32, 11; see [Avestan] (or possibly [Avestan]([Avestan])? from [Avestan] = [Avestan], 3d s. caus. act. 'takes away', aufert; cp. *âpáyati*, [or preferring the root [Avestan] ([Avestan]) we must accept a loss of *ya* as in [Avestan] for [Avestan] (?) and cp. ind. *adhyâpayati* (?) and *pratyâyayati* (Wh.), rendering 'causes to go away', i. e. 'takes away', the pahl. seeming to favour this root [Avestan] by *vazlûnd;* as a free rendering however the Pahl. may still point to [Avestan] causative of [Avestan], [Avestan]].

[Avestan], alien, later, alienus;

acc. s. nt. [Avestan] y. 31, 20 adverbially.

abl. s. nt. [Avestan] (read [Avestan]°)

g. s. nt. [Avestan] (= [Avestan]°; [Avestan] is = [Avestan] + [Avestan] see introd.)

n. pl. m. [Avestan]

n. pl. m. [Avestan]

gen. s. fem. [Avestan]

acc. pl. f. [Avestan];

the pahl. led with *min akhar;* Ner. *paçcât;* pers. *az pas;* cp. ind. *ápara*, *aparám** formation [Avestan] + [Avestan] ([Avestan] inferior compar. suff.); cp. z. [Avestan] from [Avestan], ind. *ádhara*, *ávara* from *áva;* cp. z. [Avestan], ind. *úpara* from *úpa;* z. [Avestan], ind. *ántara* from *ánta*, etc.; cp. *ἀπωτέρω*; cp. goth. *afar*, *aftra*, ohg. *aftaro;* see for further etym. [Avestan].

[Avestan], alien man, homo alienus; acc. pl. m. [Avestan]—[Avestan]-, y. 45, 11 homines alienos; pahl. *akhar*(?) *anshûtâân;* Ner. *paçcât* (?) *manushyânâm;* pers. *pas* (?) *âdamyân;* cp. for formation [Avestan]—[Avestan]-, *aparânta* (= 'living beyond

the (western) border'); for etym. see [Avestan], [Avestan].

[Avestan], y. 51, 7; acc. pl. f. of [Avestan] (= water), which see.

[Avestan] (l. av. [Avestan]), away, from: cp. ind. *ápa; ἄπο**; lat. *ap* in *ap-erio*, *ab*, *abs;* goth. *af*; germ. *ab*; engl. off.

[Avestan], y. 33, 5; see [Avestan], [Avestan]; n. s. m. part. perf. med.; cp. ind. *âpânám*, *âpânā́sas;* RV. II, 34, 7, *tám no dâta maruto vâjínam rátha âpânám bráhma citáyad divé-dive;* pahl. *barâ m' ayâfînâî* as = [Avestan] + [Avestan] imper., but first corr., indicating the root; Ner. *avâpaya;* pers. (N.B.) diff. text; *bih am bâyad**; (read *shâyad* (?)); cp. RV. IX, 10, 5, *âpânā́so vivásvato jánanta usháso bhágam sū́râ áṇvam ví tanvate.*

[Avestan], last, ultimus; superl. formation from [Avestan];

n. a. s. nt. [Avestan]

n. s. nt. [Avestan], y. 53, 7 (perhaps adverb.)

a.s.nt.(adv.) [Avestan], y. 30, 4; y. 45, 3; 48, 4; 51, 14.

loc. s. m. [Avestan], y. 43, 5; 51, 6.

n. s. fem. [Avestan], y. 44, 19.

The pahl. led in recognising the adv. form, *vad val zak î afdûm;* Ner. *yâvat nirvâṇam;* pers. *ân ân i akhar*, y. 30, 4; so *vad avŏ zak î afdûm*, y. 45, 3; so Ner. in y. 48, 4 *nirvâṇe;* so in y. 51, 14, *vad avŏ zak î afdûm;* see my texts at the places; superl. from *ápa;* cp. ind. *apamá*, as *adhamá* from *ádha* (as = *adhás*), *avamá* from *áva*, *upamá* from *úpa*, *paramá* from *párâ.*

[Avestan] (l. av. [Avestan]), upon, about, after; y. 30, 11; 31, 17; 32, 3, 8, 15; 44, 18; 48, 5; cp. old pers. *apiy;* ind. *ápi; ἔπι, ἐπί.*

[Avestan], thereto, thereafter, postea, abhinc, y. 29, 4; + [Avestan] [Avestan] + [Avestan] which see; cp. sk. *ápica;* the pahl. trlr. first explained by *akhar* followed by all (except Haug who erred).

[Avestan], was known, or announced, y. 44, 18; 3d s. pass. aor. of (which see) [Avestan].

[Avestan], m. offspring (?), progenies?; acc. s. [Avestan], y. 48, 5, posterity, [or (whether a compos. or not) 'since birth' (?); see [Avestan]; so pahl. *akhar min zerkhûnishnŏ;* Ner. *paçcât yat jâtânâm;* pers. *pas az zadan*]; cp. for form only *apiprā́ṇa*, 'accompanying every breath'.

[Avestan] ([Avestan] + [Avestan] which see); y. 32, 9 'away from'; [Avestan] is the par

ticle of emphasis; cp. ind. *ápa* + *u* = *ápo;* cp. (to illustrate the infrequent use) RV. II, 28, 6, *ápo sú myaksha varuṇa bhiyásam mát sámrâṭ ṛtâvó 'nu mâ gṛbhâya;* RV. V, 48, 2, *ápo ápâcîr áparâ ápejate prá pū̂rvâbhis tirate devayúr jánaḥ;* RV. X, 88, 12, *ẫ yás tatā̂no 'shâso vibhā̂tîr ápo ū̂rṇoti támo archíshâ yán;* so the pahl. *barâ;* Ner. *adhikam̃;* pers. *bih.*

[Avestan], y. 44, 4, acc. pl. f. of [Avestan], 'water' which see.

[Avestan], without a superior, having no first, nullum-primum-habentem; acc. sing. nt. adverbial (or masc. with [Avestan]) [Avestan] [Avestan]° (?) =, y. 28, 3; [Avestan] or °[Avestan] (which see) + [Avestan] priv.; cp. ind. *ápûrvyam;* the pahl. has *fratûm*, prob. reading [Avestan]; Ner. *prathamasya; pers. avval.*

[Avestan], to, against, ad; y. 31, 13; 43, 3, 7; 46, 11, 12; 51, 9, 19; cp. ind. *abhí; ob; operio*; goth. *bi* (?).

[Avestan] (? see [Avestan] [Avestan]; [Avestan], [Avestan]), viewed, seen, nom. pl. nt. (?) [Avestan], y. 31, 2; 50, 5; pahl. y. 31, 2 *madam-nikêzishnîh;* Ner. *upari prapâdanam;* pers. *avar* nigarishnî;* y. 50, 5 (*afam*) *madam-nikêzîḍ;* cp. ind. *dṛshṭá*, pp. of *darç, dṛç.*

[Avestan], f. (? see [Avestan] [Avestan], etc.) loc. s. (?) [Avestan] [Avestan], y. 31, 2, 'in view', in-conspectu (so altern.); the pahl. trlr. seems at y. 31, 2 at first sight to offer a loc., but it is a compos.; the loc. was therefore first suggested by Roth; cp. ind. *dṛshṭí.*

[Avestan], most furthering, maxime sustinens; superl. of [Avestan] [Avestan]-; acc. s. nt. [Avestan]; y. 51, 1, maxime sustinens; prosperans; pahl. *madam barishnîh;* but Ner. *upari varshâmi* (note the difference and judge of the error committed in holding Ner.'s trl. to be a reproduction of the pahl. pure and simple; some false reading such as *bâr°* made him think of *bârîdan* 'to rain' [(in, however, the figurative (?) sense; cp. RV. VIII, 50 (Müller (Auf.) 61) 7, (Indra) *úd vâvṛshasva maghavan gávishṭaya úd indrā̂' çvamishṭaye*; Sâyaṇa *he maghavan gavishṭaye gâ icchate mahyam̃ ud vavṛshasva, utsim̃casva gâm* (*), *iti çeshaḥ'* (?)); but Ludwig 'gies dich ausz, O M.'; so Roth; cp. RV. IV, 20, 7, *ud vâvṛshâṇás tavishî́'va ugrâ 'smâbhyam̃ daddhi puruhûta râyáḥ.* Sây.: *udvavṛshâṇo 'bhîshṭân kâmân varshakas tvam râyaḥ paçvâdidhanâny asma-*

bhyam stotṛbhyo daddhi, dehi; RV. V, 53, 14, *vṛshṭī́ çáṁ yór ā́pa usrí bhshajáṁ syā́ma marutaḥ sahá*)]; pers. *avare-barishn* (not misled by Ner.); cp. ind. *bhára*, booty-bring'g; see [Avestan].

[Avestan], steadfast characteristic, n. pl. nt. [Avestan], y. 33, 13, res-, vel indoles-, sine-dubio; the pahl. affording only the general sense, *pavan patûkîh* (= 'with', or 'as to', capability); Ner. *çaktyâ;* pers. *pah tuvânâî*;* perhaps [Avestan] = [Avestan] = 'two' + [Avestan] = 'full'; i. e. dubious, undecided, and this with the *a* priv. would be 'decided', 'not dubious', i. e. 'implanted characteristic'; cp. *ádvayas;* and for form cp. *prâ*, as in *janaṇi-prā́s*, *rathâ-prā́; πλη-, impleo;* goth. *full-s*, etc.

[Avestan] (so correcting °[Avestan]*(?)), y. 53, 5, see [Avestan], and [Avestan](?); as from [Avestan] + [Avestan] 2d pl. improp. conj.; cp. form of impf. *ā́sta* + *abhí* = 'gain ye', 'nitemini'; or refer the word to [Avestan]; cp. *abhiyatta*, 2d pl. of *yat*(?) athem.; cp. *yákshi* to *yaj* beside *yájati*, or as past p., cp. *yatta* = z. [Avestan]°; reading [Avestan]*, 'and with these', we have hisque, fem.; 'and with these religious natures (or 'precepts')'; the pahl. seems to have read [Avestan]...[Avestan]; see *pavan kôlâ* II (*dô*); Ner. *ubayor*, *-s*, (*-ḥ*); pers. *pah har dû;*

[stating other possibilities, consider a reading [Avestan] as 2d pl. imper. (from the root of -[Avestan], [Avestan], cp. ind. *yash*, but athem.; from *yah* = 'be ye zealous'; or poss. a voc. of a past-part. 'O ye honoured ones' (? to [Avestan]).]

[Avestan]-, not seeking wealth in herds, not thrifty, and so minime prosperus; minime-diligens; n. pl. m. [Avestan], y. 49, 4; from [Avestan] (which see) + [Avestan] priv.; cp. for form ind. *gavyát*, *pitûy*, *stabhûy*, *vasûy;* pahl. *afshuvînishnô*;* notice the total difference of Ner. with *avinâçanaṁ;* see comm.; the pahl. is made certain as above deciphered by the pers. *nah-afzûnî-kunandah*, as also indeed by the Gâtha-text.

[Avestan], for sacrificial use, metrical, acc. pl. nt. [Avestan], y. 46, 17; Justi comp. *ápsas;* RV. IX, 88, 7 *ā́po ná makshū́ sumatír bhavâ naḥ sahásrâpsâḥ pṛtanâshā́ṇ ná yajñáḥ;* Sâyaṇa has: *apsa iti rûpanâma bahurûpastvaṁ pṛtanâshâṭ pṛtanânâṁ abhi bhavite 'ndra* iva yajño yashṭavyo. bhavasî 'ti* (so the 2d edit.; Ludw. however does not follow Sây. with Roth and Grassm.)

If we also fear to follow this admirable suggestion as to the zend word after the hint of the pahl. trlr. which is *padmân* (Ner. *pramânam*, pers. *andâzah*), then cp. ind. *ápas* as = 'holy action at the altar'; see RV. I, 110, 1, *tatám me ápas tád u tâyate púnah svâdishthâ dhîtír ucáthâya çasyate;* cp. [illegible]; [illegible]; y. 56, 3, 3 (Sp.); read pahl. [illegible] not as printed [illegible]; this latter seems an erroneous transliteration of some early writer into Zend characters of the pahl. word *gâs* or *gâth*, for a variation exists which gives [illegible], i. e. *gâthŏ*, the ordinary non-organic) *ŏ* being misread in Sp.'s edition by the *copiest* as *r*); and if it be *gâsŏ* (or *gâthŏ*), it gives the correct idea of metric sanctity; cp. *opus* (?); old germ. *uoba;* germ. *üben* (?), see above.

[illegible], f. deathlessness, indefinitely prolonged life, eternal life, vita sine-morte in longinquitatem producta, immortalitas;

n. s. [[illegible]=] [illegible]

n. s. [illegible] = [illegible] y. 33, 8 (correction)

n. s. [illegible] = [illegible], y. 34, 11.

acc. s. [illegible], y. 34, 1.

acc. s. [illegible] = [illegible]

inst. s. (?) [illegible] = [illegible] y. 44, 18 (and poss. (?) 47, 1 (see nom. (?) and also acc. (?) du.).

g. s. -[illegible] = [illegible] y. 31, 6; 32, 5. [illegible]

g. s. *[illegible] (so corr.)

g. s. [illegible] (so)

loc. s. [illegible] = [illegible], y. 45, 7; 48, 1.

n. dual. [illegible] [[illegible]] [illegible] y. 45, 5 (so only possibly; see acc.); 47, 1 (? so only poss.; see acc. du., and inst. sg.).

acc. du. [illegible] [[illegible]] [illegible], y. 44, 17; 45, 5, but see nom. (?); 45, 10; 47, 1 (? see nom. du (?) and instr. s. ?); 51, 7.

nom. acc. du. [illegible][[illegible]][illegible]

dat. du. [illegible][[illegible]|[illegible]] (=·[illegible]°)

g. du. [illegible] = [illegible]

g. du. [so altern. (?)] [illegible] = [illegible], y. 33, 8 (so possibly (?), but see nom. s.).

acc. pl. [illegible] = [illegible], y. 31, 21; [illegible] + [illegible] which see + [illegible]

priv.; cp. ind. *amṛtatvá;* rt. *mar*, 'die'; cp. ἀμβρόσια*(?); pahl. *amerô-dâḍ;* Ner. *amirdâde;* pers. *amerdâd.*

[Avestan], not-dying, immortalis;

acc. s. m. [Avestan]

g. s. m. nt. [Avestan]° = [Avestan]

n. pl. m. **[Avestan] introduction to y. 28.

n. pl. m. [Avestan]

acc. pl. m. [Avestan]° = [Avestan]

acc. pl. m. [Avestan]° = [Avestan]

[Avestan]° = [Avestan]

[Avestan]° = [Avestan]

[Avestan]° = [Avestan]

dat. abl. pl. m. [Avestan]

dat. abl. pl. m. [Avestan]

gen. pl. [Avestan]

voc. pl. m. [Avestan]

voc. pl. m. [Avestan]

n. acc. sg. nt. [Avestan]; from [Avestan] plus [Avestan] priv. [([Avestan] = [Avestan] often in an accented syll. bef. *a*, and [Avestan] = *rt* as in [Avestan], cp. *mártya;* cp. [Avestan] = *pṛ́tana*, yet see [Avestan]*(?), cp. *mártya-kṛta* (?), [Avestan] = *ṛtá*, [Avestan] = *pṛthú*, also [Avestan], cp. *kṛ́tvan*, *[Avestan], cp. *kṛ́ti*, *[Avestan]*, cp. *ā́kṛti*)]; cp. ἀμβρόσιος(?), etc.; the pahl. naturally led the way in recognising the connections of the word.

—[Avestan] (?-[Avestan]), going(?), coming, iens (?), veniens; pt. pres., of the stem [Avestan] of [Avestan] ([Avestan], which see), acc. s. m. [Avestan], y. 46, 5, venientem (?); pahl. *yâtûnêḍô;* Ner. *samâgamanaḥ;* pers. *amâd* and *âyad;* cp. *áyati* of ind *i*, *aya* (+ *â* (?)).

[Avestan] (= *ayem* or *ayam*, otherwise erroneously deciphered *aęm* which was never an Iranian word); this, hic; see, [Avestan], [Avestan]; [Avestan], y. 30, 3; [Avestan], y. 30, 5, 6; 31, 2, 10; 33, 9; 44, 15; gen. du. of these two, horum duorum; see [Avestan], [Avestan].

[Avestan] ([Avestan], (?)) y. 29, 8, n. s. m., this one, hic; see [Avestan], [Avestan].

[Avestan], y. 44, 12, n. s. m., hic; see [Avestan], [Avestan].

[Avestan], y. 34, 6; 46, 1; 50, 9; 1st s. imper. of [Avestan] (which see); I will go; ibo; the pahl. trlr. first recognised the root and 1st pers. sg. by *sâtûnam;* Ner. *pracarâmi;* pers. *ravam* (y. 46, 1); cp. ind. *áyâni.*

itâ; pers. *nah-khvâstar*, and *nâkhvâstar;* cp. for form ind. *anehás.*

[Avestan], y. 28, 9; 32, 15; 53, 8, instr. pl. m. n. of [Avestan] (which see) through these, illis; (trad. curiouslyerrs).

—[Avestan], hostile, or nt. hostility, displicentia; n. du. masc. (returning for form to Justi), or instr. s. nt.(?)

[Avestan], y. 44, 15; cp. ind. *ókas* + *a* priv.; rt. *uc*; cp. *ὀπυίω*(?); *uxor;* goth. *bi-ûhts**, [the Pahl. trlr. is here in error or confused; see explanations in the comm.].

[Avestan], other, alius (atque);

n. s. m. [Avestan], y. 29, 1; 50, 1; 53, 5 (pahl. *zakâî min.*)

acc. s. m. [Avestan], i. e. [Avestan]

acc. s. m. [Avestan], that is [Avestan], y. 53, 5. ([Avestan] = length. [Avestan] = ([Avestan])[Avestan]).

acc. s. m. [Avestan], y. 34, 7; (one M. S. [Avestan]) 46, 7.

inst. s. m. [Avestan]

dat. s. m. [Avestan]

gen. s. m. [Avestan], (as deciphered [Avestan], not *'anyêhẹ'*);

n. m. dual. [Avestan]

n. pl. m. (?) [Avestan] (?)

n. pl. m. [Avestan]

acc. pl. m. (?) [Avestan](=*[Avestan])

acc. pl. m. [Avestan], y. 44, 11; 45, 11 (pahl. *zakâî min*)

inst. pl. m. [Avestan]

dat. abl. pl. [Avestan]

gen. pl. [Avestan]

gen. pl. (?) [Avestan]

fem.

acc. s. f. [Avestan]

nom. pl. f. [Avestan]

nom. pl. f. [Avestan]

nom. pl. f. [Avestan]

acc. pl. f. [Avestan]

acc. pl. f. [Avestan]

gen. pl. f. [Avestan]

n. acc. s. nt. [Avestan]

n.s.nt. [Avestan] or* [Avestan] (J.).

n. acc. pl. nt. [[Avestan]-] [Avestan]

inst. pl. nt. [Avestan];

cp. *anyá*, old pers. *aniya*. [Is a formation from [Avestan] + [Avestan] probable ?; a connection of [Avestan] with *alius* seems difficult; cp. armen. *ayl*, etc.; see the usual occurrences cited; but cp.(?) *ollus* for *on-lus*, *-ûllus* (?) from an orig. **ono* which is also set for *ana*, [Avestan](?); the pahl. led with *zakâî*; Ner. *anya-*; pers. *dîgar*].

[Avestan], 'otherwise', aliter, y. 51, 10; pahl. *zakâî-khadûînak;*

